IGF 2025 Securing Access to the Internet and Protecting Core Internet Resources in Contexts of Conflict and Crises

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This main session is examining the importance of securing Internet access and protecting core Internet resources in contexts of conflict and crisis situations and is organised by the IGF Best Practice Forum on Securing Access to the Internet and Protecting Core Internet Resources in Contexts of Conflict and Crises, one of the IGF intersessional activities of the 2025 cycle. The session at the IGF serves as a cornerstone for the BPF's activities that span beyond the annual meeting in June.

The session is driven by the draft problem statement that there is a clear and pressing need to clarify applicable norms, and the roles and responsibilities of different parts of the multistakeholder Internet community - and the institutions within it - in securing core Internet resources and ensuring civilian access to the Internet during conflicts and crises. 

Session objectives

  • discuss and gather stakeholder input to complete and refine the problem statement
  • examine applicable norms and normative frameworks, as well as any gaps or missing links
  • identify next steps and inform the direction of future actions under the BPF 

Call for written input : Stakeholders and invited to provide written feedback on the draft problem statement. Details are in the Call for written input. 

Session outline

  1. Opening and setting the scene
    1. Welcome and introduction
    2. Presentation of the BPF, the BPF 2025 topic and Objectives of the session
    3. Message of the UN Office on Disarmament Affairs
    4. Presentation of the BPF's draft problem statement and initial community feedback
  2. Case studies
    1. Brief case studies will cover examples of destruction of infrastructure and disruption of access in conflict context, caused by natural disaster, and disruption in the management of core resources.
  3. Discussion round 1:   Normative Frameworks 
    1. Reflecting on the different cases, what existing norms apply to the context of securing access and protecting core Internet infrastructure? Are they sufficient? Is there a need for adapting norms? Are there gaps to be filled?
    2. Does the existing work on the norm to protect the public core apply to this context? If so, how?
    3. Do Human Rights norms and International Humanitarian Law provide another angle to look at this context?
  4. Discussion round 2: Accountability Frameworks and the Role of Stakeholders
    1. What accountability frameworks would support compliance with the relevant norms? Which institutions have a role in this contexts? What is the role of different stakeholders?
  5. Next Steps and future actions under the BPF
  6. Wrap up


Moderation, topic leads, panel

  • Dennis Broeders, University of Leiden
  • Madeline Carr, University College London
  • Chantal Joris, Article19
  • Jalal Abukhater, 7amleh
  • Marwa Fatafta, Access Now
  • Pablo Hinojosa
  • Valeria Betancourt, MAG Member, BPF co-facilitator, remote moderator
  • Anriette Esterhuysen, BPF co-facilitator, session moderator
  • Wim Degezelle, BPF consultant, IGF Secretariat 

 

BPF webpage :  https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/bpf-cybersecurity

 

Session Report (* deadline 6 July) - click on the ? symbol for instructions

IGF2025 BPF - session summary report

The Best Practice Forum (BPF) is an IGF intersessional activity that provides a platform for community-driven discussion on Internet policy issues and the sharing of experiences. Its aim is to contribute to an understanding of global good practices and to inform policy discussions, standards development, business decisions, and public awareness. The 2025 BPF Securing Access to the Internet and Protecting Core Internet Resources in Contexts of Conflict and Crises builds on the thematic main session at IGF 2024 on Protecting Internet Infrastructure and General Access during times of crisis and conflict.

A video message was delivered on behalf of the UN Under-Secretary General and High Representative for the Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA). It stressed that safeguarding the digital components that ensure the availability and integrity of the Internet across borders is essential for a shared digital future and recalled that international humanitarian law forbids deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure, and that states have committed to norms prohibiting ICT activities that damage or impair critical public infrastructure.

The BPF’s work is guided by a draft problem statement noting that ‘there is a clear and pressing need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the multistakeholder community - and the institutions within it - in securing core Internet resources and ensuring civilian access to the Internet during conflict and crises.’ The statement is open for written community feedback..

The discussion examined how armed conflict is increasingly weaponising the Internet, with Gaza, Sudan and Syria as examples. The loss of internet access during conflict arises from complex dynamics that make it extremely difficult for civil society to secure alternative connectivity. Armed conflict has become the leading driver of internet shutdowns globally, as warring parties deliberately target civilian infrastructure. 

In Gaza, deliberate blackouts, destruction of fibre and landline infrastructure, and bans on repair missions have left over two million people digitally cut off with serious consequences for medical aid coordination, access to emergency services, and left civilians unable to communicate or receive warnings. In Sudan, cell towers, fibre cables, data centres, and ISP facilities, as well as the crews that maintain them, have been attacked, destroyed, or occupied resulting in country-wide blackouts. Access is further weaponised by restricting spare parts, critical repair equipment, and even fuel. In Syria, years of conflict combined with international sanctions have left half of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure in ruins. Internet access is unreliable and fragmented, with some areas dependent on providers tied to warring parties. Sanctions further compound the crisis by preventing companies from importing the equipment necessary to repair and maintain what remains of the infrastructure.

Viewed from a different angle, Internet resilience is about institutions as much as physical cables. Regional Internet registries and governance bodies are vital to the stability of the global Internet, yet dysfunction, weak governance, or legal pressures can put them at risk. Non-interference alone cannot always protect these institutions and sometimes proactive support may be necessary to ensure stability.

Human rights law prohibits blanket shutdowns, while humanitarian law prohibits attacks on civilian objects but often treats telecoms as dual-use infrastructure, making proportionality assessments flexible. There is a need to integrate human rights concerns more systematically into humanitarian law. 

Since 2015, the notion of the Internet’s “public core” (the core Internet protocols and  infrastructure that must remain protected) has gained traction internationally. However, because it is formulated as a negative norm (‘thou shall not norm’), political commitment and implementation is hard. The protection of the public core requires action at three levels: the technical and physical level (infrastructure), the logical level (Internet protocols) and the organisational level (organisations ensuring the global coordination and management of core resources).

It was also noted that the multistakeholder community’s ability to cope with conflict and crises also depends on the people and organisations that sustain the public core of the Internet. Just as cybersecurity is no longer seen purely as a technical issue, the protection of the public core must be understood as a human and political process. The multistakeholder model needs to be more proactive in safeguarding the public core. If the model cannot function as intended in such circumstances, then it is necessary to openly acknowledge its limits and discuss what must change.

In closing reflections, it was noted that discussions on civilian Internet access and the protection of the public core are complex in the current environment, not strongly supportive of rule-based systems or international cooperation. The world and the multistakeholder community have changed, and it is essential to having difficult conversations and confront uncomfortable issues, rather than avoiding them as has too often been the case in the Internet community. The Internet is a critical lifeline and life-saving tool during conflict and crisis. There should be a multistakeholder mechanism that can raise the alarm with states, the private sector, and civil society, and foster concrete responses and actions. It is important to address the missing links between human rights and humanitarian law frameworks so that protections are coherent and enforceable.

More on the activities of the BPF Securing Access to the Internet and Protecting Core Internet Resources in Contexts of Conflict and Crises, including a detailed meeting summary, can be found on the BPF webpage .