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Second draft report BPF on Regulation and Mitigation of Unsolicited Communications (2015)

Best Practice Forum on the Regulation and Mitigation of Unsolicited Communications (2015)

Second draft report

This is the second draft report of the Best Practice Forum (BPF or “this Forum”) on the regulation and mitigation of unsolicited communications (2015). This second draft report forms the basis of discussion at the Forum’s session in João Pessoa. Everyone is invited to consider this second draft and either provide comment through the formal process by Tuesday 10 November 2015 or at the session in João Pessoa, either in person or remotely. In particular, this draft presents eleven draft recommendations that will be tested for consensus in João Pessoa. Those who wish to contribute to the process outside of the João Pessoa session are invited to comment on this document online through the IGF mailing list.

In addition, this BPF acknowledges that there are many stakeholders who have not been able to share valuable input on the current status of their work in the regulation and mitigation of unsolicited communication. They are invited to contribute to this BPF so that their views can be input into the forum’s final report.

In particular, views and information regarding the following are of interest:
• The implementation of preventative measures;
• The role of automated software updates in spam, malware and botnet prevention;
• The current status of implementation of existing best practices and standards, particularly in newly online jurisdictions;
• The management of resource abuse by industry (for example, protection of infrastructure and bandwidth);
• The role of hosting providers, and industry, in spam management.
A final report will be published after the IGF.


In 2014 this BPF carried out extensive work that identified 16 challenges and 11 recommendations for future work, that were presented in the Internet Governance Forum’s secretariat’s report, published on its website in 2014. In 2015, the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) decided that the Best Practice Forum on ‘Regulation and mitigation of unsolicited communications’ was to continue its work based on the identified challenges and recommendations.

This has led to two main, overarching streams from which recommendations have emerged.
1) Statistical and numerical data scaling the problem, and current examples of multi-stakeholder cooperation that attempt to resolve the problem and;
2) The future of unsolicited communications. The next billion coming on line: Challenges for the developing world.

For the purposes of this report, the terms unsolicited communications and spam are analogous. In this context unsolicited communications is a broad term that encompasses all (written) unsolicited communications (that are carried on the internet), including, and not limited to, messages that spread malware or have other nefarious purposes.

It is not the intention of this BPF to provide a new set of best practices that must be followed. Rather this BPF aims, mainly through the collection of case studies, to provide examples of where best practices have been successful so that others are encouraged to consider what may work in their own environments.

The BPF would like to take this opportunity to thank the many individuals who dedicated their time and knowledge by providing case studies to be included in this report. It should be noted that the case studies are contributions made by individuals and are not to be considered as representations of the opinions of the BPF group or its experts.

Defining the Problem: Spam is a Global Issue

What do the statistics say?
Despite spam being a global issue, accurate quantification is a significant hurdle. No single data-set can measure the scope and scale of the problem, and the cost impact on economies for both industry and government. Statistical data about spam has several shortcomings. This is especially so as the volume and type of spam received by a given network will differ significantly. For example, a commercial freemail provider such as Hotmail receives vastly more spam per user, and of an entirely different type than a corporate, an educational or government email system.

Further while volume is undeniably a good metric, a spear-phish spam campaign (defined below), for example, of tiny volume may have a more significant impact on an organization than a voluminous spam campaign with a replica brand goods payload. This therefore makes it difficult for the uninitiated to recognize and treat appropriately all the risks that are present.

The BPF has been able to obtain some reasonably current high level statistics about internet abuse, that were presented at the Microsoft Digital Crimes Consortium conference in February 2015 by the EUROPOL Deputy Director of Operations. That is, there are:

• 116 billion emails sent each day;
• More than 90% of those emails are spam, totalling 103, 500, 000, 000 spam emails per day;
• 7 billion devices online;
• Estimated to be 24 billion devices connected by 2012 (12 billion mobile devices);
• 123 million unique malicious objects identified online;
• 307 new unique cyber threats coming online every minute;
• Estimated $445 billion USD cost of spam per annum, accounting for 1% of the global BBP.

While the majority of unsolicited commercial messaging is sent by way of botnets, the majority of spam that arrives in user in-boxes - at least in internet mature economies - is not botnet generated. This is because stakeholders in those economies have taken steps to block the spam before it gets to users. Up until 2012 or thereabouts, most botnet activity took place on individual and home-users’ computers.

However, in part, due to multilateral anti-botnet efforts in the United States (ABCs for ISPs), Germany (Botfrei), Japan and elsewhere, this vector has been remediated to a certain degree. However, significant botnet activity has subsequently emerged from commercial hosting companies, providing miscreants with better reliability and connectivity, usually through compromised user accounts and CMS (content management systems) compromises.

However as of the publication date of this document, levels of spam are down significantly over the last two quarters and certain botnets appear not to be operating or are sending spam at much lower levels. Experts are unable to determine the reason for this and this may well be a temporary respite.

"It is true, the vast majority of the bots have disappeared and hence the incredibly high volume/low return per instance spam has declined. Some of these are undoubtedly due to the bot masters (owners) getting identified and in some cases investigated and prosecuted.

Some of this is due to the low-end users (who rent the botnets aka script kiddies) moving to more lucrative, less risky stuff like executive spoofing, Pump & Dump (stock-price kiting), extortion and outright data theft both in bulk and individually.

We also do know that massive volume bots (for example, Kelihos and Cutwail) are still lurking around and make themselves known frequently enough at far lower volumes than we know their capabilities are. Kelihos still has close to a million bots (infected nodes) in total. Lethic is still present too.

As such, the CBL/Spamhaus infectivity graphs are more important than ever, but the importance has shifted a bit more towards criminality other than just spam. I'd caution against anyone to think, "it's over" just because it's died down. We've seen dips like this before. The capabilities/resources still exist, we need only an incentive for a few actors to raise volumes higher than we've ever seen before."
- Chris Lewis, Chief Scientist, Spamhaus Technology

Statistics relating to phishing, or spear-phishing, where senders attempt to fool email recipients into handing over their credentials because they believe the email came from a genuine source (for example, a bank) shed insight on the nature of the problem. A report of a U.S. based research institution claims that phishing attacks cost an average U.S. company up to $ 3.7 million per year. The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) publishes a quarterly report on phishing. It describes phishing as: “A criminal mechanism employing both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’ personal identity data and financial account credentials”.

The most recent report at the time of writing is from the fourth quarter of 2014. It provides the following data:
• During the 4th quarter of 2014, a record number of malware variants were detected – an average of 255,000 new threats each day;
• The number of unique phishing reports submitted to APWG during Q4 was 197,252. This was an increase of 18 percent from the 163,333 received in Q3 of 2014;
• The total number of phish observed in Q4 was 46,824;
• A total of 437 brands were targeted by phishers in Q4;
• The United States continued to be the top country hosting phishing sites;
• The United States remained the top country hosting phishing-based Trojans and downloaders during the three month period.

Graph 1. Most targeted industry sectors, 4th quarter 2014, source: APWG (All graphs are in the PDF version online on the IGF website. Text is left in for your reference. WdN.)

Spam Levels

Composite BlockList (CBL)
The CBL maintains massive spamtrap networks and provides blocking services (both free and commercial) for botnet-sent spam. The CBL was founded in 2003. The next two graphs represent total email flow into one of the CBL’s larger spamtraps, and give a reasonably representative indication of overall spam flow.

The Y axis is emails per second. "5.0k" means 5,000 emails/second. Thus, for each 1,000 emails/second, the daily total is 86MM emails in 24 hours. The X axis is the date/time in GMT.

No attempt is made to distinguish spam from non-spam email hitting the trap. The total flow numbers will include "backscatter". The CBL does not list IP addresses for this reason, but other DNSBLs do.

One of the most important things to note is the highly cyclic volume of spam being sent. In particular, it is noteworthy, as is already mentioned, that spam is down significantly at the time of the writing of this report. Experts are extremely reluctant to attribute any reasoning to this - to do so would be conjecture - nor to indicate that this is anything but a temporary anomaly.

Graph 2. Flow to a single spamtrap, one year, source CBL

Graph 3. Flow to a single spamtrap, decade, source CBL

The Spamhaus Project
The Spamhaus Project is an international nonprofit organization whose mission is to track the internet's spam operations and sources, to provide dependable realtime anti-spam protection for internet networks, to work with Law Enforcement Agencies to identify and pursue spam and malware gangs worldwide, and to lobby governments for effective anti-spam legislation.
Founded in 1998, Spamhaus is based in Geneva, Switzerland and London, UK and is run by a dedicated staff of 38 investigators, forensics specialists and network engineers located in 10 countries.

Graph 4. Countries with the largest amount of botnet-sent spam, source Spamhaus

Graph 5. Botnet infections, source Spamhaus

As can be clearly noted, those countries that undertook an anti-bot initiative in the early part of the decade no longer appear in the top 10 infected countries.

The following chart indicates the level of listings (botnet, hosting, DNS services provided, etcetera) per country at Spamhaus as of the date indicated.

Graph 6. Spam issues by country, September, 13 2015, source Spamhaus

Botnet Infections, when viewed per-capita provide an entirely different picture; developing nations are significantly more at risk when this is taken into account.
# Country % Rate per capita
1 Dominica 8.36%
2 Côte d'Ivoire 2.18%
3 Algeria 1.70%
5 Macedonia 1.54%
6 Armenia 1.52%
9 Timor-Leste 1.18%
10 Belarus 1.17%
11 Mauritius 0.98%
12 Pakistan 0.91%
16 Libya 0.85%
18 Taiwan 0.80%
19 Tunisia 0.80%
20 Kazakhstan 0.77%

Stat 1. Botnet infections per capita, source Spamhaus

When we look at the percentage of infections in relation to network size, again, we see that internet developing nations are more infected are at a higher risk of elevated botnet activity (see Appendix 6 for complete chart).

Graph 8. % of network infected per country, source Spamhaus

SpamCop is a web-based service for reporting and blocking spam, founded in 1998. SpamCop processes millions of spam complaints a day and is supported by hundreds of thousands of users, a knowledgeable volunteer community, and a professional staff. SpamCop is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cisco Systems, Inc.
Spamcop’s statistics are consistent with those presented above, noting a significant reduction in spam at time of writing.

Graph 9. Average spam message per second, source Spamcop

Trend Micro Inc. is a global security software company founded in Los Angeles, California with global headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, and regional headquarters in Asia, Europe and the Americas.
In the following map, darker colours indicate more activity. Again, a dip in spam levels is notable.

Graph 10. Spam activity per country, source Trend Micro

A list of other spam reference sources is at Annex 8.
Other ‘statistical’ information

This BPF has also considered whether statistics relating to cybercrime could help scope the spam problem. EuroJust, the European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit, describes cybercrime as follows: “The term cybercrime is conventionally used to describe a criminal activity in which a computer or a network plays an essential role; however, cybercrime is also used to include other traditional crimes in which computers or networks make the illicit activity possible”. It encompasses a range of activities, that are summed up in a EuroJust newsletter, as follows:

• A tool of the criminal activity (e.g. spamming, copyright crime);
• A target of the crime (e.g. unauthorized access, malicious code);
• The place of the criminal activity (e.g. telecommunications fraud);
• Facilitates cybercrime (e.g. Nigerian fraud, hacking, phishing, child pornography, identity theft).

It is worth considering how cybercrime is reflected in the reporting of crime to governmental and law enforcement authorities, and their respective abilities to aggregate and publicly report on such figures. Team Cymru notes that for the United Kingdom, no statistics on cybercrime could be found. It was able, however, to provide figures on botnet controllers, infrastructure geo-located in the following countries that has the potential to cause harm globally.

U.K. 137
U.S. 422
Russian Federation 130

Stat 2. Number of botnet C&C per country, source Team Cymru

Team Cymru notes that the victims of the resultant botnet infections do not report being infected or hacked. It argues that reporting is important because: “It helps us benchmark where we are today, drives investment and allocation of resources to meet demand. As with all organisations, governments will only make an investment where there is a clear demand and risks that cannot be mitigated by other means. Also with cyber crime as there has been no clear measurement to hold up against other types of crimes that Police Forces are measured against, it therefore falls down the priority list. …“What gets measured gets done!””.

This is reiterated by Mark Goodman in his book Future Crimes. “This silence is at the very heart [of] our cyber-security problems”. The result being that: “these incidents cannot be aggregated and studied, common defences are not developed, and perpetrators roam free to attack another day”. Goodman advocates that admitting a cyber problem is the first step towards getting better.

Dr. Christian Nordlohne of the University of Gelsenkirchen studied malware prevalence. He devised a new way to measure the value of a botnet against different measure points. To measure the prevalence of botnets is to identify the relevant factors and scale and to determine the ranking. There are two major steps:

• the bigger the botnet is the more it is prevalent;
• to assign numbers to the different malware families and botnets specifically in order to create a ranking.

All Botnets are hosted somewhere. Dr. Michel van Eeten at the Delft University of Technology “benchmark(s) the performance of hosting providers in terms of security reputation metrics (…) These metrics measure the degree to which servers of the provider are abused by criminals, as well as the speed with which providers remediate the situation”.

The Microsoft Security Intelligence Report (SIR) focuses on software vulnerabilities, software vulnerability exploits, malware, and unwanted software. In the latest report three main conclusions are drawn on trends in malware. One shows that criminals have found new weaknesses in the online world such as the targeting of vulnerabilities in Android apps. The report presents statistics on computers reporting in to Microsoft’s systems on malware encounters and malware infections: “On average, about 19.2 percent of reporting computers worldwide encountered malware over the past four quarters. At the same time, the MSRT (Malicious Software Removal Tool) removed malware from about 9.1 out of every 1,000 computers, or 0.91 percent”. This figure seems fairly consistent for the whole of 2014.

At the core of this paper is a consideration of the ‘Next Billion coming online.’ To this end, a report published in 2014 in Kenya provided some insight into the scope of the malware problem in that jurisdiction, as follows.

Year PBX attack Malware Botnet Proxy Trojan
2012 450,000 1,000,000 900,000 50,000 200,000
2013 780,000 1,750,000 1,800,000 290,000 580,000
% increase 73% 75% 100% 480% 290%

Stat 3. The scope of malware in Kenya, source Kenya cyber-security Report

The following graph, taken from the Kenyan report, shows that threat numbers can grow more rapidly than internet connections.

Graph 11: Threat activity vs. internet usage in 2013

This BPF has brought together statistics from different sources that are respected in different communities and reflect the current situation about spam volumes. It is noted that there has been a recent downward trend in spam volumes, but it is not yet known what the reasons for this are and whether the trend will continue. At this point the Forum has consensus that more research is needed in order to measure the scope, to scale the problem and its cost on economies – both industry and government.

The next billion coming on line: What do the next billion want and what lessons can be learnt?

The BPF has the view that the problems that are likely to be encountered by the next billion are most likely very similar to those that have come before. Spam, infections, malware and cybercrime will invariably be prevalent, perhaps more so in developing nations, as measures that have been developed over time to address such issues may not be implemented prior to the broader deployment of broadband connectivity.

However, the BPF also acknowledges that the next billion may require some alternate solutions directly applicable to their circumstance. For example, it is likely that connectivity by end-users will be predominantly through mobile devices and will be IPv6-based, thus making the implementation of traditional approaches more difficult (many anti-spam blocklists are only now coming out with IPv6 blocking capabilities, for example). While connectivity will inevitably bring a wealth of information and accessibility, it will also bring risks. This BPF has therefore considered the likely challenges for the next billion to come online, drawing on the experience and expertise of those who are already online and, in some cases, have learned some difficult lessons, while balancing this with the opinions of those coming online.

Survey of IGF Africa

As the IGF acknowledged in 2015, there are many challenges for the first (of several) billion who will be coming online in the coming 5 to 10 years. This BPF wanted to learn about the current situation from first-hand experience and so solicited input from developing nations, working closely with IGF Africa.

In order to receive first-hand accounts of the situation in developing nations, a survey was created and sent out to the members of IGF Africa. A total of 15 responses were received. While with such a small number of respondents it is not possible to claim that the results of the survey are representative, the qualitative data indicates that respondents consider that there are issues relating to unsolicited communications that ought to be addressed. In summary all participants felt a need for change, saw a need for training and sensed an urgent need for action.

Responses to the survey were received from representatives residing in the following countries: Senegal; Burundi; Kenya; Liberia; Niger; Benin; Togo; Cameroon and Nigeria. The backgrounds of respondents varied; including from governments, NGOs, IGOs and academia.

None of the countries represented have anti-spam legislation in place although one indicated that a law was in the process of being made. Five respondents indicated, however, that there is a cybercrime law in their home jurisdiction, while a further four indicated that such a law is planned. The results do not show if the existing or planned cybercrime laws cover unsolicited communications.

Fourteen respondents indicated that ISPs in their respective jurisdictions have not implemented best practices to prevent unsolicited communications. Respondents highlighted that spam, malware and phishing were all prevalent (see following graph).

Graph 12: Spam categories as reported by respondents

Awareness campaigns relating to cybersecurity were available in the jurisdictions of 7 respondents. 7 Respondents also indicated that cybersafety was a topic of the curricula at schools and/or universities. Seven respondents mentioned that there was either a national (5) or regional (2) multi-stakeholder initiative that deals with unsolicited communications or cybersecurity.

The second half of the survey considered plans for the future. Respondents were able to provide free text responses to questions. Responses indicated that training was considered a necessity for policymakers, industry, civil society, lawyers and end users (see following graph).

Graph 14: If training were to be made available, who needs this training?

When asked about topics for training, a range of responses were received including the following:
• The need for awareness programs so that citizens can distinguish between spam and genuine messages;
• Internships and exchange programs;
• Balancing privacy protections with the right to open access; and
• Technical skills.

Two examples were provided by respondents of mitigation strategies relating to unsolicited communications that had been tried, including: (i) carrier restriction on outgoing SMS to three per day in Nigeria; and (ii) measures in the Senegalese mobile market by the regulator. In addition, two respondents flagged a desire for the closure of port 25 by internet service providers (as is the case in other jurisdictions).

While the number of respondents to the survey is small, the results clearly indicate a desire for leadership to resolve the problem of unsolicited communications. Training has been flagged as a particular need and, as will be seen, is a key recommendation of this BPF. Other recommendations which will be presented at the end of this document are equally relevant to African and other developing nations who are newly online.

It should be noted that this BPF has received feedback from the IGF Africa meeting where the participants “found the results reflecting the real situation in Africa”. This statement seems to endorse the survey conducted by this group and may indicate that there is merit in distributing similar surveys to other developing regions in the future. Further, this BPF has been advised that the IGF Africa made recommendations in relation to cyber-security issues, including spam (see below). This again highlights the importance being placed on these issues in African economies.

Addressing cyber-security issues, including spam

Panellists put emphasis on the need for an African Safety mechanism for African e-consumers with an emphasis on Pan-African collaboration and cooperation in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of Cyber Crimes including issues related to effectively countering and combating spam. The following specific recommendations were made:

1. Encourage government, the private sector and non-governmental organizations to work together to raise public awareness on the risks of spam and of cybercrime and of what can be done to combat it;

2. Enhance capacity building in cyber-security, including spam for law enforcement personnel, prosecutors, magistrates and judges;

3. Encourage African government to ratify the African Union Convention on cyber-security and Personal Data Protection and to transpose their cyber-security laws in the framework of the Convention in such a way as to facilitate international cooperation in preventing and combating these illicit activities;

4. Encourage all African government to update their criminal laws as soon as possible, in order to address the particular nature of cybercrime. In determining the strength of new legislation, States should be encouraged to be inspired by the provisions of the African Union Convention on cyber-security and Personal Data Protection;

5. Build regional and international cooperation in cyber-security to enhance public protection and to promote more effective information sharing to address cyber crimes issues (effective regulation adoption, anti-spam technology development, and training/awareness raising of users and providers);

6. Disseminate anti-spam best practices for service providers to enable them take the most appropriate measures to combat spam.

This BPF currently has consensus on the need for training and capacity building in the African region and concludes that this BPF’s African survey outcomes reflects the current situation in Africa.

Some international lessons

While this stream will make recommendations on how developing economies can prepare themselves for the future, threats delivered using unsolicited communications are constantly evolving. This is not only as a consequence of technology advances (particularly in relation to the number, availability and type of internet-enabled devices, the “Internet of Things”) but because online threats, particularly those delivered by way of unsolicited communications, have become increasingly sophisticated.

The Australian Communications and Media Authority noted at the launch of a new portal for its Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) in 2014:

‘I urge you to think back to how you used the internet in 2005. How many computers did you have at home compared to now? Certainly, you were unlikely to be using a smartphone or a tablet or a refrigerator, television and other household appliances were unlikely to have internet connectivity. All of this has changed in recent years and it has meant for internet users, and for schemes such as the AISI, that finding the actual device that is infected on a particular internet service can be complex. And it is likely, with the emergence of smart homes that many, many more home appliances will be internet-connectable and that this complexity will be a continuing theme into the future’. The ACMA went on: ‘With threats constantly evolving it’s a bit like gazing into a crystal ball when contemplating the future, suffice to say that we will not be resting on our laurels. Having said this, there are already some fundamentals we can build on. Educating consumers and businesses to take action to minimize their risk is critical; and ensuring that programs which involve public-private partnerships, such as the AISI, and its latest innovation the AISI portal, identify problems when they do arise, will help keep the internet clean. Indeed, we at the ACMA will continue to fight malware on two fronts”.

As mentioned earlier in this report, central to the spam problem is the issue of malware that permits the spread of unsolicited communication via botnets. The Delft University of Technology has in recent publications focussed on the effectiveness of botnet mitigation centers. While there are limitations to the scope of this work, it was acknowledged that (participation in a) botnet mitigation centre seems to nudge ISPs in a certain direction, but does not dictate their actions. What has been noted, is what seems to be a shift of infections from members of AbuseHUB to non-members. If this trend is substantiated in follow up research, the conclusions of this evaluation may change over time.

In Finland the combination of the Telecommunications Act making disinfection mandatory, a regulator with the power to regulate and ISPs that adhere to the law, results in the lowest botnet infection figures for years on end.

Researcher of the University of Tilburg, Karine e Silva, assisted the BPF by providing a case study (at Annex 9) detailing current anti-spam and botnet research, highlighting the value of public-private cooperative efforts and international cooperation.

This BPF also received input on territoriality from prof. Dan Jerker Svantesson of the Bond University in Australia in which he states that “The issue of jurisdiction over online activities has been controversial since the earliest days of large scale Internet usage” and that “the time has come to abandon territoriality as the core principle of jurisdiction”. His full contribution is found in Annex 4 to this draft report.

On the basis of the provided input, this and last year, from academic researchers as well as in the above mentioned recommendations made to African states, it is the consensus view of this BPF that cross border cooperation must evolve.

Existing examples of best practice documentation

It is not the role of this BPF to reinvent the wheel. Indeed, there have been many best practice documents on the handling of spam and abuse; they vary in both quality and continued relevancy due to depreciation as they age and the threat landscape continues to evolve. The following is a discussion of the recently-published revision of an omnibus best practices document: Operation Safety-Net: Best Practices to Address Online, Mobile, and Telephony Threats.

The Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG) founded in 2003, is an international non-profit, industry-led organization founded to fight online abuse such as botnets, phishing, fraud, spam, viruses and denial-of service attacks that can cause great harm to both individuals and national economies. M3AAWG draws upon technical experts, researchers and policy specialists from a broad base of Internet service providers and network operators representing over one billion mailboxes, and from key technology providers, academia and volume sender organizations.

M3AAWG has published dozens of best practices documents dealing with all aspects of Internet messaging abuse.

In October of 2011, members from the anti-spam civil law enforcement association the London Action Plan (LAP) and M3AAWG made a presentation to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Committee on Consumer Policy (CCP) regarding the current prospect for the OECD’s anti-spam recommendations to address future online threats.

In June 2012, members of LAP and M3AAWG and experts from the community-at-large began the process of developing the report which was published in October of that year. Operation Safety-Net, the Global Best Practices report provides readers with a plain-language description of the threats facing businesses, network providers and consumers in the online and mobile threat environment, divided into four key sections: Malware and Botnets; IPs and DNS; Phishing and Social Engineering; and Mobile Threats. Furthermore, the report includes a rich set of reference materials for those charged with resource allocation and implementation of the policies, protocols, and technical measures modern anti-abuse activities demand.

The initial report served as the basis for numerous global training initiatives and was evangelized to all levels of government and industry. Three years later, 100 leading experts from academia, industry, law enforcement, government, and end-user advocacy NGOs began work to update the materials, to reflect the changing online landscape, and to ensure the document remained accurate and relevant. The second version of the report, published in June 2015, included updates to the four original sections, and covers new areas including Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and Voice Telephony fraud, Caller ID Spoofing, abuse issues for Hosting and Cloud Services, and online harassment.

Ultimately, the document arrives at several key conclusions:
This report provides best practice recommendations for consumers, industry and governments to address online and mobile threats.

These include recommendations for consumers to be more proactive in securing their own devices; for service providers to implement recommended security technologies and practices without delay; for governments to ensure modern regulatory and legislative environments are in place and enforced, and to work with international organizations to champion collaborative efforts.

These recommendations are a set of tools to manage online, mobile and voice threats. However, the threats described in this report are just a snapshot of the threat environment today. As online activities change, the use of mobile computing grows, and Internet users and businesses change their responses and defences to existing threats, these threats will shift and adapt to exploit new vulnerabilities and pursue new targets. Putting these recommendations into practice will take a concerted multilateral approach. To that end, the authors of this report strongly encourage the OECD and other international organizations to join with M3AAWG and the LAP and engage with the organizations that govern and administer Internet infrastructures. In addition, in order to stay in front of the changing threat environment, all organizations concerned should begin to more proactively collaborate in monitoring threats and implementing new measures as needed to address them.

Further, M3AAWG supports the notion of training for the developing world that is broader than simply education on the perils of spam. Its contribution in Annex 10 expands upon this.

This BPF concludes that many economies do not have a proficient technical knowledge to address complex abuse problems. Moreover, there is often a lack of awareness of existing community partnerships and a need for ongoing work to address these issues.

Many of the economies with new or expanding internet infrastructure participating in the ITU discussion have requested assistance in implementing practices and technologies that protect their developing networks from spam and other threats. This view, again, is substantiated by the IGF Africa survey and the recommendations made to African governments. This BPF is close to consensus on the need for training at the network level and will come back to potential ways forward below.

Legislative solutions

It was mentioned earlier in this report that none of the respondents to our IGF Africa survey came from countries that have anti-spam laws. Many western countries have found legislation to be an effective way to tackle the problem of spam.

A case study from Peter Merrigan of the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs at Annex 11, details the experience in New Zealand.

Multi-layered strategies for fighting spam

Many jurisdictions have realised that it is simply not possible to fight spam with a single approach. Rather, they have decided to tackle the problem using a number of different complementary approaches that create a multi-stakeholder framework to deal with the problem. The case study at Annex 12 from Cristine Hoepers of explains the Brazilian experience.

Multi-stakeholder initiatives involving industry

A number of jurisdictions have adopted malware mitigation strategies that are, in essence, multi-stakeholder initiatives. The case study at Annex 13 from Machiel Bolhuis, Chairman of the Abuse Information Exchange, explains the Abuse Information Exchange in the Netherlands.

Other examples of security initiatives that impact unsolicited communication

As mentioned in the introduction of this report, the BPF has benefited from contributions made by a number of individuals in the form of case studies. There are, however, a number of initiatives that have not already been mentioned that have shown to be effective in minimising spam. It is worth noting, however, that this BPF acknowledges that many of these initiatives (as well as some mentioned earlier) are not entirely dedicated to the prevention of unsolicited communication. Rather, they are cyber-security initiatives that have a broader goal. These are detailed at Annex 14.

This BPF concludes that there are several successful public - private and public - public partnerships in operation, cooperating in the mitigation of (some form of) unsolicited communication. At this point the BPF has consensus that this form of cooperation is an important way forward, deserving further study, with the aim of implementation in other jurisdictions.

Public-Private Partnerships

As part of this BPF, a list of public-private partnerships has been started. This is not an exhaustive list, so others are encouraged to contribute other examples during the comment period. These are at Annex 15.

Lessons learned from this exercise and draft recommendations
The following are some key observations that have emerged in the BPF and are a start towards formulating its recommendations in the final report.


In collating this report for the BPF, it became abundantly clear that it has been difficult for the group to stay on topic – that is dealing with best practices for dealing with unsolicited communications. Spam has, for many years, been a symptom of poor cyber-security practices. As the internet has evolved, internet speeds have got faster and cybercriminals have got smarter, spam has become only one of a range of problems that might arise for those who are coming newly online. As this report shows, often solutions that help the spam problem are designed to deal with other security issues. While this BPF does not consider that spam is a problem to be ignored, the BPF has demonstrated that our thinking has broadened and that in future, it would be better for BPFs to focus on broader cyber-security issues.

Draft Recommendation 1: That it would be better for BPFs to focus on broader cyber-security issues rather than specific symptoms such as spam.


As stated toward the beginning of this report, this BPF held high hopes of finding a single dataset that described the scale of the spam problem. The BPF was unable to find such a dataset. This report, however, has provided numerous facts and figures about spam, malware and botnets that we consider provides some guidance on the scale of the problem. However, the BPF considers that further work could be done to pin down a set of reliable metrics that relate not only to spam but broader cyber-security issues and sees a role for academia here.

Draft Recommendation 2: That further work could be done to pin down a set of reliable metrics that relate not only to spam but broader cyber-security issues.

Botnet mitigation

Through this process this BPF has learned that the first statistical research into the effects of botnet mitigation centres are positive. At this point in time the researchers are cautious in their wording. Future research will provide more substantive and corroborative data. What is clear is that successful disinfection rates stand or fall depend on the way the participating ISPs act on the provided data of infections in their respective networks.

This BPF at present notes that a consensus may be within reach on the positive effect that multilateral anti-botnet efforts (also botnet mitigation centers) have on the number of infections on end users’ devices.

Draft Recommendation 3: That newly connected economies consider multilateral anti-botnet efforts (botnet mitigation centers) as they have a role in reducing the number of infections on end users’ devices.

Reporting of cybercrime

As detailed earlier in this report, it seems likely that citizens vastly under report cybercrime and that, when they do, it may not be classified as such. As researchers have indicated this has meant that the scale of the problem cannot be reliably scoped. This BPF considers that processes should be amended to properly categorise crime that is undertaken using the internet. Further, this BPF considers that citizens should feel free to and comfortable about reporting cybercrime.

Draft Recommendation 4: That effort be taken by law enforcement to categorise crimes undertaken using the internet.

Draft Recommendation 5: That governments and law enforcement take proactive steps to encourage the reporting of cybercrime by all users: citizens and industry.

African IGF Survey

The results of the African IGF survey have been a major output of this BPF. As detailed in the relevant section of this report, although only 15 responses were received, the reach of the survey was broad and some key themes came through, such as the recognition of the need for training. It is clear to this BPF that there is significant interest in Africa on this topic and a need to be heard. Indeed, the BPF was approached asking if the survey could be extended as the IGF Africa identified others who are interested in participating, and, as is covered in the relevant section of this report the IGF Africa recognises the need to take action in relation to cyber-security matters and specifically mentions spam. It is therefore a key recommendation of this group, as was suggested earlier in this report, that further attention ought to be given to surveying the needs of African (and other developing) nations, not only in dealing with the problem of spam, but the broader issues of cyber-security and cyber safety.

Draft Recommendation 6: That further attention ought to be given to surveying the needs of African (and other developing) nations, not only in dealing with the problem of spam, but the broader issues of cyber-security and cyber-safety.


This BPF recognised the need for basic cyber-security training, including spam mitigation, in the African region and presumes that this may be the same in other regions around the globe. The implementation of basic spam security measures and best practices heightens the security of end users and organisations in the region immediately and prevents high numbers of unsolicited communications from reaching other regions as well.

Training tools, such as the M3AAWG/LAP Best Practice document, already exist and training has and is being deployed to those who are newly online as the M3AAWG training case study outlines. The BPF has discussed and acknowledges that there are difficulties in tailoring training for audiences for a range of reasons including:

• cultural issues – for example, an inclination not to ask questions at the time of training in some countries as it may be viewed as being discourteous to the trainer;
• language issues – most training materials have not been translated into local languages and experts rarely have the requisite language skills to present in native tongues;
• lack of technical skills; and
• financial issues.

However, this BPF considers there is value in moving this forward, even if it is incrementally. To facilitate a first step, this BPF, together with the IGF secretariat, is organizing a meeting prior to the formal commencement of the 2015 IGF. Invitees will include relevant organisations from the public, private, NGO and IGO stakeholder communities, including the GFCE, to come together to discuss a possible way forward.

The meeting is scheduled to take place at the IGF on Monday 9 November from 15.30 onwards in Room 6. Feel free to join and invite others to participate.

Draft Recommendation 7: That there is a need for basic cyber-security training, including in relation to spam mitigation, in the African region and perhaps other regions of the globe.

Consumer Education

It was noted during the comments period that miscreants will always find a way to send unsolicited communications and that people would be better protected if they were educated. In particular, it was suggested that effort should be put towards helping end users understand the characteristics of scam and phishing emails. Further it was suggested that affected industries, such as the banking industry, develop widely understood practices such as agreeing to only contact their customers through online portals such as online banking and not contacting via email. This BPF supports these notions. In particular, the BPF considers that education of citizens is something that must start with children as experience has shown that in technical matters, it is the children that tend to educate their parents rather than the other way around. Further, the BPF considers that affected industries must adapt to not only protect their own reputations but to ensure that their own customers do not become victims.

Draft Recommendation 8: That there is a need for education of citizens, including children, on matters relating to cyber-security in economies coming newly online.

Draft Recommendation 9: That industries affected by spam, phishing, etcetera must continue to evolve in order to protect their own reputations and to ensure that their own customers do not become victims.

Quick wins

As part of this BPF group members were asked to create lists of low or no cost solutions that could assist in dealing with the spam problem. While it was hoped that more complete lists could be compiled, the following are the quick wins that were identified for regulators:

• Education of industry through blogs and social media outlining obligations;
• Snappy consumer slogans; for example - Ignore it! Report it! Delete it!;
• Looking for speaking opportunities at e-commerce forums (speakers often attend the conference free of charge);
• Joining industry coalitions such as of the London Action Plan where ideas and investigation information can be shared
• Regular engagement with Industry, including ISPs, MNOs, Marketing authorities, relevant to work / patterns / trends;
• Attendance at internet-related and cyber-security related conferences is very beneficial
• Issue press/media releases on important and significant milestones/prosecutions;
• There are numerous websites that provide relevant educational materials and resources.

A technical list of low and no-cost initiatives has also been started:

• Set up a reporting center using open source tools for example, using databases built by other jurisdictions and offered freely or building a phishing reporting centre using a webform that emails reports to a ticket system;
• Deploy Authentication at important senders: banks, government. This helps to prevent some types of phish. (SPF/DKIM/DMARC);
• Process DMARC records (free tools are available);
• Use publicly available feeds and parse them for bot-infections in country (clean these up with ISP if doable);
• Make sure operators understand how to identify responsible parties/abuse contacts for internet resources (training).

These lists are by no means complete. So the BPF recommends that further consideration be given to producing lists of low or no cost initiatives that can help newly connected jurisdictions to take quick, cheap and achievable steps to assist in protecting their infrastructure from unsolicited communication.

Draft Recommendation 10: That further consideration ought to be given to producing simple lists of low or no cost initiatives that can assist newly-connected economies to protect their infrastructure.

The role of multi-stakeholder initiatives

This BPF spent considerable time considering multi-stakeholder initiatives that deal with the problem of unsolicited communications. A number of case-studies have been included in this report and some other examples have been referred. It has been clear through this BPF that while it is always beneficial for government to have a role in the management of unsolicited communication, it does not need to tackle the problem on its own. Indeed, some of the examples cited in this report do not involve government. Having said this, governments can and should play a key role in ensuring a safe online culture within their own jurisdictions; including through the promotion of education, legal avenues, supporting technical solutions and (where necessary or helpful) facilitating or supporting public - private and private - private initiatives.

Draft Recommendation 11: That consideration ought to be given by newly connected economies to a wide variety of multi-stakeholder arrangements, including public-private and private-private initiatives in combating unsolicited communications.


In conclusion this BPF has taken significant steps to outline the scale and scope of the unsolicited communication problem, taking into account the limitations of such an exercise. The BPF has engaged directly with those who are newly online in Africa and has formed a view that although cyber-security is constantly evolving that the assistance that is sought by those directly affected, generally matches with the expectations of those who can assist.
The BPF has outlined in some detail the experience of others, through case studies, and hopes that these experiences also provide a guide for those who are newly coming online. It remains, however, for those with funds and in positions of power, including governments, to consider their roles in protecting the connectivity of their respective jurisdictions and educating citizens on safe online practices. This BPF looks forward to the further involvement of the community, through the comment process and at the IGF in Brazil and refers to the following as particular areas that could be further expanded upon.

Annex 1 Recommendations for future work in the 2014 report

a. Common understanding of the problem. The more aligned stakeholders are with regard to the issues, their severity and the priority of their resolution, the more focused the dialogue is, and the more coherent various efforts aimed at mitigating unsolicited communications will be.
b. Common understanding of solutions. The challenge here is that there is a whole array of possible solutions (technical, policy, economic, financial, social) and each of them solves only part, or one set of the problems at a particular point in time. It is important to understand that there is no “silver bullet”, but rather, evolving building blocks that can be used in constructing many solutions.
c. Understanding of the differences between common and individual costs versus common and individual benefits when taking appropriate measures. The technology, policy, economic and social building blocks vary in the costs and the benefits they bring individually, for example to a company, institution, user etc., and to the common good of the global Internet and users in general. There are signs these are misbalanced. Understanding these factors and how they are (not) aligned with the needs of governments, Internet users, the business objectives of network operators and other stakeholders and how to share the costs and benefits between them fairly and equitably is crucial for sustained improvements in addressing unsolicited communications.
d. Ability to assess risks. The ability to properly assess risks, including risks to the whole Internet ecosystem, can assist in determining the tools and approaches needed. This requires agreement on metrics and factual data and trends associated with them. This data is also important for the measurement of the effect of such tools once they are deployed and to monitor the changing dynamics of the environment.
e. Identifying good practices. An overview of good or common practices within communities involved in combatting spam seems absent or at least is unfamiliar between communities. Identifying and/or making an inventory of these practices and share them with other stakeholders who have a need for this is useful in developing multi-stakeholder approaches. These future overviews or lists could also be of added value to those starting work to address spam in developing countries.
f. The difference between the developing and developed world. It is important to understand that there is a difference in the challenges they face. The developing world still has to find its way in mitigating spam at its most basic level. The developed world faces the challenge of dealing with professional, mostly malicious spammers that are active from or (ab)using resources in multiple jurisdictions. How can existing, successful anti-spam measures be used as models to follow or implement?
g. Clarification on consumer education, regulation, enforcement and rules. There is a need to define and make an inventory of resentment against governmental involvement concerning the fight against spam, as well as the reasons behind the call for more regulation and the effect of both stances.
h. Understanding of new spamming techniques. New techniques could be presented and explained to governments and agencies on a regular basis, so that they can focus on solutions and educational processes.
i. Understanding of the business case of spammers. Most measures discussed here focus on reactive prevention in one way or another. Could a better understanding of the business case lead to forms of offensive actions against (the tools and finances of) spammers and make a difference? If so, which stakeholders need to be(come) involved in this sort of actions?
j. There is a need for a better understanding of data protection and privacy regulation
in the face of fighting spam and botnets. A major challenge is the exchange of privacy sensitive
data in general and especially between public and private entities, in the fight against (one of the main
causes of) spam. It is of utmost importance to be able to share relevant privacy-sensitive data, like IP
addresses, between involved actors. However, there are still important questions and safeguards that
need answering, respectively solving, before involved parties on the public and private side can
cooperate in the fight against spam and botnets.

k. The balance between fighting spam, freedom of speech, privacy, innovation and
doing business. There are thin lines between these elements. Can the different stakeholders find
ways in which all can act according to their respective roles, while at the same time strengthen each
other’s resolve.

Annex 2 Questions in the African IGF survey

The following questions were presented to the IGF Africa members.
Are unsolicited communications a problem in your country/institution?
Does your country have an anti-spam law in place?
Does your country have a computer crime law in place?
Do Internet Service Providers implement best practices to prevent unsolicited communications from reaching end users?
Are ISPs nationally owned or subsidiaries of larger, international corporations?
Are there any public awareness campaigns in your country concerning cyber-security?
What would you prefer to change first in your country where cyber-security is concerned?
What does your country need foremost concerning cyber-security?
If training were to be made available, who need this training?
What should in your opinion be part of this training program?
Are there multi-stakeholder cooperation initiatives in your country or regionally that deal with the mitigation of cyber-security and/or unsolicited communications?
Are there cyber education tracks in schools or universities in your country or specific digital training courses available?
Do you have one or more cases that could be presented as an example to the world where mitigation of unsolicited communication succeeded, failed or never started while it was intended to do so? Please provide details in the form of a limited sized case study.
Are there reports or statistics concerning unsolicited communications available from your country, e.g. from academia, industry, government, etc.?

Annex 3. Presentation to ISOC CERT & Network Operators’ Panel @ AfricaCERT by Neil Schwartzman, Executive Director on behalf of the M3AAF Foundation

Annex 4. Contribution of prof. D. Svantesson

Fighting unsolicited communications and territoriality
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson (2015) has provided the following excerpt as a case study for the BPF that considers the issue of territoriality.

Internet jurisdiction – overcoming the problems by abandoning territoriality
The issue of jurisdiction over online activities has been controversial since the earliest days of large scale Internet usage. Here I will put forward a proposal that hopefully can represent a step towards a solution.
The territoriality principle – the idea that a State has the exclusive right to regulate all that occurs in its territory for the simple reason that it occurs in its territory – dominates our contemporary thinking about jurisdiction. However, it is poorly equipped for today’s modern society characterised by constant, fluid and substantial cross-border interaction, not least via the Internet.
Despite its long history, the time has come to abandon territoriality as the core principle of jurisdiction. Applied to the Internet, it quite simply does not work. After all, it is not always possible to point to where events occur online. Only by legal fictions, stretching reality beyond recognition, can we say that a person was defamed online at a specific place, that copyright was violated at a particular location online, that the cybercrime activity takes place at a particular place and so on.
Elsewhere, I have advocated that we should replace our focus on territoriality with three principles – principles that can represent the jurisprudential core of jurisdiction both online and off-line:
In the absence of an obligation under international law to exercise jurisdiction, a State may only exercise jurisdiction where:
(1) there is a substantial connection between the matter and the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction;
(2) the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction has a legitimate interest in the matter; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable given the balance between the State’s legitimate interests and other interests.
Despite its highly theoretical aim, the proposed paradigm shift provides benefits also on the practical level. Done carefully and diligently, this development would see no practical change in non-controversial areas of jurisdiction. The absolute majority of cases, both offline and online, will involve a similarly natural connection between territoriality, on the one hand, and substantial connection and a legitimate interest, on the other hand.
At the same time, the proposed paradigm shift would see us being much better equipped to address what are now controversial areas. It will allow us to think more creatively rather than just mechanically binary. It would, for example, free us from the thinking that State A always must have a possible jurisdictional claim over all aspects of data that happened to be located on a server located in State A; we would be looking for connections and interests rather than engaging in sterile searches for ‘where’ events occur online.
So how can we achieve this paradigm shift from territoriality to the three core principles advocated here? The reality is that international law develops, at least in part, in mysterious ways, and the first step required is that we all stop taking for granted that territoriality necessarily must be the central pillar in our thinking about jurisdiction. Everyone, from academics to businesses, from judges to bloggers, can play a role in this.

Professor Dan Jerker B. Svantesson Co-Director, Centre for Commercial Law, Faculty of Law, Bond University (Australia). Professor Svantesson is the recipient of an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (project number FT120100583). The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Australian Research Council.

Appendix 5. Full data-set related to botnet infections, chart pp. 12; courtesy of the Composite Blocklist (CBL) / Spamhaus Technology as of September 19, 2015.

Country Population Internet Population Percent Infection Count Bot Traffic Count Network Size % Infected
Laos 6,894,098 14.26% 4,147 29,004 65,536 6.33%
Yemen 24,968,508 22.55% 4,222 1 80,912 5.22%
Vietnam 90,730,000 48.31% 1,176,140 23,834,435 29,189,352 4.03%
Iraq 34,278,364 11.30% 33,938 18,041 845,568 4.01%
Cote d'Ivoire 20,804,774 14.60% 15,015 8,831 403,456 3.72%
Myanmar 53,718,958 2.10% 3,036 45,962 87,808 3.46%
Nigeria 178,516,904 42.68% 30,082 67,170 894,720 3.36%
Kyrgyzstan 5,834,200 28.30% 11,524 854,401 357,120 3.23%
Mauritania 3,984,457 10.70% 801 654 25,088 3.19%
Armenia 2,983,990 46.30% 24,213 663,569 819,200 2.96%
Libya 6,253,452 17.76% 14,899 152,670 514,816 2.89%
Togo 6,993,244 5.70% 139 6,205 5,120 2.71%
Macedonia 2,108,434 68.06% 29,059 208,022 1,118,464 2.60%
Serbia 7,129,428 53.50% 34,251 163,869 1,333,376 2.57%
India 1,267,401,849 18% 1,141,565 6,396,766 45,472,484 2.51%
Azerbaijan 9,537,823 61% 19,063 519,210 786,176 2.42%
Comoros 752,438 6.98% 97 0 4,096 2.37%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,824,746 60.80% 16,286 6,578 728,576 2.24%
Cape Verde 503,637 40.26% 386 205 17,408 2.22%
Congo 69,360,118 3% 566 512 26,112 2.17%
Belarus 9,470,000 59.02% 68,277 1,757,521 3,465,472 1.97%
Sri Lanka 20,639,000 25.80% 27,654 10,644 1,425,152 1.94%
Niger 18,534,802 1.95% 420 30 24,064 1.75%
Nepal 28,120,740 15.44% 14,328 4,703 841,984 1.70%
Guinea 12,043,898 1.72% 277 143 16,640 1.66%
Sao Tome and Principe 197,882 24.41% 4 0 256 1.56%
Pakistan 185,132,926 13.80% 259,456 302,704 17,243,438 1.50%
North Korea 25,026,588 % 14 0 1,024 1.37%
Iran 78,470,222 39.35% 292,379 5,479,021 21,684,296 1.35%
Turks and Caicos Islands 33,736 % 148 1,455 11,008 1.34%
Romania 19,910,995 54.08% 118,118 1,532,274 9,063,676 1.30%
Indonesia 252,812,245 17.14% 369,024 1,205,680 28,580,960 1.29%
Cambodia 15,408,270 9% 9,988 166,384 786,253 1.27%
Cameroon 22,818,632 11% 5,047 7,052 409,088 1.23%
Croatia 4,236,400 68.57% 31,283 30,462 2,551,680 1.23%
Palau 21,097 26.97% 47 0 3,840 1.22%
Albania 2,894,475 60.10% 3,178 341,157 263,936 1.20%
Ethiopia 96,506,031 2.90% 3,229 16,239 269,312 1.20%
Algeria 39,928,947 18.09% 115,273 372,050 9,664,256 1.19%
Mali 15,768,227 7% 1,055 1,363 92,672 1.14%
Virgin Islands 104,170 50.07% 368 5,536 32,448 1.13%
Thailand 67,222,972 34.89% 217,031 332,376 19,185,953 1.13%
Afghanistan 31,280,518 6.39% 1,314 2,474 116,480 1.13%
South Sudan 11,738,718 15.90% 116 0 10,496 1.11%
Venezuela 30,851,343 57% 80,310 97,320 7,363,328 1.09%
Somalia 10,805,651 1.63% 154 3,529 14,336 1.07%
Philippines 100,096,496 39.69% 99,171 711,768 9,296,192 1.07%
Morocco 33,492,909 56.80% 105,074 261,022 10,035,712 1.05%
Kazakhstan 17,289,111 54.89% 83,967 3,264,073 8,040,192 1.04%
Bhutan 765,552 34.37% 326 2,005 31,232 1.04%
Uzbekistan 30,742,500 43.55% 6,173 30,382 609,280 1.01%
Mongolia 2,881,415 27% 5,025 165,692 497,920 1.01%
Aruba 103,431 83.78% 548 19,115 56,064 0.98%
Argentina 41,803,125 64.70% 241,591 1,599,308 24,837,520 0.97%
Senegal 14,548,171 17.70% 6,613 12,077 681,728 0.97%
Peru 30,769,077 40.20% 78,280 2,048,778 8,091,136 0.97%
Oman 3,926,492 70.22% 9,346 464 988,416 0.95%
Timor-Leste 1,212,107 1.14% 208 122 22,016 0.94%
Suriname 543,925 40.08% 729 1,174 77,312 0.94%
Lebanon 4,510,301 74.70% 10,442 61,980 1,127,424 0.93%
Palestine 4,294,682 53.67% 10,461 25,109 1,170,944 0.89%
Swaziland 1,267,704 27.10% 374 95 43,520 0.86%
Ghana 26,442,178 18.90% 7,886 10,847 918,784 0.86%
Ukraine 45,362,900 43.40% 146,812 6,409,502 17,483,558 0.84%
Russian Federation 143,819,569 70.52% 577,197 11,205,492 68,918,169 0.84%
Montenegro 621,800 61% 340 841 40,960 0.83%
Syrian Arab Republic 23,300,738 28.09% 7,793 1 966,912 0.81%
Turkmenistan 5,307,171 12.20% 214 2,833 26,880 0.80%
Jordan 6,607,000 44% 9,515 12,664 1,236,992 0.77%
French Polynesia 279,835 60.68% 431 3 56,064 0.77%
Haiti 10,461,409 11.40% 2,352 6,083 306,688 0.77%
Chad 13,211,146 2.50% 47 36 6,144 0.76%
Equatorial Guinea 778,061 18.86% 171 107 22,784 0.75%
Bangladesh 158,512,570 9.60% 16,341 96,266 2,219,532 0.74%
Cocos (Keeling) Islands % 652 8,024 90,624 0.72%
Benin 10,599,510 5.30% 408 14,155 56,832 0.72%
Bolivia 10,847,664 39.02% 12,264 226,914 1,735,424 0.71%
Madagascar 23,571,962 3.70% 1,219 742 173,824 0.70%
Zimbabwe 14,599,325 19.89% 882 1,599 126,208 0.70%
Dominican Republic 10,528,954 49.58% 19,862 20,573 2,847,232 0.70%
Uruguay 3,418,694 61.46% 33,870 70,689 4,876,544 0.69%
Poland 37,995,529 66.60% 159,808 860,339 23,243,688 0.69%
Congo 4,558,594 7.11% 364 887 53,104 0.69%
Gambia 1,908,954 15.56% 417 156 61,952 0.67%
Liberia 4,396,873 5.41% 339 10,277 50,688 0.67%
Saudi Arabia 29,369,428 63.70% 92,897 369,862 13,945,856 0.67%
Tajikistan 8,408,947 17.49% 120 1,100 18,432 0.65%
Egypt 83,386,739 31.70% 168,877 58,879 26,252,288 0.64%
Jamaica 2,721,252 40.50% 1,807 12,209 284,928 0.63%
Central African Republic 4,709,203 4.03% 31 25 5,120 0.61%
Guatemala 15,859,714 23.40% 18,290 31,235 3,023,104 0.61%
Greece 10,957,740 63.21% 44,298 271,130 7,350,473 0.60%
British Indian Ocean Territory % 18 9 3,072 0.59%
Hungary 9,861,673 76.13% 34,243 134,425 6,049,626 0.57%
Malaysia 30,187,896 67.50% 84,693 216,588 15,031,648 0.56%
Bahrain 1,344,111 91.00% 5,610 19,752 1,001,749 0.56%
Burkina Faso 17,419,615 9.40% 788 155 141,824 0.56%
Chile 17,772,871 72.35% 72,458 288,057 13,267,968 0.55%
Malawi 16,829,144 5.83% 695 75 130,304 0.53%
Vanuatu 258,301 18.80% 71 27 13,312 0.53%
Fiji 887,027 41.80% 376 58 73,216 0.51%
Mexico 123,799,215 44.39% 191,715 1,209,029 37,646,752 0.51%
Bahamas 382,571 76.92% 722 18,691 143,360 0.50%
El Salvador 6,383,752 29.70% 1,322 15,195 267,776 0.49%
Angola 22,137,261 21.26% 6,169 5,781 1,251,328 0.49%
Guinea-Bissau 1,745,798 3.32% 5 0 1,024 0.49%
Mayotte % 5 18 1,024 0.49%
Dominica 72,341 62.86% 4,667 46,574 963,584 0.48%
Moldova 3,556,400 46.60% 9,612 134,609 1,984,595 0.48%
Djibouti 886,313 10.71% 352 48 74,496 0.47%
Sudan 38,764,090 24.64% 10,801 42,894 2,327,048 0.46%
Honduras 8,260,749 19.08% 2,357 9,357 509,184 0.46%
Italy 61,336,387 61.96% 252,054 1,678,910 54,580,059 0.46%
Samoa 191,831 21.20% 229 181 50,432 0.45%
Brunei Darussalam 423,205 68.77% 831 4,885 189,440 0.44%
Mozambique 26,472,977 5.94% 2,362 20,298 558,080 0.42%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 109,371 56.48% 31 226 7,680 0.40%
Gabon 1,711,294 9.81% 1,836 1,802 471,552 0.39%
Spain 46,404,602 76.19% 144,279 932,057 37,095,808 0.39%
Uganda 38,844,624 17.71% 1,273 808 336,128 0.38%
Colombia 48,929,706 52.57% 75,797 1,270,182 20,754,408 0.37%
Brazil 202,033,670 57.60% 477,840 2,669,049 134,704,752 0.35%
Namibia 2,347,988 14.84% 1,954 1,332 556,544 0.35%
American Samoa 55,320 % 114 1,046 32,512 0.35%
United Arab Emirates 9,445,624 90.40% 28,207 206,471 8,102,216 0.35%
Macao 575,481 69.78% 1,469 7,066 422,912 0.35%
Tonga 105,782 40% 22 14 6,400 0.34%
Maldives 351,572 49.28% 854 1,035 253,696 0.34%
Qatar 2,267,916 91.49% 5,328 44,842 1,584,137 0.34%
Taiwan 23,359,928 80% 176,312 979,490 53,624,096 0.33%
San Marino 31,637 49.60% 103 1,030 33,536 0.31%
Georgia 4,504,100 48.90% 4,417 106,392 1,441,024 0.31%
Turkey 75,837,020 51.04% 103,756 2,331,958 33,937,488 0.31%
Wallis and Futuna % 8 0 2,816 0.28%
Lithuania 2,929,323 72.13% 11,127 402,370 3,970,596 0.28%
Puerto Rico 3,548,397 78.78% 2,370 10,588 901,632 0.26%
Andorra 80,153 95.90% 127 248 48,384 0.26%
Ecuador 15,982,551 43% 13,643 243,653 5,226,816 0.26%
Tunisia 10,996,600 46.16% 39,493 288,246 15,511,552 0.25%
Bulgaria 7,226,291 55.49% 29,439 1,385,605 11,686,157 0.25%
Bermuda 65,181 96.80% 628 8,355 254,736 0.25%
Marshall Islands 52,772 16.80% 10 5 4,352 0.23%
Papua New Guinea 7,476,108 9.38% 156 4,069 70,912 0.22%
Tanzania 50,757,459 4.86% 3,806 6,078 1,739,008 0.22%
Greenland 56,295 66.70% 49 0 22,528 0.22%
Austria 8,534,492 81% 50,678 1,160,152 23,376,896 0.22%
Portugal 10,397,393 64.59% 15,947 250,141 7,476,992 0.21%
Israel 8,215,300 71.45% 28,070 843,539 13,177,118 0.21%
Luxembourg 556,074 94.67% 1,568 28,815 744,205 0.21%
Slovakia 5,418,506 79.98% 5,509 125,070 2,628,897 0.21%
Belize 339,758 38.70% 290 748 142,081 0.20%
Cyprus 1,153,058 69.33% 4,046 24,172 1,996,576 0.20%
Saint Martin (French part) 31,530 % 2 50 1,024 0.20%
Lesotho 2,097,511 11% 228 257 118,528 0.19%
Mauritius 1,260,934 41.44% 5,317 15,743 2,797,056 0.19%
Cayman Islands 59,226 74.10% 166 264 87,552 0.19%
Kuwait 3,479,371 78.70% 8,616 107,022 4,813,314 0.18%
China 1,364,270,000 49.30% 1,104,660 2,783,648 624,256,496 0.18%
Kenya 45,545,980 43.40% 8,577 22,206 4,884,480 0.18%
Australia 23,490,736 84.56% 109,330 88,152 62,428,984 0.18%
Ireland 4,612,719 79.69% 9,069 44,867 5,279,896 0.17%
Micronesia 103,903 29.65% 24 0 14,336 0.17%
Germany 80,889,505 86.19% 205,839 790,045 123,761,663 0.17%
Guyana 803,677 37.35% 95 1,809 58,112 0.16%
Jersey % 269 32,706 165,888 0.16%
Saint Kitts and Nevis 54,789 65.40% 33 2,753 20,736 0.16%
Solomon Islands 572,865 9% 54 4 34,304 0.16%
Grenada 106,303 37.38% 23 844 15,104 0.15%
United Kingdom 64,510,376 91.61% 132,222 665,604 87,831,239 0.15%
Botswana 2,038,587 18.50% 382 3,672 263,168 0.15%
Cook Islands % 23 1 15,872 0.14%
Sierra Leone 6,205,382 2.10% 57 35 41,472 0.14%
Paraguay 6,917,579 43% 3,749 7,814 2,789,376 0.13%
Trinidad and Tobago 1,344,235 65.10% 980 25,007 739,328 0.13%
Bonaire % 9 87 6,912 0.13%
Singapore 5,469,700 82% 14,320 155,279 11,487,904 0.12%
Panama 3,926,017 44.92% 4,608 68,396 3,748,672 0.12%
Rwanda 12,100,049 10.60% 570 2,462 477,440 0.12%
Nauru % 21 1 17,664 0.12%
Slovenia 2,062,218 71.59% 3,138 37,803 2,656,546 0.12%
Estonia 1,313,645 84.24% 1,901 21,896 1,631,761 0.12%
Burundi 10,482,752 1.38% 66 123 56,832 0.12%
Anguilla % 7 151 6,144 0.11%
Czech Republic 10,510,566 79.71% 11,343 285,030 10,042,508 0.11%
Cuba 11,258,597 30% 281 86 256,256 0.11%
Faroe Islands 49,460 94.66% 67 1,115 62,464 0.11%
New Zealand 4,509,700 85.50% 9,149 11,014 8,572,820 0.11%
Hong Kong 7,241,700 74.56% 27,084 135,590 25,524,354 0.11%
Costa Rica 4,937,755 49.41% 3,685 18,189 3,499,712 0.11%
Nicaragua 6,169,269 17.60% 518 1,767 493,824 0.10%
New Caledonia 266,000 70% 232 2,190 227,072 0.10%
South Africa 54,001,953 49% 48,442 119,252 49,019,709 0.10%
Curaçao 155,872 % 86 1,905 87,808 0.10%
Guam 167,546 69.27% 212 9,052 241,664 0.09%
Japan 127,131,800 90.58% 231,699 143,538 271,723,601 0.09%
Belgium 11,225,207 85% 12,720 92,332 15,645,496 0.08%
Guadeloupe % 6 847 7,680 0.08%
Norfolk Island % 1 0 1,280 0.08%
Latvia 1,990,351 75.83% 2,734 102,819 3,850,253 0.07%
Seychelles 91,526 54.26% 128 391 180,480 0.07%
Malta 427,404 73.17% 620 766 883,200 0.07%
France 66,201,365 83.75% 49,911 326,195 76,140,539 0.07%
French Guiana % 2 0 3,072 0.07%
Réunion % 36 218 57,344 0.06%
Zambia 15,021,002 17.34% 784 32,715 1,276,928 0.06%
Barbados 286,066 76.67% 4 0 6,656 0.06%
Isle of Man 86,475 % 3 463 5,120 0.06%
Monaco 38,066 92.40% 57 2,111 97,280 0.06%
Sweden 9,689,555 92.52% 13,334 863,640 23,583,569 0.06%
South Korea 50,423,955 84.33% 76,501 1,177,808 138,731,246 0.06%
Saint Pierre and Miquelon % 2 0 4,096 0.05%
Virgin Islands % 23 0 57,345 0.04%
Holy See (Vatican City State) % 1 0 2,560 0.04%
Netherlands 16,854,183 93.17% 11,789 62,235 32,792,987 0.04%
Gibraltar % 58 66 165,376 0.04%
Switzerland 8,190,229 87% 4,758 169,337 13,806,277 0.03%
Iceland 327,589 98.16% 303 17,727 946,688 0.03%
Canada 35,540,419 87.12% 26,133 312,985 92,987,044 0.03%
European Union 508,308,718 78.10% 12,566 212,011 55,949,914 0.02%
Antigua and Barbuda 90,903 64% 9 23 40,960 0.02%
Norway 5,136,475 96.30% 2,023 699,430 10,480,428 0.02%
Niue % 31 2 178,560 0.02%
Liechtenstein 37,194 95.21% 53 2,079 306,946 0.02%
Denmark 5,639,565 95.99% 2,277 203,736 14,622,752 0.02%
United States 318,857,056 87.36% 263,171 12,088,485 2,021,114,820 0.01%
Finland 5,463,596 92.38 579 34,224 11,469,440 0.01%

Annex 6 Contribution of DINL, Digital Infrastructure Association of the Netherlands.
by Michiel Steltman, Director of DINL

DINL, the Digital Infrastructure Association NL is the representative and voice of the providers of Digital Infrastructure in the Netherlands. Next to the Rotterdam Harbor and Schiphol Airport this sector is referred to as the Netherland's Third Mainport. It forms the heart of the Dutch online economy. Because it hosts the AMS-IX, the world's largest Internet exchange, it plays a key role in the global Internet.

Participants of DINL are: AMS- IX (Amsterdam Internet Exchange); DDA (Dutch Datacenter Association); DHPA (Dutch Hosting Provider Association); ISPConnect; Stichting NLnet; SIDN (Foundation for Internet Domain Registration in the Netherlands ) and SURFnet.
What are DINL’s core messages?
A Free open and safe internet is the basis and requirement for economic growth. Digital Infrastructure is the basis and condition for:
• NL digital gateway to Europe, as the ideal location for online services[1];
• Tomorrow’s ICT in the cloud;
• Digital Innovation and transformation;
• The knowledge-based economy of tomorrow.
Core themes of DINL - with respect to government policy ; and the open forum on IGF:
Is the ambition to develop, in the public domain, general policy principles to match with the (new) laws and regulations and Government operation in the digital domain. That is also, in our view, the biggest challenge for all countries. As policy principles we use:
• Free, open and safe Internet (GCCS2015[2] and WRR report[3]);
• Multi-stakeholder approach on all (3) governance layers as defined by ICANN, with private-public cooperation as a basis.
The “NL”model of “polderen”, where multi-stakeholder and PPC are in our genes, strongly works in our favor with respect to many other countries. Its provides us with an opportunity to show the way forward.
That has, we think, consequences for policy. What is no longer possible?
• · Using outdated terms, definitions from the ICT and telecom sectors, indicating the Online economy in those terms;
• Interventions of all kinds (economic, security services, Justice) in parts of the online world that should be protected according to the WRR report[4];
• Unilateral government action, and considering sector/companies as opponents;
• Policy considerations with insufficient attention for the interests of the online economy;
• Preventing Balkanisation of the internet.
What will this take, what are DINL's goals?
• Consistency in laws and regulations in the digital economy;
• Introducing and agreeing on concepts and definitions that reflect the structure and dynamics of the online world;
• Bringing those in line with current laws and definitions (slight tweaking);
• Recognizing the tiered structure of the online economy (ICANN, DINL, WRR, analysys mason report model[5]);
• Recognizing the mainport metaphor, and the leverage function of digital infrastructure and internet for the economy;
• Always consider the balance between safety (privacy), security (justice/services) and economic interests in policy making;
• Approach to fighting cybercrime with PPC/multi-stakeholder initiatives such as "barrier models" and codes of conduct;
• Focus on international harmonisation and cooperation;
• “Double funnel” model for operational communication: Cooperation on operational improvements such as interfaces between services, National cyber-security Center, Politics, Autoriteit Consument en Markt , Team High Tech Crime, and other supervisory services and authorities, - with centralized non-profit facilitators for the online sector (example NBIP[6] );
• Cooperation model (Example NaWaS , abuse-Hub, and others.)
In the IGF forum we plan to present this approach as “the only way forward” for an open, safe, and free Internet; for Economic development and transformation that will result from growing and stimulating that Digital economy.
Issues that we see:
• Governments do not sufficiently understand the difference between ICT, Telecommunication and the Internet (economy);
• Traditional stakeholders still dominate the discussion, an do have insufficient consideration for the interests of small and innovative companies in the online sector;
• Online companies are often seen as mavericks and cowboys, not to be taken seriously;

Given the age of the sector, there is still a difficulty to organize the sector and to fund this properly.
[3] De publieke kern van het internet. Naar een buitenlands beleid. D. Broeders. (WRR 2015). In this report it is advised that the basic protocols and standards that make up the internet have to be seen as a global common good and such need to protected from any state or other interference.
[4] Ibidem
[6] See NaWas example

Annex 7. Working Group for Organizing Coordinated Disclosures (OCD)
by Inbar Raz, Working group member

The workgroup was created at the GCCS 2015 Conference in The Hague, on 16-17 April 2015. It was created by the participants of the Parallel Session on Ethical Hacking, as well as some of the spectators who requested to join.
• Session description:
• Session video:
The purpose of the workgroup is to find the way to allow researchers to do their work, without fear of prosecution or persecution, while at the same time protecting the vendors from unnecessary actions, exposure and/or damage. The key word here will be Ethics.
Pilot in Israel
Israel is a small country. As a result, the security Community in Israel is a rather small group with a <2 degrees of separation factor. Because of this advantage, I chose to carry out the OCD's first step in Israel, as I am easily able to bring both Security Researchers, Hackers of various morals, Police, and Government to the same table. We decided to create a process with the intended result of creating a Government-sanctioned procedure, that will allow the Responsible Research of security vulnerabilities, as well as the Coordinated Disclosure process, while trying to guard the interests of all involved parties (General Public, Vendors, and Researchers) - the largest dilemma here.
Initial meetings have been held with the Israeli National Cyber Bureau (INCB), as well as the Israeli Police Cyber Unit (LAHAV 433). Both parties responded very positively about the initiative and are eager to take part in it.
As the work progresses, I will be happy to update the Forum. Our intention is to finish the work in Israel in a relatively short term, and then leverage it as a precedence for other countries interested at this, as well as our own effort at OCD Workgroup.
In the meantime, if you would like to get a general idea of the subjects that need to be discussed in this process, I'll refer you to two resources:
1. A 30-minute presentation titled "Hacking Ethics in Education", by Jeroen van der Ham. It was given at the CCC conference in Hamburg on December 2014:
2. A 15-minute presentation titled "15 Minutes on Ethical Hacking", by myself, that was given at the 5th Annual Internatonal Cybersecurity Conference in Tel-Aviv on Jjune 2015 (skip to 4:55 if you are only interested in OCD):

The questions that will need answering, and are at the heart of the discussion, are divided into three tracks:
1. What is a "proper way" to conduct research on someone else's vulnerabilities?
- How can you perform the research without causing damage to existing data and services?
- How can you perform the research without breaching an unnecessary level of privacy?
2. What is the "proper way" to report the vulnerability to the vendor?
- How long after the research has been completed, must you report?
3. What is the "proper way" to publish your research results?
- Are there any timing constraints?
- Can the vendor impose a time frame? If so, who regulates that time frame?
- Are you required to supply the vendor response?

Annex 8 Other Reference Sources of Spam Data

Spamrankings recaps botnet data from several sources in graph form by monthly measure, highlighting problem areas such as by country and RIR.

Cloudmark Threat Research
Email and SMS filtering company Cloudmark provide a rich source of reference and statistical data. (Sign-up required).

Kaspersky Lab
Kaspersky Lab is an international software security group operating in almost 200 countries and territories worldwide. The company is headquartered in Moscow, Russia, with its holding company registered in the United Kingdom.

Signal Spam
Signal Spam is a not for profit organisation processing spam reports from individual users (mostly in France) and automatically addressing abuse reports to member ISPs, email service providers and partner organisations in other countries (The Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, United States, Luxembourg). Members and partners take action according to their activity (ISPs identify botnets, hosting providers identify abusive or abused servers and ESPs unregister victim emails and/or take action against customers abusing their platforms).

Signal Spam publishes a quarterly report on the information received from its users: these reports are based on spam received in users’ mailboxes and which they deem unsolicited (commercial, abusive or illegal). Over T2 2015, 72.85% was classified automatically as commercial spam, the remaining being cybercrime related (phishing, scams, malware, etc.).

Annex 9 Contribution by Karine e Silva of the University of Tilburg

1. Botnets and Spam
Botnets are networks of compromised machines remotely controlled by so-called botmasters. Botnets serve various criminal purposes: DDoS attacks, click fraud, keylogging, spam, among others. Spamming practices, in particular, have occupied a prominent place in botnet activities. As noted by experts from Microsoft and UC Berkeley, spam is a driving force in the economics of botnets, serving as a monetization strategy. Botmasters profit from using their network to send spam email (for the purpose of advertising, phishing, malware distribution, etc.) as well as by selling and/or renting their compromised machines to spammers. In a recent study, researchers from UC Santa Barbara and Aachen University defend botnets are essential elements to the success of spam campaigns, highlighting the fundamental connection between the two malicious behaviors and the underground transactions conducted by spammers and botmasters. To illustrate this relationship, it is worth to remember the Rustock botnet, an infrastructure once responsible for 1/3 of world’s total spam. In short, a holistic approach to fighting against spam must encompass a strategy to mitigate botnets.
2. Fighting Against Botnets: different angles
Mitigation against botnets includes prevention, detection, disruption, and disinfection. Prevention of botnets may refer to increasing the costs of criminality as well as enabling better industry security standards. Detection and disruption depend on the development and deployment of fine-tuned techniques, adapted to the evolving dynamics of mass infections. Finally, disinfection should enable infection removal and vulnerability patching, preventing the re-exploiting of the machine by the same bot family. Clearly, there are several hurdles to achieving each of these mitigation steps and concrete results must combine perspectives from the technical, legal, and policy angles.
2.1 Legal Perspective
Massive botnet takedowns in recent years have three common characteristics: one, close collaboration between public and private sector; two, cooperation between foreign law enforcement officers; and they are temporary measures, and in most cases the botnet has come back up. The disruptions of Gameover Zeus, ZeroAccess, BeeBone, Ramnit, and others, demonstrate the paramount influence of these two elements, further discussed below.
2.1.1 Public-private collaboration.
As noted by Germano, while industry has expert insight and knowledge for combatting threats, public authorities hold prerogatives for investigation and prosecution of crimes, and for providing statutory protection in the context of information sharing. Ideally, a combination of both skills and mandates would support further results in fighting against botnets than isolated efforts can yield. Despite its advantages, in most countries public-private collaborations are yet to substantiate their legitimacy, effectiveness, and accountability. In other words, it is often unclear whether public-private collaborative efforts conform to the rule of law, whether they concretely translate into better results, and whether actors are held accountable for misuse of power or fundamental rights violations. Solutions to these barriers may include the adoption of clear frameworks to promote transparency, trust, and accountability of public-private collaborations in face of citizens and/or specialized multi-stakeholder committees. Finally, there is a great need for empirical research on the effectiveness and efficiency of public-private collaborative efforts, which can help demonstrate the added value of such initiatives and encourage government, society, and industry support.
2.1.2 International cooperation in criminal matters.
Contrary to law enforcement powers, online activities are characterized by the fluidity and thinning of geographical borders. In cyberspace, communication is ubiquitous and malicious users take advantage of this flexibility to target victims in various parts of the world, while subjecting themselves to minimum risk. In this context, international cooperation is key, as it enables actors to bring together pieces of the puzzle that would be otherwise out of reach. In mass-scale contaminations, it is very common for evidence to be spread over different countries, and in the possession of various companies and law enforcement agencies. By combining efforts, law enforcement agents are able to join their powers and compensate for the limits of territorial jurisdiction. While the exchange between EUROPOL and the FBI has strengthened international cooperation involving EU Member States and the U.S., a systematic framework for cooperation in cybercrime is still lacking. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime is a landmark on international cooperation against cybercrime, but limited to an array of mostly European countries. There is thus a need for an international instrument representative of the demands of different countries, capable of facilitating the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime at a global level, while ensuring balance with human rights.

Annex 10. To Champion a Safe and Secure "Next Generation" internet

The "bandwidth revolution" in emerging online countries is providing high-powered global internet access to millions of users for the first time and vastly changing the anatomy of the connected world. Unfortunately, we also know that when a new region brings significant bandwidth online, an onslaught of criminals follows, rushing to establish their abusive and illegal practices in new unprotected territory. While broadband access brings the promise of both economic and personal growth to these regions, it also opens the door to spammers and cybercriminals looking to set up new cyber-breeding grounds and expand their illicit operations around the world.
This raises an important question for the rest of the world: Will these rapidly evolving countries come online with all of the advantages from the industry's decades of hard-won expertise in protecting end-users or will they unwittingly go through the same mundane struggles and ordeals, starting from scratch in learning about spam, malware, bots, DDoS attacks and other threats?
This is an educational and technology issue with global economic repercussions. As we all know, the internet is a borderless entity and along with the communications and monetary exchange it enables, there also is an endless stream of spam, malware and fraudulent messaging surreptitiously flowing from country to country. Spam generated in one country very often targets users on the other side of the world.
For everyone involved, it is vital to prevent the establishment of new spam and cybercrime havens. Without the necessary understanding to protect their end-users, these developing countries will never fully recognize the benefits of the global online economy. If spammers and cybercriminals are allowed to subsist in these regions, users in countries with existing robust internet economies will also be severely harmed.
Recognizing the hazards, many developing countries have asked for assistance with training, best practices and technical support to combat spam and abuse on their networks.
Training Goals
We should advocate safe and effective internet access for users in all countries with all the benefits of participating in the online community, including economic growth and improved wellbeing. To this end, we should promote the voluntary implementation of known anti-abuse best practices for network and hosting operations to fight online abuse such as spam, bots and malware, and the continual updating of these practices with new techniques and technologies. This encourages reliable, safe and sustainable access to the global internet community for business, governments and users.
The goals are:
1. Help emerging online countries become functional and safely-engaged participants in the global community by training industry ecosystem producers - such as ISPs and network operators, email service providers, technically-focused government agencies and NGOs — to avoid spreading unwanted traffic and other threats to the internet community. This includes training to reduce the distribution of abusive messaging on all platforms and to abate related threats like bandwidth hijacking;
2. Provide training to help emerging online countries protect their own citizens from internet abuses, such as spam, phishing, malware, bots and other threats.

How to Achieve These Goals?
1. Provide experts to speak on best practices and topical work that already exists within M3AAWG and other respected anti-abuse organizations.
2. Develop programs and curriculum for basic "101 courses" since many best practices assume certain technical and operational knowledge, that take network administrators and anti-abuse personnel to the next level by teaching how to operate and manage safe networks.
3. Train the trainers on anti-abuse best practices so that the instruction lives on and is not "one shot work."
4. Provide training at hosted training venues such as the ISOC Combating Spam Project workshops or M3AAF organized workshop/training meetings.
5. Develop partnerships with other organizations in related work to expand the M3AAF outreach effort.
6. Develop relationships with "champions on the ground' in each region as a channel for sharing future M3AAWG and other organizations' best practices.

Why Now?
While countries around the world are looking to join the global online economy, a number of public policy and governance events are underway that could have a profound effect on the technical community. Currently, there are major International Telecommunications Union (ITU) initiatives under consideration focusing on spam and internet governance that also address the roles of the ITU and the internet community.

Annex 11. Case Study: Implementation of New Zealand legislation

In May 2004, the Ministry of Economic Development (now the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment) released a discussion paper entitled “Legislating Against Spam”. This document was the first step in the Government’s proposal to address the specific problem of spam through legislation. The discussion paper provided a background on spam, the relevant New Zealand legal framework – namely the Privacy Act 1993 and Harassment Act 1997, and detailed legislative issues for anti-spam legislation. The issues that were detailed included the legislative scope (what type of messages should be regulated), consent (for example, whether an opt-in or opt-out approach be adopted), transparency (the need for sender details or an unsubscribe facility), privacy (the use of address harvesting software and address harvested lists) and enforcement (for example, whether the legislation should be civil or criminal).
The Government wanted to benefit from widespread input prior to drafting the legislation. Therefore, the discussion paper posed several high-level questions, and sought consultation through submissions from those interested. These included the Direct Marketing Association, Email Service Providers, Internet Service Providers and Mobile Networks. There were a number of key outcomes from the submission stage, for example all of the respondents considered spam to be an important issue, and spam had markedly eroded people’s confidence in the reliability of email. Furthermore, almost all respondents agreed that legislation was required. The submissions were taken under consideration; the legislation was drafted in June 2005.
The Unsolicited Electronic Messages Bill was formally ‘introduced’ into Parliament on 28 July 2005.
In order to properly frame the legislation, the Government had to formally scope the nature and magnitude of the problem and ascertain the need for action. They compiled the examination of the issue into a “regulatory impact and compliance cost statement” which formed an integral part of the Bill. Considerations for the cost statement included:
• The Government’s 2005 Digital Strategy.
• Metrics on the amount of spam relevant to total email traffic in New Zealand.
• The potential economic impact relevant to the loss of productivity (in a workplace), loss of confidence in dealing with business and other communications online, as well as the consumption of network and computing resources.
• New Zealand laws that might already have contained aspects of spam regulation.
• Self-regulation measures within the industry.
• Risks of not implementing an anti-spam law – for example, New Zealand becoming a safe haven for spammers.
• What other countries had implemented by way of anti-spam law.
Through the Unsolicited Electronic Messages Bill, the Government also created objectives in accordance with its Digital Strategy. This identified the individual benefits of implementing an anti-spam law (the benefits for Government, businesses, Internet Service Providers and society), and captured the results of the initial consultation via earlier submissions.
In 2005, the Ministry of Justice considered whether the Unsolicited Electronic Messages Bill was consistent with provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, such as the right to freedom of expression. It concluded that the Bill was consistent.
The Bill went through the required three ‘readings’ in Parliament - the first reading on 13 December 2005, the second reading on 5 December 2006, and the third reading on 27 February 2007. There were a number of amendments recommended and actioned through this process, prior to the third (and last) reading in 2007.
The Unsolicited Electronic Messages Bill became law on 5 March 2007 and came into force six months later.
While the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment administers the Unsolicited Electronic Messages Act 2007, the Department of Internal Affairs was selected as the enforcement department. The Electronic Messaging Compliance Unit (EMCU) was set up within Internal Affairs to regulate the Act.
The Act is a civil piece of legislation rather than criminal. It provides provisions for the sending of commercial electronic (email, SMS, fax and instant messaging) messages with a New Zealand link. While there is generally a high domestic compliance rate toward the Act , there remains the challenge of regulating unsolicited commercial electronic messages (spam) coming into New Zealand from offshore; spam that can be deceptive, harmful and fraudulent.

Annex 12. The Spam fight in Brazil

Internet Governance Context
Fighting spam has been a topic debated on Internet Governance related forums in the past 15 years. The reasons for this topic being present on discussions for so long are as diverse as the ways we can research the topic. The efforts to stop spam can be approached from technological, legal, political and social aspects.
In Brazil the strategies to fight spam are the result of a coordination effort by the Brazilian Internet steering Committee ( Anti-Spam Task Force (CT-Spam). This effort involved bringing into the discussion of possible solutions dozens of Telecommunications Companies, thousands of Internet Service Providers, Consumer Protection organizations, representatives from the Civil Society and the Academia, as well as the technical staff of
The success of this initiative points to the fact that a multi-stakeholder collaboration is the best strategy to effectively implement security policies, deal with cybersecurity related issues and establish trust on the Internet.

A Brief History
The CT-Spam was created in 2005, as one of the initiatives, with the objective to deal with the obvious problems that spam was causing to the Internet in Brazil and abroad. This effort was proposed and Coordinated by the Board Member Henrique Faulhaber.
Since its inception the CT-Spam is working with actors from different sectors to raise awareness about their roles and the importance of implementing anti-spam policies and technologies. At the same time it was working to provide awareness and education to end users about safety and security on the Internet.
Different Approaches to Different Problems
After several studies conducted by it was clear that the major spam problem in Brazil was the abuse of the country's broadband infrastructure by international spammers, usually abusing open proxies or through botnets, both in end user infected computers.
The impacts of inaction were already being noticed by consumers and access providers, specially:
• the inclusion of whole broadband providers' IP ranges in blacklists and;
• in some cases the blacklisting of the whole country;
• raise in operational costs, invariably transferred to consumers;
• instability of the broadband connectivity, as the spammers were using all the available upload bandwidth;
• international effects, as the spam messages were both originated and destined to other countries.

Nevertheless, there were also other issues to be dealt with, especially:
• educating the end users on how to identify spams, especially those related to malware and phishing;
• raising awareness of the e-mail marketing sector about the importance of best practices, data protection and privacy issues related to e-mail marketing;
• studying a legal framework for Brazil.

As the result of the multi-stakeholder discussions the CT-Spam worked to implement different policies and technologies for the different aspects of the spam problem. Among these activities the main areas of work were:

A) Website
A Web Portal was created with information for end users, e-mail and connectivity providers. For end users the information is focused on explaining what is spam, the risks of malware and fraud and how to avoid these risks. This information is presented also in four videos. For the e-mail and connectivity providers the focus is on several anti-spam techniques, including DKIM, SPF, Greylisting and Port 25 Management.

B) Port 25 Management
To prevent broadband infected computers to perform direct delivery of spam our studies showed that the most effective countermeasure would be to implement Port 25 Management. This is the term used to refer to the policies and technologies implemented in residential or dynamic IP address spaces to enforce the separation between message submission and message transport.
This measure was formally recommended by in its Resolution "". This recommendation led to two other important documents: a formal statement from the Consumer Protection Department of the Ministry of Justice, analyzing the consequences do consumers and recommending its adoption; and the Cooperation Agreement, signed by, Anatel, the Telecommunication Companies Union and the ISP Associations, with the details of the implementation process.
The implementation of this technique alone was responsible for taking Brazil out of almost all existing lists of "Top Countries" originating spam.
The port 25 management adoption process was characterized by an intense collaboration coordinated by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee - - among actors seeking to satisfy the public interest. The implementation of such a Brazilian multi-stakeholder and multi-participative Internet governance model left no doubts about its success. Councilor Eduardo Levy, who is the President of the Telecommunication Companies Union, acknowledged this result in his interview to specialists documenting the project:
"Well, this is complex; yet it is beautiful from a democratic point of view and for the various forces that acted in it; and it’s better still because it was the whole society who benefited in the end. Nothing was strong enough to prevent society from gaining. To me, personally, and to the whole telecom sector, being part of this process and being able to publicize it, made us very proud."

C) Anti-Spam Legislation
Anti-Spam Legislation - CT-Spam promoted a legal study of all international anti-spam laws, as well as all the laws being proposed in the Brazilian Congress. At the end of this study a new text for a legislation was proposed, based on the opt-in principle. This text is the base of the current anti-spam bill being currently considered in the Congress.
D) E-mail Marketing Self-Regulation Code
This initiative arose from the perception that more than working on new legislation, there was a need to establish standards and best practices to guide email marketing companies. This Code details how to send e-mail marketing respecting opt-in principles, e-mail reputation best practices and data privacy and protection related to e-mail address lists.

Annex 13. The Abuse Information Exchange in the Netherlands

The Abuse Information Exchange is an association of Dutch internet providers and other stakeholders, established as initiative from private parties to effectively share and use information on botnet infections and other internet abuse by centrally collecting, analyzing and correlating information from various national and international sources. Therefore the Abuse Information Exchange can be defined as the National Abuse Report Clearing House. This initiative has been established in 2012 and was supported by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs that provided a grant to start this initiative.
Botnet software usually causes few problems on the infected computer; often the infection is not detected at all. But botnets can cause great inconvenience and harm to others. According to research from the Technical University of Delft 5 to 10% of all computers in the Netherlands are infected with a botnet infection every year.. Current members of the Abuse Information Exchange are internet service providers Tele2, KPN, Solcon, RoutIT, Zeelandnet, XS4ALL, Ziggo, and Surfnet and SIDN (Foundation for Internet Domain Registration in the Netherlands). Recently, the hosting providers association ISPConnect and the Dutch Hosting Providers Association (DHPA) have become members of the Abuse Information Exchange thereby extending the scope of the Abuse Information Exchange to almost all internet access and hosting providers in the Netherlands. The association meets on a regular basis with the Dutch National cyber-security Centre (NCSC) to give updates about the progress that has been made. The association also meets with other stakeholders such as academics and ministries to further improve Internet safety.
The central software of the association, called AbuseHub, receives information from a large number of reliable notifiers. It was specifically built to be able to analyze great amounts of data, in order to allow the member ISPs to act swiftly in case of a botnet infection on computers in their networks. Abusehub analyses the information from notifiers and forwards it to the specific member ISPs, who use the notifications to warn their customers about botnet infections on their machines. Anonymized statistical data on the received Abuse reports is available through the self-care environment. This combination of both a community and a system (Abusehub) provides a powerful and concrete mechanism to increase the maturity of the Internet safety and the general Abuse handling in the Netherlands.
A recent report of the Technical University of Delft has indicated that The Netherlands scores above average in terms of botnet control. Also, the report indicates that Dutch ISPs perform above average compared to ISPs in other countries. Especially the internet providers that are members of the Abuse Information Exchange have improved their performance. Their combined share in botnet infections has fallen from 80 % in 2010 to 63 % in 2014. The most infected non-members are smaller ISPs that have not (yet) joined AbuseHub and hosting providers. The fact that the hosting providers association ISPConnect and DHPA have recently joined the Abuse Information Exchange is an effective step to further increase the maturity of the Internet safety and the general abuse handling in the Netherlands.

Annex 14. Other examples of security initiatives that impact unsolicited communications

Advanced Cyber Defense Center (ACDC)
The ACDC program, which was mentioned in the 2014 BPF report, ended on 1 August this year. One of the goals of this EU program was to establish 8 botnet mitigation centres in Europe. At 1 August there were 12 botnet mitigation centers in Europe, although not all ACDC partners, including Finland and The Netherlands. Some of these centers are established within CSIRT, e.g. Croatia and Spain, others with a regulator, such as Finland and others are public – private initiatives, such as in Germany, France and the Netherlands.
Check and secure
Check and secure is an online initiative “powered by” a German cyber-security company called Cyscon, that, according to its website, cooperates with a host of partners including government, anti-virus companies, ISPs, mobile companies and with the anti-botnet initiatives ACDC and Botfrei.
Check and secure is an online tool that allows end users to check, for free, whether their IP address is sending unsolicited communications. If a positive response is received the end user is warned and pointed towards a mitigation tool. The tool also checks whether the most common software programs have the most recent updates installed. If not, it recommends that this be done straight away. is an initiative of the Dutch Platform Internetstandaarden and was launched at the Global Conference on Cyber-Space in April 2015. A combination of different organizations representing the internet industry, government, NGOs and internet community joined to make the initiative a success. Its aim is to present end users the option to find out whether their internet connection uses the latest internet standards by testing the internet connection and providing responses to the following questions:
• How secure is my email?
• Is IPv6 offered?
• Is DNSSEC used?

One of the features of is that “concerned” end users are encouraged to contact their respective providers seeking answers to questions about the safety and reliability of their internet connection. The technique behind the website is available for organisations in other countries that are willing and able to run the tool.
Stop. Think. Connect.
In this awareness raising program based in the United States, the Anti-Phishing Working Group, the National cyber-security Alliance and the Department of Homeland Security work together to raise the awareness of internet users and present them with ways to be safer on the internet. In its own words:
“Take security precautions, understand the consequences of your actions and behaviors and enjoy the benefits of the Internet.
STOP: Before you use the Internet, take time to understand the risks and learn how to spot potential problems.
THINK: Take a moment to be certain the path ahead is clear. Watch for warning signs and consider how your actions online could impact your safety, or your family’s.
CONNECT: Enjoy the Internet with greater confidence, knowing you’ve taken the right steps to safeguard yourself and your computer.
Protect yourself and help keep the web a safer place for everyone.”
The program advocates itself internationally and is adopted in several countries outside the United States.
Global Forum on cyber-security
The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) was launched at the Global Conference on Cyber-Space 2015 and currently has 48 international members from governments, IGOs and private sector. It was set up to assist in the global effort to strengthen cyber capacity. It is a key initiative which gives momentum to global cyber capacity building and makes technical expertise and new funding available. The GFCE is designed as a pragmatic, action-oriented and flexible platform for policymakers, practitioners and experts from different countries and regions. Its goal is to share experiences, identify gaps in global cyber capacities, and to complement existing efforts in capacity building. Under the umbrella of the GFCE, members are pushing forward capacity building initiatives which are centered on the four main themes of the GFCE; cyber-security, cybercrime, e-governance and data protection.
Initiatives are brought forward by one or more organisations from different regions and/or stakeholder communities who can in different constellations lead, fund, discuss, give or receive these initiatives. The GFCE is looking for action programs.
This BPF concludes that there is a need and want for practical training at the technical level in Africa and given the potential of the GFCE platform, sees an opportunity for involved stakeholders to connect there.
The Dutch national scrubbing centre is an initiative of an association of hosting centres called Nationale Beheersorganisatie Internet Providers (NBIP). This association started because of the legal obligation of internet providers to have taps placed in their networks when a court order allows law enforcement to do so. “Because smaller organizations had difficulties complying with the Dutch telecom laws, a Shared Service Center was constructed”. In 2013 NBIP thought up the concept of organisations working together to mitigate DDoS attacks. Only a few months later it opened its functionalities. In the initiative stakeholders from different communities participate. With all the botnet traffic going into NaWas other possibilities arose. “In 2015 the NBIP started research together with the University of Amsterdam to find out if pattern recognition for DDoS mitigation could work and to find out which “DDoS cannons” should be targeted first by law enforcement agencies”. The next step foreseen step is NaWas-LEA cooperation. NaWas is a public - public participation.
DINL, the Digital Infrastructure Association NL, is the representative and voice of providers of Digital Infrastructure in the Netherlands. Participants of DINL are: AMS- IX (Amsterdam Internet Exchange); DDA (Dutch Datacenter Association); DHPA (Dutch Hosting Provider Association); ISPConnect; Stichting NLnet; SIDN (Foundation for Internet Domain Registration in the Netherlands ) and SURFnet. It is established to voice the core messages of the participants, who come from different backgrounds in the internet industry, and thus influence government policies.
This initiative is beyond the topic of mitigating unsolicited communication. However, this BPF noticed that nearly all members of DINL are involved in one or more mitigation actions against unsolicited communication, which makes DINL a potential partner to discuss this topic with. The full contribution of DINL can be found in Annex 6 to this report.
Working group for Organizing Coordinated Disclosures (OCD)
This informal Workgroup was created during the Global Conference on Cyber-Space, following the parallel session responsible disclosure. It has as members from the hacker community, large corporations, a district attorney, policymakers, representatives of CSIRT and others. The purpose of the Working group is to find a way to allow researchers, i.e. ethical hackers, to do their work, without fear of prosecution or persecution, while at the same time protecting the vendors from unnecessary actions, exposure and/or damage. It is one of the first active initiatives in the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, sponsored by governments and industry. The full text of the contribution is in Annex 7 to the report.

Annex 15. Public - Private Partnerships

Limited-Term partnerships
The Canadian Task Force on Spam
Review global messaging abuse from the Canadian perspective, develop best practices and recommendations, report to Minister of Industry. The task force held multi-stakeholder participation.
DNSChanger Working Group (2010-2012)
DNSChanger was a DNS hijacking Trojan active from 2007 to 2011. The work of an Estonian company known as Rove Digital, the malware infected computers by modifying a computer's DNS entries to point toward its own rogue name servers, which then injected its own advertising into Web pages.
The DNS Changer Working Group (DCWG) was created to help remediate Rove Digital’s malicious DNS servers. The DCWG is an ad hoc group of subject matter experts, and includes members from organizations such as Georgia Tech, Internet Systems Consortium, Mandiant, National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, Neustar, Spamhaus, Team Cymru, Trend Micro, and the University of Alabama at Birmingham working in collaboration with the FBI, the NASA-OIG and Estonian police.
Longer term partnerships
The Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG) is an international non-profit, industry-led organization founded to fight online abuse such as botnets, phishing, fraud, spam, viruses and denial-of service attacks that can cause great harm to both individuals and national economies. M3AAWG draws technical experts, researchers and policy specialists from a broad base of Internet service providers and network operators representing over one billion mailboxes, and from key technology providers, academia and volume sender organizations. The multi-disciplinary approach at M3AAWG includes education, advice on public policy and legislation, development of industry best practices, guidance in the development of industry standards, and the facilitation of global collaboration.
The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) an organization dedicated to incident response. Membership in FIRST enables incident response teams to more effectively respond to security incidents reactive as well as proactive.
FIRST brings together a variety of computer security incident response teams from government, commercial, and educational organizations. FIRST aims to foster cooperation and coordination in incident prevention, to stimulate rapid reaction to incidents, and to promote information sharing among members and the community at large.
It currently has as Special Interest Group (SIG) on the topic of this BPF. Its goal is to “share experiences about botnet mitigation and remediation and to identify different approaches and best practices that can be implemented to address this problem”.
Anti-Phishing Working Group
APWG is the worldwide coalition unifying the global response to cybercrime across industry, government and law-enforcement sectors. APWG’s membership of more than 2000 institutions worldwide is as global as its outlook, with its directors, managers and research fellows advising: national governments; global governance bodies like ICANN; hemispheric and global trade groups; and multilateral treaty organizations such as the European Commission, Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of American States. The APWG is also on the steering group of the Commonwealth Cybercrime Initiative of the Commonwealth of Nations.
Team Cymru
Team Cymru Research NFP is an Illinois non-profit and a US Federal 501(c)3 organization. “We are a group of technologists passionate about making the internet more secure and dedicated to that goal. We work closely with and within Internet security communities, as well as with all manner of other organizations - after all, almost every organization in the modern world is connected to the Internet in some way or another, and they all need help to ensure that their parts of the network remain safe and secure”.
London Action Plan
The London Action Plan (LAP) was founded in 2004 with the purpose of promoting international spam enforcement cooperation and address spam-related problems, such as online fraud and deception, phishing, and dissemination of viruses. Since inception, LAP has expanded its mandate to include additional online and mobile threats, including malware, SMS spam and Do-Not-Call.
LAP membership includes representatives from the government regulatory and enforcement community and interested industry members. Through annual meetings and bimonthly teleconferences, members stay connected and share information that is critical for any organization engaged in anti-spam regulation and enforcement.
National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance
The National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance (NCFTA) is a non-profit corporation focused on identifying, mitigating, and ultimately neutralizing cybercrime threats through strategic alliances and partnerships with Subject Matter Experts (SME) in the public, private, and academic sectors.
Through NCFTA initiatives, hundreds of criminal (and some civil) investigations have been launched, which otherwise would not have been addressed. Currently, NCFTA has aided in successful prosecutions of more than 300 cyber criminals worldwide.
INHOPE is an active and collaborative network of 51 hotlines in 45 countries worldwide, dealing with illegal content online and committed to stamping out child sexual abuse from the Internet.


Contact Information

United Nations
Secretariat of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF)

Villa Le Bocage
Palais des Nations,
CH-1211 Geneva 10

igf [at] un [dot] org
+41 (0) 229 173 411