The following are the outputs of the captioning taken during an IGF intervention. Although it is largely accurate, in some cases it may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages or transcription errors. It is posted as an aid, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.
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(Audio silence) ...agenda to WSIS+20 pioneering sustainable development with satellites critical internet infrastructure. Great way to start the conference. Academics symposium talking about the critical internet infrastructure and talking about new different dynamic in that discussion. That is emerging with the use of internets, LEO satellites being space where you see a lot of tensions emerging in how do we organizing access to the internet and do we actually make that technologically possible but also potentially and legally possible.
Our speakers today will help us understand some of the tensions that are there and some of the evolutions that have emerged in this space. Evolutions emerged.
Maybe I will introduce two speakers in the program. There were three. But unfortunately our third speaker did have to cancel her participation in today's event. We hope that everything is fine with her.
I will introduce our two speakers. Then we'll move on to the discussion. I'm hoping that given we have two speakers we'll have plenty of time for discussion and debate and I will certainly try and come back at the end if the presentation and try to feed this some thoughts into this.
First of all, we have Jonathan Liebenau, from London school of economics. Talking about evolution of Low Earth Orbit. Perspectives set the stage, and Joanna will be talking about international law. Joanna Kulesza and LEO satellites jurisdiction and human rights. Set up very interesting day for the entire conference, but also, lead to some very interesting discussions from 9:30 onward or so. So members of the panel, I will pass over the floor to yourselves. Please you have around about 15 minutes, I'm getting feeling that you're still halfway through you're narrative. Might start dancing. And then we'll see from there. Where attention goes. Jonathan, the floor is yours.
>> JONATHAN LIEBENAU: Thank you. Please interrupt me as soon as you get board.
Let me say a couple things background. I'm historian of technology. Worked for many years at London school of economics as professor technology management and I bring both of these perspectives to the study of LEOs and other aspects of space communications in infrastructure.
And I also think that this is a good way to seriously address the broader question of the panel which is from Tunis to WSIS+20. I'm going to focus on the problem of the governance of internet infrastructure and LEOs in historical and economic perspective. With start with the question who benefits? Do this we need to have some idea of what the value of the network is. Who is ascribes value to and what relationship the value proposition holds to those who finance it.
In the early history of infrastructure, systems were mostly private. And faced competition. Other than roads mostly public for the past few hundred years in most place. During the 20th century, most infrastructure elements became either sanctioned monopolies or public entities sometimes through state enterprises, sometimes as public utilities, sometimes using other governance methods.
Only towards late 20th century did liberalization eye des begin to move towards infrastructure that was private, competitive models. Landmark was the USAT telecommunications monopoly broke he into competing elements starting with unity trust case filed by the US justice department in 1974. Break up system in 1984 followed by privatization of British telecom. Same year. Large ways of other telecommunications energy, water, transportation, and other utilities, in Britain and elsewhere were liberalized. World trade organization and European UN accelerated that trend in the early 2000 with the wholesale liberalization of telecommunications network and services.
These were not driving factors behind Tunis but very much I suggest element of background that's important for what happened since.
With early infrastructure, only small numbers wealthy people could make use what was on offer. Change occurred when it became clear to industrialized economies that the spillover effects of good quality universal access was a major contributor to economic growth.
We might address value question by measuring benefits to individuals capture the logic of infrastructure, that offers cheap access and where extensive or universal services required, we must consider what these spillover effects might be.
Not on easy measure to come to. Partly because infrastructure is become foundation of majority of economic activity. Try to measure these things in all kind of situations and whenever the London is closed by tiny by the of snowfall, there is this sense that we have economic problem to address and measure of what that effect might be. Is make an effort. We can try do this but it's not very precise at all.
The answer for LEOs cannot be limited to how many people use the system. Or even how high a price the market can bear. Answer will have to come back to the spillover effects. Some guess as to what the widespread economic benefits of the system might be over a relatively long period of time. Have an idea of spillover effects are. More difficult to measure them in aggregate, as opposed to recounting antecdotes or cases which describe their effects.
For any investment critical determinative values time frame in which the price can be amortized, type of payoff expected, and the date upon which the payoff is required. Flaws in dealing with simple dimensions of finance is sufficient to explain the failures of every preceding LEO project.
For the ones determinants might have more to do with the critical relationships between government engagement and private sector business models? For the current ones j in particular procurement of services is going to be handled in medium term, value of the spinoffs that might be for government use, military, surveillance, launch services, et cetera. And what rules get a applied for things such as taxation, subsidies and critically interconnection pricing.
The locus of revenue generation however differed and choices made about where premium profits might accrue in where cross subsidies might be used distinguish companies and shake their finances and sometimes their technologies and in part of my study, I went into detail all of the LEO projects throughout the history not that long a history. We can get a very clear idea. Explain since all failed, explain what the different cause of failure have been.
These aspects of the financial model and revenue generation is evident for example in the cases of LEO constellation configuration. Or indeed whether the satellites might be placed in medium or geostationary orbits instead of justice being limited to a LEO configuration.
I understand that in Mari set, first of the pseudo‑commercial geostationary orbit communication services, is being supplemented with LEOs now also. So these kinds of choices get made and configuration based, first and foremost on what these economic feature business model are going to be.
It's evident in what connections are made to as we in Marset maritime or aviation interests between civil government or military establishments, the technical tradeoffs may be somewhat clear between high versus low, latency, powerful payloads versus mini satellites broad coverage orbital allow services for density populated latitudes.
Star Links initial intention if Elon Musk comments on the opening in 2015, are to be believed it provide back hall traffic. And as he said, about 0% of local 10% local customer internet traffic. Considering that at that time, and since, back HAUL) vast majority of traffic has been cared by under sea cable, this was quite a claim.
Idea focus on high density cities. Estimated to cost $10 billion as a kind often entry fee. US Federal communications commission offered later revoked 885‑and‑a‑half million dollars worth of Federal subsidies to support world broadband customers. Nevertheless revenue seems to have moved from eight years of losses to small profit currently based in large part on a little over 4 million subscribers. These subscribers pay for broadband various levels of VRIS but also a business line for the US space development agency, military? Service, and dual use satellites. May not continue. When I wrote the first version of this, I cited fact that competitors like York, Lockheed Martin and Drummond on getting some of the business that StarLink in expected to get. Since then, three‑hours after Musk insulted Trump, came away with SpaceX contracts, so you can see that business model is based on a little more idiosyncratic and erratic conditioning than theory of business models might otherwise have predicted.
Nevertheless military applications for related businesses especially star shield are likely to continue to be closest to the core of this business model.
One web has very different business model and one particular dependent on national satellites UK government, regional formally intergovernment agreement organization now, liberalized company Eutelsat and big investors Bart Global. India Japan SoftBank. Spotlight satellites over five years. Targets governments including military users large corporations, and some easily communities rather than isolated communities rather than individual customers core to the star link business model. Statement one web began LEO constellation competing StarLink. Launching 2023. And first I think first satellites in prices affordable to many customers although, important element of the business model is the relationship with AWS in supporting the data centers that Amazon runs? Long established SES formally the society paying satellite, is a publicly quoted company, largely owned by the government of Luxembourg based on a different business model, to provide telecommunications back hall services both heading economies and emerge economies. Hyperscalers data centers operators AWS and Microsoft Azure, variety of other products platforms digital broadcasting? GE stationery satellites put in it competitive position. Unlike LEO firms SES crew substantially by acquisition and backs,for example, O3B along with Google and investors HSBC and some leading asset management companies. Well, I keep on compiling lists of all the asset management companies that are invested in the digital economy and it's the same list of leading Black Rock, State Street, Vanguard.
And so we see the same investors. Fact that that group of investors clearly has a shared set of incentives is an extremely important element of the story about the relationship between the characteristics of these investors and the business models that emerge in the cases.
At the end we come to the core economic problem we can frame around the simplest definition of economics, which is distribution of scarce resources. Starting point is determination of cost in relations to the benefit of system. Seen the basic entry cost on the order of $10 billion. And the most common beneficiaries are either investors expect to make profits through revenue or sale of business, entrepreneurial. Sale of business. Utilize satellites for related purpose such as national governments, who expect returns through economic growth. Or major commercial users of internet such as Amazon with Kuyper, benefit, both by the infrastructure components for their AWS business and through extending internet access to more customers for their e‑commerce business.
The targets for revenue have not changed in tight very much. But they have changed in scale isn't internet access dramatically widened traffic boom and hyperscalers have been an important element of business. Incentivized business models based individual and small group access business supply chain customer and on governments.
At this point, it's appropriate to remind ourselves that there is a balance needs to be struck between the commercial and national interests. There both because national interests will eventually determine rules of the game and governments cost constitute and crucial and some case dominant source of revenue for the companies. It's rarely easy circle to square.s close to difficult situation for the companies to do it's kind of longterm planning that the financing bodies would expect.
Especially now that we see how volatile the state of SpaceX might be.
We need to consider what these elements of functionality of the systems are in relation to the costs and go back to the question about who benefits and who kind of tradeoffs those beneficiaries are making.
One critical consideration that sometimes forgotten in these kind of analysis is extent to which the characteristics of digital services affect national economy? This can be done by approximating digital intensity of the sectors that make up the characteristics of that economy. For example, some sectors are entirely reliant on data and associated services such as banking and finance, online services and entertainment, e‑commerce, other sectors are reliant to some degree but not as great extent, retail, export, others are far less dependent on digitalization for basic functioning. Even if digital accounts and communications are commonplace.
Those include many of the primary sectors agriculture, mining and fisheries. Britain heavily reliant on banking and finance has a great deal more to gain from advanced widespread digitalization than a country largely reliant on small scale farming and oil and gas. For Egypt, country with large occasionally population and authoritarian government, priorities of Army prevail. So there are tradeoffs necessary between say privacy and surveillance or between unencumbered international data exchange and internal control.
The loss of economic advantage is occur from advanced data infrastructure for a country like Egypt is small. In proportion to their current source of GDP. For countries such Norway lack akoranga assess to manifest major advantage. Sacrifice little economic practice. Others forestalling economic ambitions. For others effectively unthinking to lose any opportunity afforded by effective data infrastructure components.
I see this as the general background. And I hope in the discussion, we can come back to the relationship between our governance concerns and these two features which we can see as theme of what I've been expressing. One, is that as characteristics of, we infrastructure we have to consider who the beneficiaries are exactly, and how they receive that benefit. and at what cost, what tradeoffs.
Ed second is given did diversity of governance and business models regulatory powers should be used to forestall, foreseeable conflicts. Including things like state enacted functions universal access an unbridled seeking behavior. So I'll leave my initial comments there and hope we can pick up on these two points about characteristics of infrastructure and the significance of these governance models for specific regulatory powers that can and should be applied.
>> thank you very much. I think there are many interesting issues that you raised in your presentation. And I look forward to helping the discussion go along those lines. Before we do that, I think the best if I pass the floor over to Joanna to immediately start your presentation. Okay?
>> JOANNA KULESZA: More than happy to that. Thank you so much for the kind introduction and thank you for allowing Berna and myself to propose this panel I have prepared few slides. My understanding visible to our audience and there is a little clicker to your left. That I might wish to use. Thank you so much. Just to be more self‑sufficient.
Thank you again. Thank you for this opportunity to speak on critical component of internet governance one might argue that is internet infrastructure most significantly as Jonathan elaborately emphasized with regard to relatively novel components thereof. Today for the 15 minutes I'll try to is squeeze this into 15 minutes. Stop me if I go over time. PM I have been given tall order to speak about international law jurisdiction, sovereignty and human rights. We all know this is a 90 minute lecture. I shall prevent that from happening our reason for proposing this session amongst others was this declaration that you see before yourselves or maybe more specifically input documents. To what will happen in 2 weeks at ITU, which is plus 20 summit. WSIS+20 summit met with group of expert colleagues working on LEOs and satellites connectivity colleagues from internet society exciting week to talk about P satellite you satellite and, decided that the most pertinent Ewa to pursue was WSIS+20. Avenue to pursue. Documents hoping will facilitate that discussion in Geneva couple of weeks time. That I will try to pick themes from today just to offer them for discussion here.
Together with other distinguished author it's would be filled new gave the document a glance. Read. Jonathan joined us for insightful intervention an supported documents itself find the names of the authors reiterated there. Close up of the document. There you go. You can see it more clearly.
Few points here including the ones that you see in the title of the intervention. I will try to focus on them. Traditionally, I should probably start with the introduction. But luckily for me, Jonathan has done a wonderful job explaining why LEOs are at critical junction.
It's technology has been known for decades. But now, it enjoys a significant increase in interest for a reason economic and beyond. We look at shift in intergovernment governance towards infrastructure at that has been prophesied by our distinguished internet colleagues at least a few decades before? Prophesied j happening before our eyes. Reason why we have chosen LEOs as theme for that specific dedicated WSIS+20 input is three fold. First witnessing a technological evolution happening before our eyes. increasing developmental trendies that John that elaborated on, very eloquently. Third, private actors gaining significant powers, control, maybe this is the time to speak about changing the traditional paradigm for jurisdiction and in outer space. And I emphasize that question mark.
You could say this is nothing new. We have been regulating outer space for decades. We have extensive international legal framework and you see three key components of that international legal framework before you. You can say jurisdiction issues are well answered. There are no issues with sovereignty. We they what it is. We have the implementing this decades. Nothing new under the sun. I think in this room, that statement might prove controversy. Experts aware no that is not the case. Jurisdiction article 8 of the outer treat space treaty attaches jurisdiction place of launch. Happens to be for example US US would then have the authority to govern the activities that have given object. Possibilities liability attached to that object, U.S. jurisdiction would apply as well.
Very simple paradigm is being contested which reflects the framework of article 8 probably not being perfectly sufficient for our discussions in 2025. It attaches control based on the very traditional concept of jurisdiction attached to a state. Also introduce issues. For example, farm shopping but most significantly suggestly look at liability being attached to the space, to the state of launch itself? Witnessing increase role of private actors thinking forever more about multistakeholder challenge to governance impacting actions happening WSIS+20 happening following weeks. As we do progress, we looking at issues that are attached to this dated framework.
On one hand mentioned already? That are attached) reflective the flags of convenience challenges we witnessed other international spaces like the open sea for example. Jurisdiction attribution is based on states trying to reach more functional arrangement introducing national laws are few examples here for the purpose of time. I'm going to try and go through them quickly.
One could say that he default legal framework for states not to hold national appropriation whereas if you review three examples that I have here, you will see that states are indeed trying to overreach beyond that traditional jurisdictional framework all the way back into 2015. US was first country to induce respective national legal framework might be perceived challenge. Luxembourg and UAE following suit. Question work on jurisdictional framework one we have in place is enough. More additional approach might be suited to address contemporary challenges. We might have time to circle back to these and Q&A. To give you maybe a closer understanding, closer view of what we're dealing with 2015 US commercial space launch competitiveness act thoroughly analyzed by colleagues working in outer space law allows for example, 40 ownership for the ownership of outer space assets that have been mined by private companies, one could view that as contra ducally to the original jurisdictional arrangement. That is happening right before our eyes.
You with see already said intense debate around this. Very briefly recap visible on your screens right now. Luxembourg approach is relatively similar. We are again witnessing May maybe territorialize national spoke us to the government of outer space we resources you would see companies domiciled in Luxembourg. That are allowed to extract their own resources.
Again, if you're look for specific legal act, it is visible on your screen right now.
Most interesting approach United legal issues. Focus on space activities? Asia emirates UAE would be offering most comprehensive regulation available thus far. The law is visible before yourselves as of right now. We are witnessing jurisdictional challenges and one could say overreaching sovereignty claims from state that merit rediscussing paradigm we have introduced mid 1900's. 1960, seventies. We are with increase of LEO reliance for global broadband, market access issues. Game for big players. Well developed states saying how issues will be regulated not so much. I apologize. Not so much with regard to smaller players who rely on infrastructure that is being offered them.
Then finally, issue we found off most significant importance is question of cross‑border data flows. So we would be looking at authority grabbed by those offering infrastructure and having access to data, claiming national cybersecurity, national security issues. And accessing data as per their national roles. Rather than looking for any international arrangement to be Erin introduced. These three issues prioritize need for discussing complex jurisdiction framework.
We look at this point extra territorial application of laws. We are witnessing data localization laws being introduced, perfect example, try Chinese national, cybersecurity law allows for access to data within infrastructure managed by that country. Looking at lower orbit infrastructures, offered by China, there is likelihood that data could be accessed by the country authorities there themselves. Not Chinese issue. Seen this with StarLink and SpaceX as well.
Data approaches might result in conflict of laws and eventually enforcement challenges. I do have a specific example to discuss how criminal law investigations might be stalled by this unclear jurisdictional framework behind data access.
Cybersecurity has indeed been the leading cause for state trying to regulate internet infrastructure, Low Earth Orbit satellites. Concerned LEOs might be weakest link in networks and I trying to ensure that vulnerabilities will be mitigated cybersecurity round when we speak about application of international law, one of the hot topics always been attribution and responsibility, data access is vital for the purpose of attributing responsibility, so who has the data has the authority has the power here.
We could look to the UN and wonderful work that has been done around cybersecurity. We have the group government. Experts emphasizing 2015 international law applies offline and online. Hence internet infrastructure would be governed by the United Nations chart. We are witnessing, the final report of the open‑ended working group being prepared as we speak.
One could look into those processes and say, we've done so much in cybersecurity we could easily apply to these networks as well.
This brings us to relatively specific arrangement in the outer space treaty. On the prohibition of military uses of outer space. One could say again, we don't need a specific framework because everything that needs to be said is in article 4 of outer space treaty. Outer space is not to be used for military purposes. This has probably been the leading theme for research also with regard to digital sovereignty and just going to emphasize wonderful work done by Giganet net colleagues elsewhere. Manual international law applicable to military uses of outer space.
Minimum project completed almost a decade ago. Detailed framework how outer space should not be used for military purposes. Last theme. Thank you so much. That's the projector. This brings me to the last theme I wanted to highlight. Human rights issues. We were hoping that might cover those and more detail. But again, this might be issue for us to cover in a discussion. You could say data is not really a problem because specifically here in Europe, we do have the GDPR and very proud of extra territorial effect. We speak very proudly of the Brussels effect. GDPR shaped global thinking about personal data protect, vital component of data collection one might have. And we also have the convention 108 from the council of Europe. Data protection is covered. We applied also to extra territorial networks.
That might be the case but my favorite example to counter that paradigm is this one. If you're following news, regarding internet infrastructure, there is growing debate star links with being used organized crime and that challenge has been discussed recently for example. During the council of Europe octopus conference see organized crime using Low Earth Orbit satellites reliant infrastructures to make sure that their data is not as easily accessible to law enforcement officials as it could be.
Erin west doing wonderful job. US prosecutor. Trying to highlight that criminal networks focused on I don't like the term, but professional term is big butchering. Using Low Earth Orbit satellites and internet connectivity to make sure their business is done more privacy if you will. This is the link with cyber execute and human rights. We might wish to have framework that will allow us access that data easily. Cybersecurity) last issue that was highlighted in the theme of my intervention here, question of connectivity and indigenous and marginalized populations access. Clearly there is a sustainability theme. Tunis agenda promised us we would be granted sustainable internet access and time to review that promise. Have we indeed been able to introduce international framework? Allows for equitable access to those marginalized or indigenous communities. We highlight probably one of the you vital issues to be addressed by WSIS. Wrap this up, environmental sustainability issues clearly, also includes space debris and ethical mass deployments implying ethical considerations to be made. The increasing role of private actors, facilitates need, to think about how we govern these critical internet infrastructure.
Right now we're looking at a classical multilateral network built around international treatise. But maybe, this is time to shift the focus more to private actors. Just to ensure for example, transparency.
One of the exercise we have done speak with Chinese colleagues on the way that China manages their critical infrastructure, both lower orbit satellites and under sea cable. Find the report here. Highlights very different approaches between different regions to critical internet infrastructures.
Finally, maybe, this is up for discussion, during Internet Governance academic network meeting, we might indeed ask for more transparent or multistakeholder focused framework for internet infrastructure low earth orbit satellites.
Love to hear your feedback on this are we ready for multistakeholder framework internet infrastructure. Should WSIS+20 look into it or maybe this is very different environment and model we used following the Tunis agenda promise not appropriate to face the cybersecurity and data access challenges of 2025. I would try to come to a conclusion. Work that you see in the document is based on the serious of case studies. Looked at way that StarLink was provided in Ukraine. Looked work done by Chinese colleagues. One web. Edges recommendations need to discuss jurisdiction and framework and sovereign did I grounded in that research more than happy to answer specific questions. Maybe we do have might wish to follow the work on cybersecurity through united nations but also through region networks has resulted in 11 responsible state behavior. These are clearly applicable also to cyberspace infrastructure discussing today. Brief reminder what they look like. They are rooted in international law. But it is by far more operationalized framework focused on confidence building measures. Maybe that is the path for us to follow to ensure that the aims of the Tunis agenda are met with the use of international law as well.
Last but not least, for conclusion, let me emphasize we are witnessing increase legal tensions Folk around Low Earth Orbit satellites and critical internet infrastructure. Session today is call for enhanced international cooperation not just multilateral intergovernmental. UN venue. It seems we have a lot of work done on international law how it applies to critical internet infrastructure. This the time to make it more harmonized and operational. I think it's 15 minutes. Thank you so much Mr. Chair.
>> JONATHAN LIEBENAU: Thank you so much. In this very strange silent conference format, I'm now being asked, well, no not going to ask you. If there are questions. I believe that people who have sitting down farmer below us, hello if you like to ask questions. Mics on the side or just come and sit. With the rest of the people up on stage.
I would like to just briefly kind of make some comments. This has been really interesting to see how we start in this space. Looking, in this space, looking at way that satellites are call to certain operations, not core to certain operations,er really intrigued Jonathan by your kind of differentiation between how you can say well, some countries need LEO satellites more than ear other some countries need this advanced data infrastructure. Wonder how that plays into UH discourses about UN discourses quantum of access and equality of infrastructures. That might be one way think of it specifically you're talking about sustainable development and ability to then move forward to that level you achieved what you wanted to do.
I think you went through the jurisdictional sovereignty, legal political, and aspect here. I think this is the call that you're making at the end is really worth while and sense of let's have this conversation. About where do we take to take these questions on satellites and where do they sit in terms of the international frameworks we want to work it. A lot of this is echo of the discussions we've been asking having about LAN line based infrastructures for Enter a long time. A lot we can draw from that kind of space.
I find this interesting time to be having this discussion. As you said. If we're now thinking towards future what kind of frame words will we be working with. Quite similar opportunities for conversation around the room we have some people who very keen to talk. I've taken up more time. Show of hands, keen to talk. I will also look online. Start in this direction. If that's okay. This direction go around. Minutes to ask your question. We'll collect couple for the panelists if that's okay.
>> annoying using headphones. Not using them. Very liberating. Liberating. Enormous cues for security at the door.
>> An incredible distance between the door and here. I just wanted to have been looked at broadcasting regulation that mid to late nineties, back at LSE, and being treated to the endless expense account of Dennis Gilhooly. Interested me to know that transformation just money is here? In greater numbers? Or rather market is here?
Second question I had, Joanna. Luxembourg German Bank Offshore, British Bank Offshore, UAA. Wonder whether it's possibly to find out guess it probably is, which American or British lawyer wrote the UAE treaty because obviously no real parliament involved, and it would just be fascinating to interview them and find out what they were doing.
I think you talk about thinking about things more in terms of private acers to, you don't get much more private governments than UAE and Luxembourg. Already here.
Really, really interested in the development of this bias haven't really touched on this for 25 years. Because I haven't really) dates all of this. Fascinating presentation. Thank you.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Well, we have under 12 minutes. Really like to get as many questions in as possible. Thank you. Please. language access for the record. Wonderful presentations. Very interesting in my question both to, Alex) question to Joanna anyone else want to respond. Looking at application of the common heritage of mankind principle to internet infrastructure, of course, that principle was first established with young clause and outer space treaty common interests of mankind instead of common heritage of mankind. And many people said it was kind of dead. Because it was based on the lack of governments or other parties ability to exploit the resources that were being protected. But now, of course, with international seed bed authority, High Seas Treaty common heritage of mankind principle front and secter. Chance to expand protection of public core of the national and other ways of looking at internet, digital public infrastructure and more global way. Be very interested to see if the current discussions outer space treaty is going? A direction that might reinforce CHM as to UN High Seas Treaty is doing. Extend that the discussions about Internet Governance.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: One person online. I'm going to pass to the next two speakers. Three speakers here. And then we'll go to Alejandro online.
>> Christopher you for record. Love your work Jonathan. Quickly, you mentioned rent seeking I find that two things in my mind. One is rent speak soaking works both way. Rent seeking. Lands lost from Santa Ana calls. Look at entry new provider chance to extract money in terms service provision. Curious to factors into your analysis. Business models question of pursuing different ones would fit with different types of technology. But on a business standpoint doesn't it make them to do heterogenous models. Which one like to be best but the answer you would expect one person uses one business model other one uses different one, second actor, interesting to is he if that plays in. On your point, fascinated about your discussion of China data localization is one thing you thing. Other aspect talk about licensing launch and sustainability. Frustration is incomplete if you will participation of Russia and China in launching administration and so to me, different aspects beyond the data localization limit on multi‑lateral solutions people don't participate and lack of property rights in terms obligation there.
Remember thing is other as aspect mention data flows potential revolutionary aspects direct to phone which is the ability to go to direct to phone great Iran hates this. Because you can't there's no base session, earth session you can track any more. On some level, you talked about, problems with data localization. Other human rights standpoint, portend huge benefits and term accessibility, we're talking about US now, CAP on universal service 1400 cost of Starling. So now, we are putting upper bound on what you need to connect with people and potentially hugely beneficial people remote areas. How do you strike that balance?
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Before moving on, and taking additional questions I'm wondering how is your capacity to respond? I want to answer now or move? Maybe Milton, just pause on the question. Give you three minutes in total to respond to those and then we can come back to the next question.
>> JONATHAN LIEBENAU: Okay. Chris and Christopher, Chris spoke first. Why you know? Some of it has to do with cost. Yes. Launch cost is dramatically less. Entry cost is low. When I was trying to figure out what the entry cost was, I thought $10 billion was rather small amount of money for entry into LEOs. Of course, the cost mount up and that is not to compare Kuipers entry cost to start link. Cost is lower but 25 years ago, or more, that the small cheap satellites were being developed. Siri was already producing quite cheap. I think it does come down to difference between then and now to the spillover figures. Economic value of using data infrastructure which has do with dissemination of large scale usages. E‑commerce, complete transformation of military usage, and other things that go beyond the kind of telecoms model which still prevails 25 years ago as basic with earth sensing and other such functions on top.
I think that's part of it.
The main point I wanted to make about data intensity industrial sectors structure of economy will be significant determinant as to what the trade offs are going to be on how you want to play the game. So it shouldn't surprise us that country like Egypt or indeed Turkey or number of other countries that have authoritarian governments are happy to pay the price, Egypt more than Turkey. More industrialized company. Happy to pay the price service requirements of military or government, as they see it because it's not as if the financial sector or e‑commerce is major contributor to the GDP in those countries, I think those things.
This is of course explanation of why one‑size‑fits‑all model shouldn't be expected. It may or may not be demanded but shouldn't be expected rent seeking arguments, you're right. Didn't take into account supplements cost.
>> interesting element should ty relatively straightforward to model. But this along with other kine kind of inputs intervention seeking specific, so in a sense the digital intensity by sector in relation to structure of economy is framing of some of that problem of specific element of interconnection costs and development is interesting. Interconnection cost and settlement is interesting. Heterogeny, I guess we regard heterogeny as general good. Good thing for any kind of system to have heterogeny. Unfortunately I think we are, in danger of losing considerable amount of heterogeny way competition policy is, working, to allow too big to fail giants in dominating wide range of practices.
I would say that the three main big segments of economic models are going to be probably first and foremost, data centers and associated infrastructure. That is trying to deal with that 6% or so not carried by under sea cables now but have certain advantages to move away from under sea cables.
The second is military in and third is way in which local commercial services like e‑commerce, might be differently benefited by LEO constellation. There again we can see one size is not going to fit all.
>> JOANNA KULESZA: Start with Christopher's comments. Thank you so much for that. I think we do agree that the multilateral arrangement is not perfect. We might wish to work on amending it. I fully agree with you. We don't see enough of cooperation months amongst states hence call for maybe rearranging that paradigm. Data localization part we can put our finger on know what's happening whereas outer space existing arrangements are by far not sufficient. I think we do agree on that point. I'm happy to follow up offline if you will. I like the argument of direct to phone connectivity. Way of the future. We're not there yet. It's still question of access to data. At which point going to happen. If P we lose on the ground sessions, still be outer space infrastructure that might allow access to data. Lose that link question might be there. Don't have answer privacy to security. I don't anyone has. Closely related to nationally sovereign concerns for states to decide unless we intervene tell them is there a different balance to be struck. Hope that answer your queries more than happy to that conversation. Thank you for the comment.
Move to Alex. I did not recognizes threw. Wonderful to see you appreciate the comments. Work of the global commission on stability of cyberspace fundamental will better understanding what will you be lick core of internet might be. Public core. Tenth anniversary volume is coming out more than academic discourse I regret to say I have not seen international legal discourse or including public core internet if you will, as defined by the global commission. And to the common heritage of mankind narrative but this is very timely discussion for to us have. Our call to maybe raise it Geneva in 2 weeks time I believe there is room for that conversation to happen. Regretfully, I don't have anything to report to say yes, this is valid concern we seeing discussed at UN venues I don't consider myself outer space law expert. I only do little part. Deals with internet infrastructure. So there might be better informed colleagues either here in the room or online who would be better equipped to answer threat of hope. I'm not the one to shed that light of hope on to that discussion. Thread of hope, I appreciate intervention. Chris' question.
International lawyer, UN venue, I would never have the courage to claim that neither Luxembourg or UAE or nonsovereign states thank you for raising that. I think that's what I heard. That's a question of communicating.
I actually know colleagues would worked on those drafts. I'll follow up. I don't have specific answer to you. But I think it is very insightful piece of legislation is that predicted evolution. I do agree with you. It's business‑friendly. If you will. Or private actors friendly. But then again, why not? We see bigger con country it's app and big powers focusing facilitating private actors best they can. Conversation for me to follow up on. More than happy to answer questions to colleagues and report back with more details what motivated them to introduce that unique piece of legislation. That's the best answer I could give at this point.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Thank you. I was just going to beg for another minute. We have three questions I would prep we do take the questions that we have propose we take the questions but we really try to create response brief because otherwise, follow on noneffects.
>> MILTON MUELLER: Several questions. I will focus on one. ICANN for LEOs I want to sort of bring some reality to that question. So ICANN was create because there was a centralized registry for names numbers an protocol for amateurs that could be somehow point of governance. Debate because there was no existing apparatus for governing that other than the IETF. When you talk about ICANN for LEOs what, is it exactly that are you talking about governing? What is the resource and how would decisions be made and Thor to make them be established? One can think of the radio frequency spectrum as being a point of leverage. But it's hard to imagine nation states giving that up. One could imagine launching, I don't know, just like when people talk about, what exactly are they talking about. Establishing new institution for?
>> University London. Thank you for the presentation. My question is follow‑up on yours. I was wondering after what extent do we need to create multistakeholder body for satellites or bring satellites to exist multistakeholder bodies? For example, IDF, barely see presence of any satellites. Companies. So not so much. From what I know. I could be wrong.
Related to that, what leverage do we actually have to do is that and how to that would change need to do so as business case, is competition in the satellite sector increase. Thank you.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: I would like to just now give the floor to Alejandro online. And then I think we'll that will be all the questions.
>> Thank you. Can you hear me?
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Yes.
>> Mexico City. Past 15 minutes past 2:00 AM recommend all chairs panels and workshops in IGF to give priority to distance remote connected participants. Who are unfunded and very often America at least working ungodly hour. Coming also on the points? Ungodly hours LEOs, is Milton's and questions. Once you decide on once you know what I want to govern what you really need to govern, you have to find a way too convene sort of force convening the actors and make them pay for the things.
Has hatched over years. What has happened over years rare scare, the private powerful actors, let's say by finding that they are violating anti trust laws competition laws or something else, and you have to have a set of stakeholders that is not already at the table or already operator and governments governmental organizations.
Stake holder like astronomical union marginalized. Concerned about the ill effect of satellite. Thank you.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Thank you very much. Two second responses. Sudden should we have ICANN for LEOs Joianne not ready question to Jonathan. He has notes. This is just for me to say that's the feedback we have received. Let's have a multistakeholder model with ICANN being paradigm. Not ready to write that paper. Because I'm not sure what this would aloha like. Go into multistakeholderism, not sure what it is we would want to take from the ITU. Maybe radio frequencies I don't see a central point that we could use ICANN paradigm. ICANN dealing with the whole debating multi‑stakeholders per se. WSIS+20 is the moment to have that conversation. If there are those have a clearer picture that sort of we hear speaking of at conferences, I would love to hear more. But with that, I would also share the floor with Jonathan because I know he has devoted some thinking to this. Second two seconds going to for. Thank you.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Please.
>> JONATHAN LIEBENAU: Okay did write notes exactly this question mainly to get my own around it. Very much on the same wave length as Milton in particular. Comments that you made.
I think first question is whether multistakeholder model makes sense especially in relation to the incumbent organizations that are occupying territory in this now. Where does it stand in relation to them? Do it is override them? Does it supplement them? If it supplements them what kind of power relations might be, related? Rather pessimistic about the idea but it's worth explaining? Especially to address those who are committed to the concept of multistakeholder models than I am. So that we can have proper discussion. And just think about governance from first principles and extent to multistakeholder model one form of governance not necessarily dualistic. Possibility. There or not.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Great to be continued on this panel. Thank very. Thank you to our panelists. Thank you to the questioners online participants.
[applause]
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: You will now see the chair to going to come and take my place. And keep everybody better time thank you very much everybody.
>> TRISHA MEYER: I will invite speakers of the next panel to join me up here as well as for the people who have end upsetting over there. If you want to join on stage there really is no hierarchy no order. You are very welcome join here which makes interventions easier for you.
We will take, 2, three minutes to set up. Also if you need that couple you have coffee or something, you can go ahead head and get that. While we get set up for the next panel. Thank you.
(applause)
MAPPING THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY
GOVERNANCE: FROM DOMESTIC COALITIONS TO GLOBAL
NORMS
>> TRISHA MEYER: Interest of time I think we will get started with the second panel of the Giganet annual symposium.
If I can invite everyone who does not have headphones on therefore cannot hear me to sit down. I shouted camera off. Mic off.
So the second panel today discusses the state of multilateralism and internet governance from a longterm perspective. Research is part of EU funded horizon Europe research project on multi‑lateralism and technology. Governance called report an outage REMIT and panel is entitled mapping politics of global technology. Governance from domestic coalitions to global norms.
We have three papers as well as a discussant. Who will from my understanding, you'll intervene after the three panels three papers have been presented. The presenters have 10 minutes each. And the slide should be appearing up on screen as well.
I take the note from the previous Q&A that I will take remote participants questions first. When we get it that point in the panel.
So with that, I would like to first issue a I'm not going to apologize. But there is a baby here. So as a chair I will be kind of both doing time keeping as well as child care juggling. But just so everyone is aware of that we have a young IGF member here with us as well.
All right. With that, I will pass on to the first speaker. Roberta Haar also introduce the REMIT project.
>> ROBERTA HAAR: Hope he has slides already. Upon? First presentation. Is that possible.
>> ROBERTA HAAR: Yes. Good morning everyone very pleased that we have some people in the audience my name is Roberta Haar professor Roberta Haar. PI consortium called consortium. Three papers that our research. Diverse. Work packages, content work packages see element of each one of those work packages.
Just I want to give you this warning. Little bit of brief report what we've done. In our second year. Just finished second year of the consortium project. We had a very good report from the E.U. commission two independent evaluators. Report came last week evaluators gave flying colors also conference last year which was very well attended very successful. Photos from that is well. Our project is in response to EU horizon call from multilateralism and transnational democracy. Strategic technologies emerging technologies an see there different, overall scope of what we looked at, four main domains of technology. And next slide that I will show you also is specific technologies that we're looking at. How we tackled it all. I myself research under the consortium. Geopolitics part. My paper that you'll see, see next.
See that we have quite broad. Also reflects the contents of our papers this morning. So these are the technologies. You can see we have digital and quite a array there. Ones that we crossed out were the ones that we had proposed. To the commission. We didn't actually go forward with them. But see we have been quite extensive in the type of ways that we have developed to access these technologies. I will talk about that in a later slide. Work package one I'm leading with some help University where I'm based. Monitoring cord nighing the project. Work package 2 also leading methodological part. Dennis helps me in that. Data management guy. Both plan, I've been putting together a stakeholder contact list and also, I made a handbook which is on the methodology we're using in the consortium. Advocacy coalition framework which is more associated with public policy. But we're using it in foreign policy and all kinds of things. Mapping out coalition. Finding out who is working in policy areas and different policies subsist temps. What do they believe what policy do they want.? Subsystem) foundational part of research we're doing. That very evident in the research that I have done will present to you also this morning. You see that we have been also developing see there, scenario testing workshops. We also developed serious game. Scenario exploration system. We've done with the joint research center EU commission and I will show you that hire here slide of that. People there developed you through the data we have developed, we put it into a game. Serious game. We already played it now twice. With some very positive results. Try to bring our data more live and scenarios. So we did a lot. Developed it. Did some testing. I tested it with our partner there. And row mine yeah. Tested in students in Moss strength developed innovative aspect of understanding our data. And reviewers thought it was very innovative and very good way of learning about what we produce normative construction. Dennis lead work package three. Going to share his research with you today, Mariel, apart of that also panel today. Part of that work package. As you see also last year, two years ago IGF in Kyoto.
I'm in the work package 4. Look normative how does it feed into first reading to the geopolitics. So I am a American foreign policy specialist trans study relationship foreigncy my research focusing on American transatlantic. What I'll be presenting to you next. My research done with FILA Institute of National Affairs. 5, normative construction bring things on the economic and social level. Pollinia will position present today with that. James Shires also a paper that we have today.
Last work package is communication and dissemination. Also in charge of our website. I don't have a link up there. Which you should of course. But it's REMIT research.EU sign up for the newsletter coming out with the recommendations stage of our research. Please stay tuned. Maybe also sign up for scenario testing workshop. We will have this was also our conference. Go to the next page. We will have a scenario testing workshop. In January. Have one first September. At FIA in Helsinki next one. He'll have one in January. On cyber. Then have one in April in Rome second conference. Big REMIT conference there. Well many to sign up for the conference.
Another two workshops at Louvre one on intergovernment governance and one on quantum. In the fall like to come to workshop, interest in those particular technologies, please sign up. Please let us know. We would love to have you there. Also, if you're going to EISA, we have a whole section, remit section nine panels. Some of our researchers will be close panels then opened it up to panels. Title of our section is navigating geopolitics of strategic technology. Greater encourage you in Barcelona late August, come to one our panels.
So that is the end of that. Save questions for the end. Right? Okay.
We can move on to my second presentation. Sorry if I went through that fast. Didn't have very much time. You can see that we're doing a lot of research in remit.
So as I promised so my own area of research is transatlantic relations. Looking at particular US foreign policy. I did this research really look at different coalitions using apathy coalition, specifically within Biden administration. Look at three coalitions making policy, what their beliefs are, and of course that also spills over to American foreign policy today.
I did this with Finnish Institute of National Affairs. Researcher question. Joe Biden assumed office, promised to bring multilateralism back but he didn't do that, he really talking about trade, he really adopted very much the Trump foreign policy, also initiated blunting strategy, curbing Chinese economic political power, and plenty of examples of that, so that I have examples there on that slide. Export controls, subsidies to develop US strategic technology compatibility.
And so the what you come to realization what Biden did was very much a significant shift from democratic President. See that I have in red. Shift, especially when you're thinking about someone as a person own I'd why. Just before that Biden really professed liberal international world view. Marks a momentous change in US foreign policy in multilateralism with regards to China. That's my area going forward. What did I do? Collected some data with methodology. Looked at newspapers. I used LexusNexis database. Did some also semistructure interviews with officials to code these things.
Team of coders coded through Atlas TI. We made a code book. Call these things, you can find in the article that I put together. Already finished and submitted it to journal geopolitics under special issue.
And then of course I used ACF framework. Which was really designed and also done some research on this. You can look at articles that I written. Using ACF to explain foreign policy change. The last slide that I just showed you definitely highlights a foreign policy change in American important policy. Used ACF to, name this foreign policy change. This is the ACF all the different steps. And my paper goes true all of these steps. Can see that I rush goes through.
First step is identify, the policy subsystems. Liking at US foreign policy regarding multilateralism and China. Specifically in their rivalry of strategic technologies. Time frame, 1st of January 2021, to the first of January, 2024. Reflected data collection. Documents that I coded from that time frame. Identifying my first boundaries of this subsystem corresponds to diagram on the left. Coalition A and B. Identified three coalitions I will go through. ACF is really focusing on belief. What do policymakers belief, what is their world view.
>> that base on world view, what this do they want see the problem, what tools do they think are out there to address that problem? What are their policy preferences all those things are part of the AC if as framework. And ACF) identified actors. Potential coalition members. Through inductive and deductive coding try to measure coordination of the different coalitions if they have good coordination, strong coalition. Measured all of these things about the actors.
So this is part of data now. I told you identify three coalitions. First coalition identified was new isolationists. Many of these people are Coleen Momohara now of the Trump administration. Members now I think it's very hard to characterize Trump as a new isolationist and I think that current sort of turning on it's MAGA, MAGA crowd on each other. Is very much indicative the fact that there are isolationists in the Trump administration. But also, people that are more like Trump, maybe more transaction list. People identified that had these views certainly could talk about Peter Navarro or Steven Miller, Chris Miller all of these people are very much isolationists views. Is linked fighting within the Trump administration. Identify through structural codes I trying to capture their world, views.
Also with value coding. Second coalition multilateralists. People within America, foreign policy subsystem, who still really focus on multilateralism believe that way to go forward. I will show you also some of the views I have later tables.
A lot of data out there that I'm throwing at you. Greater encourage you to then look at the cold front overall article goes into more detail. Those that are primary coalition within the Biden administration. We labeling them flexi‑lateralists somewhat multi‑lateralists and somewhat new isolationists. Identify these coalitions.
Step 3 talk about identifying their different beliefs. Here you see these are all the beliefs and a.m. pa think coalition divides beliefs deep core, near core and second core. Deep core are those things that are really at the heart how you see the world. And then this will inform how you want to then guide your vision of the world, and finally, actually what policies do you want enacted based on all your deep core and near core beliefs. Then I try to capture beliefs because of course captioning belief SS difficult thing to do. I captured that through value coding. Captures world view expressions world view. LexisNexis database. Beliefs new isolationists. And the part blue things that the new isolationists coincide with the flexi‑lateralists. No things in green overlap are the multi‑lat rests, flexilateralists see as alluded to in the beginning, that flexi‑lateralism has a lot in common with new isolations. Blunting with Trump administration that they adopted many of the same views? Trump administration, you're to see Trump economic way, rival way I what China, similar Biden administration similar to the Trump administration. A lot of red coincide.
So what I do? Maybe it's hard to see there. But? Left side, that is the access for coalitions. On the right side, is actually looked at what was were the main technologies that they talk about, then can you see that robotics, and cyber and biotechnology up there. But it's really think that everybody talked about was artificial intelligence. Military and civilian. Part of it. I would through descriptive coding tried to capture, the dynamics between the different coalition. Who is winning the argument? Who is being able to shape policy? See tried to do that. Green, multilateralists might be interested for people today, they are in the minority. They were not very much heard. Voices were drowned out. By obviously flexi‑lateralists voices.
This is the code occurrence. About beliefs. Then you can see who is informing beliefs. And which beliefs you see that flexi‑lateralists core beliefs very much informing again AI. A little bit of biotechnology. A little bit of robotics. I am going fast was because I realize I don't have a lot of time. My chair is telling me I don't have much time. This gives you Sam of the findings that we have. Sam sample interesting. If you looked at early version on ACF, external events are also very important when you talking about shifts or changes in policy. Coded for 10 different external events. Most important external event shaping policy. Overwhelmingly came up from this time frame, that way the computer power is linked to great powers most important element of what everyone was talking about. What most impact why the policy shifted in America from one of more multilateralists.
>> Support of liberal international order to one of being concerned about multilateralism, doesn't it really Trumpy, cold war order really what is benefiting America.
You see that computing power very essential in the shift. That's end of it. I went fast. I guess we can later we'll have questions. Okay. Good. I'm sorry if it was too fast. Tried to be fast.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Perfect. Before my timer went off. Thank you so much. To Roberta. For the first presentation. We have a small shift in the program in that we will, that we will be taking the paper that is listed third as second. So I now pass on the floor to Dennis and governance finding act for principle networks between 321 digital build bill of rights. Floor is yours for 10 minutes. Thank you.
>> Great. Thank you. Now we're ready to go. Very odd phones on. You hear yourself double. Waiting for slides to appear. Talking about digital bills of rights. Topic that has been explored in the academic world for a little bit longer. At the same time not to the depth of everything actually interesting.
Digital bills rights make normative claims about how the internet and more expansively digital technologies ought to be governed what right be people joy. What these documents tell us about nature of global digital governs courses. Governance. Did discourse. Joint program. Led by Dennis Redeker an myself. Working together with Nicola Palladino and efforts other people on the slide.
Since we have limited time, let's dig right there. Digital bills right, what are they? Employ the characteristic jargon constitutions, documents made by states, classifying core rights for example, and articulating rights of individuals and establishing obligation. Way constitutions to. Directed different holder power. Public trying to restrain you are Po of straits. Also private older of power? Restrain power of states j African declaration of internet right an freedoms.
So in terms he research questions, we've been trying to do is to study I very large set of these digital bills rights. Covering over 30 years cover a lot of development thinking about governing digital space. How is the norm of it discourse about digital rights structure, which actors discourse coalition can go far beyond state as with know which principles are affiliated with these different coalition. That form around particular discourses.
So expanded previously existing data sets. Expanded to 321 digital bills rights covering 9092 to 2023. Interested in learning more, also a lightning talk number 80 on Wednesday. Talk about data set more and also interactive interface that you can use to explore it.
These are all digital bill rights related to internet, to digital technologies. To platforms, to AI governance and principles related to different technologies.
All been hand code a lot of people working hard on this data set hand coded for 58 principles of various categories of data or Meta data. Things like freedom of expression, privacy and so on.
Won't spend too much time on this. Interesting thing in with what kind of documents actually are producer and how many of them. Over time, see that there is increasing use of this format, so more and more digital bills of rights are being put out. Especially in the last few years, largely because of AI related documents.
You see a peek but most of that is, recent ones, really focus on AI.
Look at what kind of actors are proposing them, we are approaching this whole breath of Po is involved in multistakeholderism, and we do see indeed all different actors types using this format. But if you look at the signatures would put them would put them out a lot of it supported by intergovernmental and Civil Society and to lesser extent, for example, from academics but quite some involvement from the private sector.
One thing we find interesting from the script inside is where do they originate from in terms of regions originate regions. Geographical scope Europe is quite prominent. Featuring within our data set signatory of proponent of Digital Bills of Rights a lot from global UN, global bodies and North America reason honestly represented within data set. Final thing before you hand to over into my colleague, code all of these principles, you can see development over time as well, which principles are being used more often or less often. For example freedom of expression used to be one dominant ones featuring less within the newly put out Bills of Rights. Freedom of expression hand it over to my colleague.
>> Thank you for the introduction it data set and remarks. So I'm going to take it to some of the analysis when we doctor for the paper. We wonder obviously about structure of the how the curious is linking actors and principles and rights. They ash Enter articulated. Recode data set. Recode not just document. Document entails this principle. Recode statement. These actors who authored document are then taken as those supporting the statements. For example, in favor of multistakeholderism, freedom of expression, so on and so on. What we did. Did in the collate these results because you can imagine some of actors are authors of many of those digital bills rights including you're European, council of Europe. APC. Some actors very active in this debated and publishing these documents. Created bipartite network linking actors and principles. Wanted to know about the structure of larger discourse. 320 documents statement and more than 8 actors coded. Used rhythm how these cluster where which actors and principles are closer to each other which more similar and did not set the number of discourses or discourse coalitions that we wanted to see. So we had in the end, came up with four clusters somewhat similar. Show you this now. This is when we got. Out of the 321 documents. I think there's a word of causing. Mayor Ella explained that over a period of more than 30 years. Not necessarily people in one room. Not IGF 2024 or something. People debate something specifically around one table. Instead people might have authored statement 20 years ago and so also entailed maybe again 20 years later, different kind of statement. So we haven't done here is to look at the shifts. Neither on individual organizations or actors level. No on the level of the network. For this? Nor on the) working on this. But quite complex.
This is essentially first kind of overall descriptive. Analysis. The four clusters we found, you can see here, actually, there are three bigger clusters and one smaller cluster. See also on gray you see the principles assessed here. Principles for example, on top you see privacy. See transparency. Freedom of expression. Then you see the actors clustered around them by the stakeholder group. Actor, sometimes multistakeholder, could not form a group, group that authored no specific‑yeah. That actor is just multi‑stakeholders actor. Cluster. Human rights intergovernment governance. Coalition. Leading principles such as transparency, freedom of expression, human rights, accountability, freedom of information, heavily dominated by the civil society. Actors. Look at the purple here, this is also somewhat dominated by stakeholders location in Europe. And North America and globally. In terms of period, starts already kind of earlier document. We have very strong uptake in the 2010 for this coalition.
Second coalition, is the inclusionary rights discourse coalition. Here we see right to access, use awareness, cultural diversities often, participation rights an principles but also developmental interests to have, internet reach out to more people. Strong focus on one hand, I mean, Africa I think. In term of regions. Not surprising. Also, Civil Society. Authors.
Third cluster we can make out is the security and legitimate purpose coalitions about privacy, data protection other right and values that are at the core of those actors. Those statements? Actors are based on, we see here, a lot of government documents. Fitting that bill. A lot of European and global documents but not so much Africa. Not so much in North America.
Last and smallest of those discourse coalition government coalition. Really discourse about social media. If you will. Content, internet, broader topic, can be understood as more broader topic, but freedom of hate speech, freedom of disinformation, intermediate, linked to discourse. Civil society. Intergovernmental organizations. See a lot of Europeans and global input.
Already pretty much it. We are seeing here database that help us better understand overall picture of courses in the space. Certainly interesting to compare to this otherwise seeing discourse. Either temporarily one year of period of three years, kind of document earlier heard WSIS+20 contributions or input papers. These are other ways of understanding obviously discourse. We see here strongly civil society oriented perspectively. And one open question remains.
>> remains is how squares with otherwise seeing the world particularly idea that we have this European Chinese and American model, digital empires as new Bradford calls them project we work on assumption, how do we square this with those four discourse coalitions? And also, honestly where is the global self in that model of three additional empires? Missing but global stuff is part of discourse. So quite important to differentiate. That's it for this paper. Thank you.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Thank you for this second presentation. We will be moving onto the third now. Entitled Virtual Routes, Tomorrow Never Dies. How emerging technologies shape cybersecurity. Also have 10 minutes and I will also be using my dog timer in case you go over.
>> APOLLINE ROLLAND: Thank you very much. Let me just take this off hi everyone. Thank you so much for having me today. My name is Apolline Rolland Virtual Routes. Maybe just to let you know where is Virtual Routes. Nonprofit that it can tackles impact emerging technologies on global affairs activities variety of activities more specifically into three branches research, education, public engagement with variety of stakeholders. Paper presenting today is called Tomorrow Never Dies, how emerging technologies should be as cybersecurity futures. How concept of emerging technologies shape how we think about cybersecurity and institutions project risk and action into the future. Part of broader conversation how ideas like emergence and concept of emerging technology travel through different institutions and influence governance. Some context. Emerging technologies are central to technology governance nowadays. However, what counts as emerging technologies and its meaning is very much taken for granted? Meaning) cybersecurity is shaped by that thinking around inherently future oriented. Cybersecurity we act now on threats that are yet to occur. As such, con is he of emerging may sound a little bit descriptive but very political see fined seen as urgent requires priority on determining govern and funding opportunities? Research question for this paper was how does emerging technology shape the cybersecurity imagery and orientation to the future? Before first of all what do we mean by emerging technologies? Defined by novelty. Uncertainty and impact politically constructed and future oriented threshold space no. Yet real but they are seen as urgent. Cybersecurity other hand, frames emerging technology both threat and solution. So emerging technologies can be understood as threatening to cybersecurity. But then they can also provide solutions cybersecurity solution through emerging technologies. It follows quite a similar narrative as emerging technology. In that focuses on what is the next threat and could be the next solution. It depends on technology narratives to justify both anticipation and action.
However, one key distinction to make here. Cybersecurity can be both component of technology but also be technology area. First for our case, selection, we decided to focus on west. So emerging technologies western problem. We'll just, yeah. Decided to focus on the west because the US and allies quite similar institutional models. For finding and govern emerging technologies. Family shared liberal market systems an aligned technological governs or technology governance. US framed emerging technology both economic opportunity and strategic priority has led to a practice in technological assessment but standardization and forecasting. China and Russia in turn just to give a little bit of point of comparison, taken slightly different approaches to emerging technologies. That is because influenced by their own geopolitical contention outside the scope of our paper.
Nor to do this paper we have mapped out technology assessments since 1972 in the west. Without going through too much in details, these institutions helped frame what we understand as emerging technology in the west. And assess and both diffuse notion of what constituents emerging and which is risk is managed. Less being elevated because they exist being developed because they exist. Well recent are either seem more like advisory so there have been developed part of parliamentary duties or very sector specific. So for example, health sector developed specific technology assessments organizations.
How we evaluate cybersecurity as emerging technology? As we seen before, cybersecurity is both shaped by and evaluated as emerging technology. We can see them both as aspect component of emerging technology. But also, as a field of emerging technology. Existing tools, don't quite fit the nature of cybersecurity. Because cybersecurity is very particular kind of technology. Can be both hardware an software. Both digital and also physical. And there a need for better model but let's see perhaps two examples we have researched to kind of back up this claim.
First one that we looked at was Gartner hype cycle. Methodology developed by Gartner, private consultancy. Wildly used to help clients decide who invest and releases heavily experts judgment and market sentiments. Very much stout market hypes and it is not really backed by scientific criteria. Very subjective. Case of cybersecurity for examplar are, that could mean focusing what looks exciting rather than what is actually important.
Second methodology that we looked at technology read in this levels. Maybe more of accurate/developed technology developed by NASA. For the air space and defense field originally to track technical maturity to research deployment. Remains subjective especially in the testing phases. It also does not account for the issue of technological object lessens. Witness a technology is release leased in market deemed as being emerging but then over time, with height level, until next time emerging any more.
With regards to cybersecurity specifically, there has been many attempts to apply atoll cybersecurity. But rather inconsistent we found. First been applied to cybersecurity systems viewing cybersecurity has a field. Then supplied cybersecurity Technological innovations more component access to's given technology. Seen as, developed as cyber specific TR models. Don't quite capture the unique nature of cybersecurity and specific valuation needs require more flexibility cybersecurity is nonlinear. Dynamic and relational. What does the concept of emerging technologies do for cybersecurity.
>> two main thing. First justifies funding through speculative models with limited scientific grounding. And second, prioritizes cutting edge technology Will overlooking older critical dependencies. At the expense of mundane but critical systems. Such as legacy codes, outdated infrastructure but also, underfunded public service.
So to conclude on this, I will just conclude on that note. Question should probably not be only on what technologies are emerging but who decides what gets seen and what gets missed. And that goes to evaluation and that matters because it influences how emerging technologies including cybersecurity no matter how you see it, is governed across institutions. That will be all for me.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Thank you very much. Well chemist one time. I will now be passing the floor for 10 minutes to our discussant. Dr. Old gas. Served on current chair of the southeastern European dialogue on internet governance. Seating the floor is yours.
>> Thank you. Thank you for inviting me. A little bit outsider for this party. But still it's such a huge pleasure to engage with such a rich body of research and governance of digital technology. Listening to presentation, I have found myself thinking about how far conversation digital technology governance has gone in now. And how complex also it has become along this way.
I also want to know that what you had speakers are not just academic explorers but attempts to try to make right explanations, many of us working policy field, every day that we are trying to navigate. Space where both chair politics, governance ideal and normative aspiration of collide. Writing Ph.D. on multistakeholder policy make. Offering fresh promising force for the re‑energizing of international law. And it seemed to offer more inclusive flexible alternative state‑centric making something more agile and human‑centered. Kind of approach that could bridge global divides and bring in voices which too often were left out of the formal diplomacy has been shown today by the speakers.
We have come more, cracks in the multistakeholder approach and promise of multipromoted something which is totally open participatory and faulted in implement effort. Witnessed stakeholder presence rightly appointed couple of minutes ago, by Dennis, found also in the their research we have seen that Civil Society groups struggle to sustain engagement intergovernment governance representatives coming from the global south, again mentioned in the research paper.
Discussions how the quite a lot, but policy doesn't always follow those discussions. And while internet governance after 20 years, remains vital space for dialogue. How many left venue with rich ideas? Many times I can think of that. But it was very rare that we had a clear path for the implementation of those ideas and this is an important that theme after having all of these discussions important not just wait until the next IGF happening, year, long time, discussion and follow‑up activity happening in between. What struck me in today's presentation is also, how current research papers are extension and where it's construction of rights, discusses through digital bills. Shaping of cybersecurity future. Narrative around the emerging technologies or domestic coalitional dynamics influence what Diane kind of multilateralism is possible. Reminds us intergovernment governance has never been just technical corporation. Also about the power that stakeholders bring to the table.
We also should be honest, any policymaking process in this space today is inseparable political competition. Strategic technologies AI quantum crowd. International security. Who sets the standard? Controls infrastructure? Defines risk. No longer questions shown by example of continuous US client tensions? Notion of shared future collapses under national interest. I think 'see a lot of value. Shared with us in presentations. Tracing in a narrative gives. Digital governs understood. We practices need. Shaping playing feel. This kind of analysis can inform how we approach participatory govern. Strategy rooted in not just in aspirations. Never going to be implemented.
Help uses shop the questions. For example, who is shaping the emerging norms and values are reflected in those norms? How can multistakeholder spaces like IGF remain relevant. Constitutional decisionmaking. Institutional decision‑making. Can between bill and framework and anticipate models. Look at how the notion of digital constitution remains into IGF outputs. Translating values in the principles and principles in the pressure on policymakers. We might also consider how IGF coalitions could engage in shaping how emerging technologies are framed. Not just by dominant western actors by centers equity legacy and user across the globe. Take AI real life example. Mentioned here today. Couple of times. Today powerful actors talk about Frontier AI only game in the town. Yet for most of the world, issue is not simply GPS 4 or 5. But algorithm discrimination public surveillance in migration context. We need governance framework speak to both realities.
Yes, multistakeholder is still worth defending but not uncritically. We need to safeguards from meaningful participation. Mechanisms for accountability and pathways to translate talk into policy. Where the IGF is still holding potential? Embraces convenient documenting and advocating for complete follow‑ups and implementation of those insides and recommendations that are being so widely discussed during the sessions like the one we are having today.
To summarize I would say that road ahead for global technology govern agency definitely any Windowing linear. Won't be political. If we use analysis like one presented today not only understand the today, but also design smarter more inclusive engagements strategies, we perhaps he can still push the internet governance field to equity even in a world which is shaped by a lot of competing interests values and governance strategists. Shouldn't remain just in academic journals or panel discussion Senate room do our best to good ways to care carry them into our strategies partner and institutional reforms of thank you.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Thank you very much for this rich intervention. I've been impressed at the speed at which each of you is able to have, yeah. The words flowing.S and coming out coherently. We be moving on to a little bit less than 20 minutes of Q&A. As I indicated at the beginning of this panel, I'll be taking online participants questions and comments first. However I do not see any at this point. Feel free to raise your virtual hand or put them in the chat and I can read them out. I will move on to questions here. Within the room. At this point. Thank you. I'm from the University. Question goes more to the first two presentation. Wondering whether you have considered using natural language processing that could help you analyze in a different manner. Not placement but complementing it what you have done. Also wondering whether you have considered comparing data that you with different one. Somehow naturalizing things. Normal. Don't remember which person it was, most people talking about AI. Well, everybody is talking about AI. Pretty much everywhere you go. Interesting to find a way to somehow normal aize that or compare it with different institution to see if it's an outlier or regular trend. Interesting to see work on that. Thank you very much.
>> TRISHA MEYER: thank you very much. Take a second intervention.
>> Christopher you University of Pennsylvania. Thank you for the presentations particularly ones that I love the empirical grounding so many of these things, presentations of are often observational and it's hard to make the claims.
You keep thinking what I always think of humans guillotine, start with a descriptive analysis and question is, what doe make from it? Problem to me has historically political analysis theory what you will. Multistakeholder things describe them. Very little tracks on how we should design such processes in a ways that overcome problems. So I find myself wanting comparative analysis you mentioned last ICANN. Formalized government affairs committee. User representation and ways to make it more concrete. Because talking about multistakeholderism and pluralism values says little about different institutional forms that would make them better or worse implemented. I find myself craving some more analysis of different styles of multistakeholderism to make some more prescriptive claims? What a better and worst would like. Broad commitment of multistakeholderism a lot of sectors we have the work done by various people analyzed many flavors multistakeholderism and hardest choice choosing among them. Wondering work you're doing moving in directions set some insight into that.
>> TRISHA MEYER: We'll take about 2 minutes of any each speaker would like to intervene at this point. Intervene at this point.
>> Trying to gather data. Trying to map the world as it is, indeed to gain insights of how we go forward. We are as I said in the second year of our consortium.
>> MARIELLE WIJERMARS: At the data gathering stage of our consortium. Do the compare of it part that you mentioned we have people experts on EU in the consortium and experts people experts on China using a little bit different empirical methods my Ph.D. student, coded 900 different documents, doing more of a network analysis in China. Different groups there in China. Do they believe, going forward. So indeed next thing we want to do compare these things. See if we can find pathways overlap, things we can suggest. Last part of our consortium, last stage, last deliverable we promised commission, our recommendations. What do we do in the father? Now, you're sort of halfway through.
So stay tuned to remit to go to the website. Commission website deliverables made so far in our journey of in the end finding good recommendations and that what we hope to do. We also hope that we could harvest some information from the scenario testing workshops that we've done. So data that we have putting in these scenarios what will happen in the future. And then we can gather harvesting from the players. Recommendations that we can. What if they observed about playing the game that we created. So stay tuned. I would say for some more of that. And we are really trying to ground what we want us to suggest in the future through some empiric, hard data various ways going forward.
>> DENNIS REDEKER: Thank you all for the fantastic comments. Questions comments. Ties somewhat any think made the point of how digital constitution, documents fit in the IGF process and proposed, can we learn something for Constitutional institutional design. Fit well together. Where this data? I think have a rights to principles coded more like outcomes. Question is what kind of institutions fit these outcomes. How can we achieve them. Some. Codes we have are actually multistakeholderism, transparency, kind of different kind. But many of them are substantive in that sense. So really depend on create outcomes for internet user. Interesting question. I think something that we need to part of project also. Do other question, I think two questions actually, at issue, LMU starting project because of these data.
>> Not LLM. Not languaging process. Large languaging process.
>> Exactly. So different voice analyzing this. Where we do few masters students work on different things with the database. Trying to expand education. Relating maybe toed second point. Trying to more efficient in the sense of scaling, coding because quite labor intensive. And starting project looking into how we can code current and future documents in more efficient ways as they come out. But it also might them reason to opportunities to actually take different data source as play them, compare this to say WSIS input. GDC input to see cross‑references and see normalization. In a way, have to see how we do that. Not so easy. In eye sense I think comparison to other in a sense) other kinds of data would be key.
>> Very quickly. Comment back on that. Analyzed idea from the you've seen method. Happy to talk about that. Challenges you faced probably similar.
>> Absolutely. Let's do that. Thank you.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Yes have another question. Go ahead.
>> Much the evidence you're using reels to preferences and position. Rather than actions and outcomes.
>> JONATHAN LIEBENAU: I'm concerned that at least in some future step, of the research, there is more clearer relationship that is established. I think it's very serious problem. I remember in the late 1980s very have had in those it countries giving to have IT policies built into their serious policy frameworks. I related that to investment and import rules and various kinds of things. But it very soon came the case that all countries had IT policies. Very much looked the same. They did change. But they changed together. Completely decoupled from report outcomes that I was initially interested in. And I'm concerned that this is pattern that you may find first if you take a longer period looking over the formation of these preferences, and positions, and do more to relate that to what kind of outcomes we might expect.
>> I have a question.
>> TRISHA MEYER: I have a question online. Are you able to unmute or like me to read out your question?
>> Go ahead read that. Thanks for very engaging session. I am a board member of Asia organization and member of LAC ICANN. Ask from the learning from this discussion for the Global South if anything going beyond multistakeholderism. Thank you.
>> TRISHA MEYER: I'll invite response from our speakers first of all. How do we go policies and principles to practices or how do we at least capture those practice and then the online question, on the findings for the global south if any going beyond multistakeholderism.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Thank you for questions. Haven't figure id out. Jonathan asked about practice. Reform institutions keep those principles outlined in documents. Particularly those documents in the data set we have estate party and international organizations they do have the power, to some extent it confined in that. This to realize principles and practice I something that working on and great to also get your advice and input on underway we can structure recommendations and we can also look into tracking actions versus principles?
>> DENNIS REDEKER: That is the one thing we can do even before the state recommendations and can recommend how to bridge the gap. Quick answer to the question online. Great question. Indeed. The part that we analyzing, we do see as I mentioned, see this, heavily, one coalitions heavily dominated by Global South actors. Part of that. That relates to internet access, relates to participation in the global digital sphere and I think these are the kind of questions or concerns very much lacking in the frameworks we have for the digital empire. Certainly digital empowers literature, and empires, focusing on only on those great powers. Disciplines should do to turn this around. Not just use, only when we see it in the data, but really start with theoretical framework that entails I think global south as well. Patricia. I want comment on this moving from principles to action and I believe that whole problem about multistakeholderism you can have best multistakeholder, model and then all stakeholder stay present around table. This model lacks enforcement power. Comes to enforcement and implementation very often about governments will implement what has been discussed. Because even around the table, governments can commute things. If those principles and ideas and recommendations are not further taken into further into implementation not everybody value having all of those stakeholders around the table. I believe we should be really considered after so many years, raising multistakeholder model should look for the ways how to actually be more convincing decisionmakers who have the power to put those principles into action.
And also, it's very important to support the researcher which has been done by the academics to prove it further into action because such a huge for research papers different analysis being produced by academic institutions Civil Society organizations. So much money invested into that. Find every single research paper list of recommendation conclude again, where are these recommendations ending up if they are not further taken to decisionmakers? It's not that much value?
>> TRISHA MEYER: I'm looking around the room.
>> I'd like to jump on that. Not doing enough linking actions ideas to pressing positions to outcomes. Bring out might slide again. ACF trying to do that. I don't know if you, we are definitely trying to say what are the power dynamics between the coalitions? Actions that they are taking profess to believes in first place or not. we are really at the moment trying to map reality not only with them say what they do, and through that, go to the next step and have some recommendations. How to go forward.
>> ROBERTA HAAR: We're trying to capture that. Not always successful. Trying to do that.
>> TRISHA MEYER: With that, I would like to close this session to give everyone four minutes to grab a coffee. I will thank all of our panelists presenting various research in progress of the remit project. You can find remit research.lightning talk Wednesday, 2:00 PM discussing more findings data set specifically underlying some of these papers. Thank you everyone for joining online and here in the room. We will be back at 11:30. Give ourselves until 11:32, then a five‑minute break. Thank you 11:32. It is 11:32. You have a five‑minute break. ¶¶
(Recess)
GIGANET FRONTIER PAPERS
>> TRISHA MEYER: All right everyone. Welcome back to our next session. This session is Giganet Frontier papers. Initiative that we created for this symposium for addition of 225. This was of course, because, 2025 last session, was held in December. In Saudi. Didn't have enough time to do a proper paper core and review process. Instead we have asked two of our colleagues, that have been active in the Giganet community before to give a presentation. Without further ado give the floor for Chelsea Horne first presentation of this session.**(add session names)
>> CHELSEA HORNE: Good morning. Thank you so much for Giganet having me here an thank you in Tokyo to Sophie and Jamal. My presentation, first, my name is Chelsea Horne. I am a senior lecturer American University Washington, D.C. presentation entitled growing up governed parental controls child online safety and politics of internet regulation.
This project ties together three key themes. One is questions of platform design, which is something that coming up very often now especially in policy and regulation concerns. It's tying together concerns about online safety and in particular, that of youth and children.
I hope that this project raises questions but also, opportunities for policy interventions, to either think about the ways that we regulate online safety, in regards to children in particular, and also, some the opportunities that rethink the ways that we regulate design.
I see we're one behind on the slides here. Got it.
This is part of a larger project. I'm working on book project OMG privacy session. To set the stage, as large I want give context. First privacy settings, I argue are quit critical space for research policy literacy and enforcement. Some people say policy privacy settings are a hollow game where something that doesn't matter. One of my central thesis is that they do matter and is a critical opportunity point.
General conversation right now is that we have the situation that places a lot of burden and I would say undue burden on the user. Default choices, often neither reflect privacy friendly being practices and user preferences. A lot of research supports that.
Yet our online conversations about privacy are framed as matter of individual responsibility and privacy literacy. Have this at odds conversation that we are we're at right now.
So privacy settings privacy and settings together? We're looking at intersection of user platform and regulation. We have a lot research indicators user do not change privacy settings or if they do, only when they are aware of a privacy violation.
Platforms my research shows relies on questions control and choice via privacy setting and we also see how regulators find and penalize also look at things like GDPR, general data protection regulation and new proposed policies that looking at how penalize deceptive settings. Also known as dark patterns new term. Phrase to refer to manipulative an deceptive design practices.
Social media platforms as we know, platforms in this context, critical mode of communication. Average user has a approximately 8.5 social media accounts which is very important to think about in the context of my research because we're not look at just one platform. There's a disarray of consistency across platforms. This terms of privacy setting and default selection that raises a lot concerns about privacy in concept in practice.
Facebook has over 3 million, sorry 3 billion monthly active users. Over half the internet users today. They play platforms may a significant role in setting policies and privacy security, speech, data and more.
I have my slides here. Perfect. Here we go.
Parental controls, growing concerns about mental health and that of children in particular? We see emergent trend of setting allows parent to select, mediate and establish rules for child's account. This is issue I'm focusing primarily on United States raised global scale across European union, China, India Brazil and United States? Parental controls core issue of online safety.
>> Digital trust and resilience, responsible innovation and digital rights make it critical issue and concern of Frontier of internet governance today.
In terms policy, look at this terms United States here. There's been a longstanding interest including guidance on parental controls start of the 1997‑96 era United States started is to Folk regulating internet issue. Effect focus on, several on gag lawsuits, arguing in particular that ineffective or nonexistent controls contribute to online harm of children parental controls one of these key tenets sever of these on going lawsuits. Several of these j for you, what you see here in the chart, too many function I wanted to get from this. First what I've done here is looking at US proposed legislation, I tracked key term of parental controls over time. Specifically issues related online issues. One on parental controls in health concerns. Since it didn't have to with online, cleaned it out of the data set. We see two things here. We see from 202 to 208 it I can in it from 206 to 2008, peak legislation addresses parental controls. Around the same time as many of you know, Facebook and similar platforms taking center stage in social media. See a peak in platforms and we see a peak in legislation that is trying to target parental controls platforms.
Then we see second rise from 2019 to 2023. Until today, basically, in terms data set available. Another peak. Post Cambridge Analytica, 2018GDPR fully enforced see another peak of protection tied directly towards inflection points around privacy concern on social media platforms we increase parental controls bills second point is look at what are the key policy eras being addressed, see that for science technology and communication primary ones during first weak during second peak, concerns on crime and law enforcement. We see two different concerns from parental controls. One is online safety. In the beginning. 2006 era. And now more recent ones more concerned about on line safety in regards to crime and law enforcement.
Looking at the phrase frequency, of the major concerns of each of these bills, the number one phrase, each bill has like different subject areas, tied to them. So the top one was pornography, this was number one concern of most proposed bills that had to do parental controls. We see other concerns like safely actions, liability, administrative remedies, right to privacy, within the top five, then we see all the between top 10 are crime prevention, crimes against children, criminal investigations, criminal justice information. So there's a very heavy focus on crime and law enforcement in these bills.
Now, of the ones that within the data set, three will became actual law. And what I have here is excerpt refers to protections are quoted although the computer software and hardware industry and often related industries, have developed innovative ways to help parents to date such efforts have not provided national solution to the problem of minors accessing harmful material on the Worldwide Web. From very early on, always a concern saying that platforms say that they're parental controls privacy settings are innovative top of the line. Concerns about how effective they can actually can be.
So moving on into the actual analysis here, what I'm looking at online safety for children, two key components. Default selections many platforms change default settings for youth teen and children's accounts. And second thing are the actual parental controls themselves we see separated two different sections here. Looking at the slide several top social media platforms some concerns they have switched higher default settings for youth accounts, location, tagging, account visibility, messaging and also in terms of content.
These are the ones seem to be most universal across different platform. I will expand more what each of these mean. Seeing still a lack of consistency. Some platforms YouTube are not worrying about these at all. Some of them Facebook, Instagram, have some of the highest default settings. Most publicly have a strongest public rhetoric around this too. In addition to the more standardize ones, TikTok has several additional extra defaults that weren't really consistent across other platforms had different functionalities. Just showing that TikTok had the most nuanced to default teen settings.
Now, moving on to the parental controls part of it. We see here Facebook, Instagram, also have highest quantity of privacy settings. Parental controls in terms of privacy settings but also, look at themes being raised in these actual parental controls? How much time being spent, does it set breaks or prompt remind you saying you're on our platform for a long time. Does settings allow to manage actual friend of children, are they able to view or approve the teen settings like to do they allow the teens to regulate their own settings but parent still has to go and double check and approve those settings in order for them to be applied? Looking at filter, blocking of content and of people messaging. What text can be offered through extra parental controls TikTok again because they're platform has so many different nuanced components had the most amount of parental controls in totality.
Here we see privacy, settings I develop I couple of years ago. Looked at the privacy settings general. 7 types to this type. Visibility discoverable, boundary ability, contents, account security, data access and portability. Well as data‑sharing and personalization. So looking at different platforms, we can isolate each privacy setting into one of these categories. Lens of parental controls see here, two main points from this. First, TikTok has the most amount of parental controls. Whereas YouTube has the least. See that questions boundary ability most visibles across all of these protection, primary concern for all platforms is ability to limit access to teens or children's accounts? And then we see range of otherwise outside of that. Lack of consistency.
So in terms key findings, there's a wide array of actual quantity parental controls allowed. Nuance what can and will be enforced by these protection. See platforms take on the burden of visibility part. How access is teen's account to the general public? Platforms take on the burden of that responsibility don't give that to the parents to control. Do the study for adults, visibility was number one privacy setting typology put across. Interesting to see that what concerned for adults, platforms take on that responsibility themselves.
There's a unified focus towards setting limits of the children's accounts in terms boundary ability. Discord and TikTok have content concerns added new addition, question of transparency. Parental controls settings that allow parents to see a child's settings as opposed to having control over them. Discussion points raise by this type of analysis. See that protection like privacy are concept in disarray. See that parental controls also shift the burden or one could argue opportunity of responsibility to parents. And we also have questions about what types of and amount of controls parents should have, something that global perspective will be very interesting to pursue, in terms of research.
Final two questions, are, how will parental controls shape how we choose platforms, so say something like TikTok very comparatively strict parental controls options. Most wide range versus something like YouTube, which has very few parental controls options.
How does that shape our how parents chaos platforms for their children? Larger question what is the role of parental controls? One thing I can view is say that's a form of posturing by the forms we're offering choice and control for parents and it's a pushing off the burden and responsibility of online safety for children. But also could say that parental controls are perhaps a solution which is another perspective on. Raises question of what is the role of parental controls?
I will? Finish up there. Thank you very much. QR code linked in. Interested in the a topic love to continue the conversation and go from there. Pass it back to Sophie thank you very much.
>> SOPHIE HOOGENBOOM: Interesting insighte. I would like to, go to second presentation. This panel presentation is from Vagisha Srivastava.
>> VAGISHA SRIVASTAVA: Hi. Thank you for the opportunity. It's Vagisha Srivastava very on point.
I will be talking about specific case of CBDC innovation. Talking India. Paradoxes come up around inclusion and is your surveillance in the landscape in general.
Before begin, with anything, let me just ask you all, with the show of hands, how many of you have, show of hands, heard about CBCD before? Okay. Great. For everybody else, you have something new to learn.
The ABCs on CBDC, essentially Central Bank digital currency which is digital legal tendered issue by the 10 central bank of specific country and in most cases seen, have a direct sovereign liability.
We have seeing it being developed in two flavors. Retail player, which is for domestic payment and wholesale flavor for Bank to banks or cross‑border transactions.
It's often said that it has a gas light finality but depends design of CBDC central banks choose. Offline, instant. All of those depend. Atlantic council database, 130 countries are exploring in the pilot stage launched it or researching on CBCD development.The green ones that you see on screen are the ones that have already started a pilot. The motivations are multi‑factored. Some say it's for financial inclusion. There is strict idea that we want to build resilience against failing infrastructure, domestically in terms of digital payments but also globally with financial infrastructure being controlled by major dominant countries like US or any sanctions of swift, et cetera, what has become a key cursor motivation point for countries to (explore).
Also idea of fight against crypto. Saying that Central Bank digital alternative always compete with the cryptocurrency. Wondering why am I talk about this here? I have answer for you.
So why am I talking about payments at Giganet? Now, the three key understandings for me is that digital, digitalizing money replicate it's a lot of digital Governance challenge even? The intergovernment governance space before. There are questions around access gaps inclusion problems, questions around platform powers, surveillance comes from Central Bank issuing digital lending alternative.
Also aspect of sovereignty and I have classified that into two. There's monetary sovereignty aspect. Competing directly with crypto. States want more control over the issuance finality of transactions. Digital sovereignty angle states do want to have some control over the computer and infrastructure through which money Moves in the internet. Sovereignty angle weaponized dependence. Countries don't want to rely on global financial networks because we've seen that, they are proned to some sort of coercion in some cases. So if you look at alternatives being discussed at the G20 business, trying to dealign themselves from the US financial network. We see CB CD alternative. Fit it's into a lot of narratives we have heard being talked about in the internet governance space but just translates on to money. Digital money as I see it, is information which has some sort economic value and EU embedded to be entrusted associated with it. Moving across the internet linked infrastructure. So that is kind of why, I started looking at the digital currencies and that is why I got the opportunity to ear speak here about this. Broader picture I would like to Zoom in one specific case study there, two key reasons why I, chose in case study. One, because in pilot stage of development, 2, I'm a little bit more aware of the context because I'm from there and we seeing a lot of puzzling things coming up in the digital payment infrastructure that I thought deemed exploration.
I will now presents a timeline of the digital payment. This is link to CBCD, but whole development landscape what has happened in the past few years, in the digital payment space.
We began with hard infrastructure. Digital ID project that India started. Highly linked to the whole DPI dialogue been happening in the space for a long time now. And ID necessary because when you link it payment you have all the options of KYC and emails whatnot. We started with the infrastructure. Development which then developed into ID linked payment system enabled payment system. 2016, UP I launched unified payment interface government, central bank and government launched, to sort of provide for digital payment alternative that wasn't existing in India. Quite sophisticated technology. Flaws and has its shortfalls but in terms of infrastructure, itself, he wilily really sophisticated.
Linked demonetization attempt. Government attempt to enable more cashless economy to flourish in the country. Normally drawn in the country. Finally, go to 2020, when the COVID struck, we saw sort of digital payments getting accelerated because people did not prefer using cash. That is what ABI or Reserve Bank of India, central banking port. Global dialogue being constructed. 2022 to 2022, 2020, internal docks happening. Saw the development of or pilot launch of CBCD, today as speak one pilot of offline DBD direct benefit transfer that CBCD used for, but tool or innovation is still struggling for viable use case. Government still figuring out. Context in time I can begin talking to about the research question. There were a lot of puzzles initially because why would a government start competing with its own resources that it has developed with previously. So like I said, unified payment interface was working quite well. Digital payment alternative. People using in space of cash. Why launch CBCD, what is the motivation? Competing with a product that yourself launched? It's that the puzzle that I started with. And led me to questioning to what extent is India's CBCD initial strategic response. Rather than tool for financial inclusion central Bank issued BPF before. Three key areas you want to target. One promote cashless economy and wanted more people to not use cash.
Shifted to digital payment. Second one was they wanted to have financial inclusion in the country and third one was that CBCD will act as bad you're to crypto use under the country. Those were the three key objectives that they listed and inclusion became like big deal, most used terms in a lot of reports that you see.
Way I'm using inclusion here is slightly different I'm talking about, bringing the marginalized population on board including population on their own chosen include themselves digital payment alternative. Conversation about population chosen to get offline and not use digital payment. Of course, central bank government want to bring both of them on board if they want to promote cashless economy. The way I'm defining strategy utility here is value attributed to the digital Ruby in three domain are, safeguarding monetary sovereignty people using domestic payment alternatives rather than foreign. Highly reliant on the adoption itself. Second one is enhancing geoeconomic resilient and efficiency. Providing backup for domestic retail payments, GPI should the existing system fail.
In terms of the analytical framework I focused on four key domains. Existing infrastructure, institutional readiness. Policies Central Bank proposed, taxation, inclusion banking, the innovation attempts by public sector and private sector bank. Capacity of country in general, geopolitical pressure. A lot of dialogues G20, WSIS, Briggs, and sanctioned risk that I have already mentioned idea of design architecture which is how is the Central Bank thinking about innovation at the core of the technological actor itself. Centralized core. Offering an offline functionality. Programmable at any level? Cross‑cutting assumption strategic and sovereignty logic is ultimately sort of outweighing inclusion expectation in those framework.
So I chose qualitative study for this. Because the pilot is still in very many. Not a lot that has happened. Still seeing words in terms of adoption. So I managed to conducts interviews across domains an stakeholders. Spoke to policy people. Spoke to Fintech. Banks also some consultants closely will link with the Central Bank in the development of the project? Didn't get day chance to speak to any of the Central Bank folks. Always trying. Looked at official documents gathered contextual data from the board and trade statistics that my strengthen whole sale adoption. Been shown a timer. Quickly move on.
So key points here that I want to emphasize on is that also key findings for that. Retail side of CBCD in India adoption stays marginal and it will remain very low if UPI remains dominant and subsidized method of payment e‑government already supporting it to the core. Government is supporting? Alternative UPI is not going to work if that technology remains dominant. Supported during interview and supported by the data I collected arises from international engagement and geopolitical shops.
In 2022, there was a G20 Marrakech meeting that happened several interviews suggested that uptake. Pilot really began after that. So a lot in the countries exploring CBCD almost after all of the G20 countries have a pilot piece to be box attempt retail level Central Banks launched a pilot and now trying to figure out what the use cases are of that. Launch a pilot inclusion outlined to the institutional dean sign and readiness. Seeing through the internal policies that the government is really making it complicated for merchants to stay on board with complicated tax laws. Design does not offer online feature. Gives marginalized population exclude from this. But they're also launching new, suggesting new policies that keeping people who are already on cashless economy to go you outside of that.
Sovereignty and strategic angle to it. Skip all of that. That's probably equipment. One important point focus on privacy cybersecurity and surveillance angle. As of now, way pilot is working now, huge risk of centralization, not just India, but this can be extrapolated to a the lot of other countries as well. Single sovereign Ledger not on a decentralized basis. Single point of control we have a risk of, security risk we have privacy risk and we have already seen all of these build in previous cases with identity and existing digital payment.
So that is where I'll stop. With just a quick point. That is still a work in progress. I would greatly appreciate suggestions feedback and of course, questions. Thank you.
>> SOPHIE HOOGENBOOM: Thank you so much. Spend last 7 minutes to ask if there's any questions I don't see any questions in chat. If there are, please raise your hand. Any questions here in whole? Please raise your hand? Two?
>> Thank you. I can't hear myself. Funny. I can't hear myself. Thank you very much to both of you. Despite different topics I think I have questions for both of you?
>> JONATHAN LIEBENAU: Try to make them to the point.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Chelsey really interesting to see shift towards more securitization approach after Cambridge Analytica in the proposals that came out to the law.
I actually interested so in thinking about that securitization angle whether that fit it's into your research kind of take kind of thinking about theories, securitization. Ask you specific questions come from academic child and parent of child having to do he will with this.
I don't know how much of this is emotion and analysis. I've been very curious to see how in the European union context right now, you can't avoid walking around Brussels without seeing posters that just sponsored by Meta which saying, we are asking, begging European union to impose parental controls on our platforms. I find it really interesting. That's really Instagram, Meta, that's saying can you please give us the obligation to do parental controls. As if they couldn't do it themselves. And you know, why that relationship between the company, private sector and public sector in that way.
One thing you said specifically, one your point you talked about parent choice of platforms. I find it interesting because having 16‑year‑old, decides what platforms he uses and not me also wondering how does that fit into? Platforms actually make themselves more attractive to different age groups different moments. Wondering what role do I have in choosing that?
That fits into narrative that seen across the central incentive political parties in the European parliament. Actually trying to push the responsibility away from government, more to parents. And I find that a bit worrying that then we're told, you're responsible for choosing the platforms that your children are on.
That was the first question. Which is long. Sorry.
Second question, really interested in the map. To see that it's United States is not gray, not blue, not green, not yellow. It's white. So nothing is happening there. You think that explainable easily explainable because of the public sector involvement. Does that actually help your storyline in fact from the beginning? Then other another thing I wanted to asks what, we've been hearing a lot in the European union about national European solutions to certain call infrastructure issues. Such as payments? Core) and this CBCD acronym, and all of this stuff that goes around that, to me, seems to be part of the India stack put against the Euro stack. Wondering how that fits into that whole narrative about the India stack. Thank you.
>> SOPHIE HOOGENBOOM: Thank you very much for your question. I think I would like to go to Trisha and then we round it out.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Chelsey, it's a pleasure to finally meet you in person. I was wondering if you could comment to the fact that in your data set, I think you had about 30 bills of we prepared which only three were adopted. I think this is fairly common for the US context but if is anything to be said why there's so few and so long ago. Actually, almost 15 years ago, and the second, whether you considered looking at Snapchat as well. Just considering where kids are currently. Thanks.
>> I'll take those one. More recent. Yes, does track with a lot of different bills.
>> CHELSEA HORNE: Propose a lot of legislation few makes it into law. Pretty similar, few bills getting more attention such as KOSA kids online safety act in the United States. Proposed a few times. Getting increasing bipartisan support. A lot of conversation around it. Lots of concerns. Whole issue in itself. Been a lot of attention to it recently but not necessarily any action taken into terms of law becoming law or proposed bill becoming law.
And then yes, so I'm planning on extending study to Snapchat is number one next thing on the list. Then over to your questions, be very brief. Security interesting because it's often pitted as being oppositional to privacy. Part of my, previous part of study was showing actually that we see privately and security used almost synonymously. Can lead to confusion what is actually privacy. So that conflation of two terms oppositional, really, really fascinating, important part of this. This is hundred% agree.
Meta asking to be regulated. In particular. 100% agree. J2018 and '19 famous Washington Post article mark Zuckerberg make plea, please regulate us. And why don't they do it themselves? I think is question I think we have some of the employees would work here. So let's ask them together. Parental choice. Child to have the account, parent must approve the account. What I mean by choice. Kids couldn't have the account unless parent said yes, I approve. Leads part of the choice. Parent's account links to child's account, some of it all through the kid's account and one of the child's account, but yet parent must be able to view things. way parental controls are applied very disparate as well.
>> VAGISHA SRIVASTAVA: Thank you for your question. Yeah you're right. United States almost absent in the CBCD stage. Lobbying by banks don't want alternative come from the government. Recent executive order launched this year, January 2025? Clearly stated US is not going to alternatives try to integrate with the dollar rather than focusing on essentially specialized digital currency. In terms of new dialogue you're correct. Kind of attempt to build like a core infrastructure for the country. In the end yeah as well. India. One thing that's surprising none of the policy notes or annual reports, speeches by the central bank, did it mention sovereignty as a core cause for them to develop it.
So the narrative is linked to inclusion. And not sovereignty. But I think it would be strategically everybody better if they started to using this as approach especially in terms of involvement that India has in the BRIGS dialogues and G20 discussion and within the BIS as well with respect to CBCD development.
It's not part of India stack just yet. Haven't Laked it under that. Labeled it under that. I feel even the Central Bank, knows at the moment that at least within the leader sector domestically, innovation in search of problem. Don't have a clear use case yet. Still figuring that out. I feel like once at that pipeline is figured out, they might declare it part of India stack. So far that dialogue does not exist. Might become part of develop infrastructure if comes to the part government feels important. Welcome step but those dialogues nonexistent at this point.
>> SOPHIE HOOGENBOOM: Thank you for your excellent presentations and thank you for everyone participated in morning section of this program. We will now go and have lunch and we will convene at 1:30 with our panel discussion with a provocative title Should WSIS End. Looking forward to seeing all of you back in that workshop room 6 at 1:30. Thank you very much.
[applause]
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PANEL DISCUSSION: SHOULD WSIS END?
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Well good afternoon everybody. Welcome to Giganet panel. Ask those sitting in the audience to please move up and join us on the desk. Open forum for discussion. So ready to begin?
Good afternoon everyone. Welcome to the critical discussion on the future of World Summit on Information Society. Two decades WSIS cornerstone of global digital governance. Private sector and Civil Society negotiated internet evolution approach inflection point must ask should WSIS continue reform or end?
Born in the early 2000, emerged garners digital divide clash between sovereignty and models. Geneva declaration and Tunis agenda shaped early internet Governance. Challenges AI, data fragmentation and geofragmentations look nothing like 2005. Initiative global digital impact raise questions about WSIS relevance. Still serves purpose or legacy more volume than substantive. Begin with opening statements. Whereupon lists will answer key core question should WSIS end. This will be followed by moderated debate on key tensions from geopolitical divides to multistakeholder legitimately and questions closing takeaways.
Guide us through this debate privileged five leading voices. Left Alex Klimburg, Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
Next to him, Global Techno Politics Forum, Pari Esfandiari.
Next is William Drake from Columbia University.
On our extreme left, there is Avri Doria, IETF and former IGF board member and ICANN board member.
To my right, Dr. Milton Mueller Georgia Institute of technology.
Over to you and the question to all the panelists, should WSIS end or continue?
>> ALEX KLIMBURG: Thank you for that introduction. Following the conference in 2013, wrote we had experienced internationally between two camps in and cybersecurity companies obvious to all single mind wish of IETF to play a key role here. One commentator on my piece said visceral imagery cold imagery. Could have consequence came to the conclusion that sadly, this was probably correct and he had a change of heart. That commentator right. Need to be careful with our language aware of the threat of creating that which hope to avoid. Creating consequences commentator was Dr. Milton Mueller lesson that I think Milton white paper errors or omissions forgets importance of danger of inadvertent consequence, suggesting that we abandon WSIS recreate something else might be opening Pandora's box. Thinking negotiation today would be easier than 200 3 to 2005. I don't know if anyone thinks it would be years. Back to reality after the insulting scene at the US meeting couple weeks ago, US blocked WSIS resolution over SDG and diversity concern that the whole WSIS process could unravel.
I am worried too. In the end, highly to get a compromise if we have to. Likely, consequences are pretty serious. Not important contribution of this process in my opinion, rather, legitimacy that imparts internet community and to the multistakeholder model overall. Plays indirect role in legitimizing ICANN management of internet name space, former GAC carrier. Most European governments breaking only international laws allowing non‑European key pardons over infrastructure. Debate resolves sticky issues of the national internet developments, similar factors consider. Problem here and WSIS helps explain how national sovereignty changed for all us in the internet age. WSIS cannot really expire have to be actively killed off. Somebody really wished do that. Cast iron succession, not be too long before couple things would happen. No particular order. Firstly, many governments may conclude there is now little league basis for allowing ICANN manage a chunk of what they consider national internet segments include own TLDC domain space but others aspects. Secondly US government might try to resume control or key referral process. This might also trigger crisis within DNS second train of trust and roots operators overall. Fragmentation governments manage new treaties along Russia and CIS communication agency suggested months ago and which solid block of BRICS states has been arguing every since code of conducts was published or since 1999 first UN resolution on the topic. All really goes that far, who is to say that the Europeans will be happy to still back the US side on this argument. Also, really goes that far, doesn't go that far only have to worry about the old argument of effectively western free internet society versus the rest, already bad enough pressure on Europe that is right now might become too strong to effectively consider different model to what they might consider a suddenly hostile American tech landscape. Only way that could effectively placate European concerns in this regard say new or dual incorporation of ICANN, is probably unthinkable for the Trump administration as. Well. Have a complete fragmentation of western position. All of this is extremely doom and gloom, I think is unlikely to happen. Overall compromise in current WSIS more likely than some kind of failure. Even that might come down to looking at the link between WSIS and SDGs. One option is not to simply renounce SDG, commit to digital development goals. As additional thing to consider. Might be a small price to pay for keeping WSIS consensus alive, but might take probably until WSIS plus 22 to accomplish. Thank.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Thank you.
>> PARI ESFANDIARI: Sit back and look at it question of WSIS, end is timely. But perhaps not the right one. Basic question is how can WSIS be reimagined to meet today's realities. I don't think WSIS should end but I also don't think it can continue unchanged many.
We shouldn't keep it out of habit or nostalgia or should we abandon it just because the original context has shifted. Technologies institution was adapt WSIS in terms recruited systemic not historical documentation, accrued more relevance than ever if we are willing to reimagine it. Antonio Graham said old world is dying and the new world is struggles to be born.
Now is the time of monsters that captures a moment optimism of early 2000 faded. Digital governance is influx. Seeing concentrated dominant platforms of the behind closed systems. And states motivated by authoritarian thinking desire for control, national security, and privacy consents. Push for digital sovereignty. Frameworks like WSIS are under pressure. From AI, platforms, dominance, fragmented infrastructure and geopolitical pressure. WSIS remains key to governmental process. Formal multistakeholder inclusion. That give us legitimacy and flexibility. Call it as we lose, not, strong alternative. Must be forward‑looking to remain. WSIS should strengthen accountability mechanisms trust and legitimately. Governance frameworks active I integrate emerging issues like AI and mandatory computing and modernize participation models to insure and more inclusive engagement. For many especially in under represent the regions, WSIS still enables formal inclusion. Ending this wouldn't solve multi‑lateralism problems. Is it would deepen exclusion. Global Digital Compacts risk states led policies process with limited stakeholder input. WSIS not a relic. Mechanism still supports corporation rates inclusion and cybersecurity. Must evolve perhaps by giving IGF more freedom, why WSIS becomes coordinating value based connective tissue in a fragmented landscape.
We should avoid full phenomena choices WSIS are nothing, UN or private sector. I believe that governance today needs hybrid overlapping models. Ending WSIS would erase one few intergovernmental spaces where multi‑stakeholderism is still recognized that, is not progress. It's a clear case of institutional memory failure. Renewed WSIS can foster policy cohesions and debate internet core values, support inclusive collaboration.
So to conclude, WSIS shouldn't end but it must evolve and we should help shape that future. Thank you.
Jodi.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Over to you.
>> WILLIAM DRAKE: Welcome back from lunch. Having a conversation on the Giganet list that led to this panel being created, where are and Milton suggested that we have it about should WSIS end, I was very confused absolutely no possibility busy WSIS is go end. Nobody on earth wants to end other than Donald Trump. No proposal to that. Sear seriously that's it. No possibility of having. Why are we having this conversation? Got to Milton's paper he did with his colleagues. IGP understood, at least this is the agenda going on here.
Paper says, WSIS became significant 20 year process one reason. Intergovernment governance. Political controversy made WSIS central arena for intergovernment governance, central arena centric. No point having WSIS. Processing going on any more transitions happened and ITU is going, it's not going to take over ICANN. And so ICANN is sort of safe from the multilateral world. We don't need to have anything else going on. Pretty much serious misconstruction often entire history of WSIS. Started UN general assembly initiative global digitized transform environment, what it means to development. Two parts to WSIS agenda. Digital transformation and investment. What most governments cared about going into WSIS and that is what many of the stakeholders have been involved in the WSIS process have been involved never since.
Yes, intergovernment governance was a huge political issue if we hadn't solved it probably would have killed whole WSIS process. Can't imagine Tunis agenda hadn't worked out. Yes, intergovernment governance guy. Most important thing to me. For sure.
I'm not the world. The world is big. The world has 193 countries. And UN general assembly mandated WSIS and man dads matter in the UN to set of things? Mandates J11 action lines all involving 39 different UN entities and processing. Each of which has vast constellation of expert communities and in. GO and other actors with a variety of issues. Only care about ICANN. Maybe you don't care from the food and agricultural organizations working on digitized agricultural in collaboration with lots of other different parties but the parties that are involved in that do care. Maybe you don't care that UNESCO is involved in open science and working with people on that, but there is the whole process there.
There is a lot of peel people in the world involved in a lot of things other an ICANN mandate for them to continue to work on those things. Not going to stop because we Giganet have a panel and say it should stop. Thank you.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Thank you. For those statements.
>> AVRI DORIA: Thank you. I find myself in a curious situation. Of a can't think of a single word bill said that I would disagree with. No, it was actually a pleasure.
But I want to go further. Because we were asked other than some sense a silly question, was also normative question. Should it end. I personally think that WSIS has nothing to do with ICANN. There's sort of coincidental along the same path. That they marched along the same path for a while, and then they diverged. Lots of other uses.
Now, I am not sure that all of those purposes are actually being met. I'm not sure that all of those programs are as effective as they should be. Working in the right direction. That they're development goals are appropriate for today. And not for yesterday. So for me to say that all of those programs should continue unabated would be as wrong as asking should WSIS end.
What I really think is required is very much a reimagining or reshaping as with was said. Let's go through WSIS. Go true you through action lines go through the programs find out which are effective and find out which aren't continue those that are effective. Fix those or replace those that aren't. Some of them may no longer be necessary. I certainly have not done that. So that is. Perhaps there is a positive answer to should it end. If you do that analysis, and you find out nothing is achieve its purposes, nothing getting done, applying a bunch of bureaucracies purposes. Sure, maybe it will end. Find still value developed, shows getting them working on economies. You would immediately have to replace it with something new. In my view, it's analyze, fix, repair, get rid of what is not work keeping, and improve what is worth keeping. I guess that's where I'll stop.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Thank you. Milton?
>> MILTON MUELLER: Thank you all for participating in this discussion. I think this is exactly what Giganet can bring to the IGF informed scholars an have to respect the fact particularly with the case of Bill and Avri on the work of intergovernment governance charged with defining it. I have to say I disagree with bill that WSIS is a lot more than ICANN. The United Nations come up with various kinds of initiatives on various kinds technological things over the last 30 or 40 years and none of them really amount to. Because multilateral institutions systemically are not what develops, the digital economy any more if they ever did.
So fundamentally, reason we all converged around WSIS was precisely because of intergovernment governance. Because the problem was new. Because we want to establish anyway forms of governance around the internet. Now, really have to sharply disagree. disagree with Alex that consequences are serious. He says for example, without WSIS, there would be to legal basis for ICANN. I'm sorry but WSIS is a political document. It is no not a legal document. There's no legal basis for, ICANN or anything else in WSIS. There's nothing in WSIS that legitimizes IANA in fact, whole point of the first 10 years of WSIS was to delegitimate ICANN and to see whether it be incorporated into the intergovernmental system. Delegitimize. Most of us entered process at that time was to defend the model of governance by nonstate actors.
So I don't think that is a good reason not to end WSIS. That it has anything do with. I think ICANN and IANA survived this process. They have established themselves as a legitimate form of Governance and what we need to be doing really is extending and developing that. ICANN has a lot of problems. Kind of ignoring and they are allowed to sort of wave the flag of UH take over multilateral threats to avoid dealing with their own problems.
I think in our paper, we outlined different ways forward. Thing I would like to emphasize the most is the significance of global trade relationships for the future of intergovernment governance as well as digital Governance generally. The I think have to take the TikTok controversy or perhaps even before that, the WAWAE controversy as paradigm where intergovernment governance has gone starting around 2017, 2018. Essentially we have two largest digital ecosystem on the planet, Chinese and American, fragmenting meaning deliberately decoupling on the basis of national security. I don't think WSIS network addresses that. I don't think it provides any ways for addressing that. WSIS is all about development, sustainable development goals, toes kinds of things, but fundamentally, what is driving development or nondevelopment or undevelopment to this day is in fact this clash over geopolitics and this assertion of digital sovereignty is really a version reaction against the internet, so when the Europeans talk about digital sovereignty, they're saying we don't really want to have a global internet community global internet technology. We want to have our own and of course the Chinese are saying that. Americans are starting to say that. This is fundamental problem of digital governments that we need to start dealing with and I just view the world summit as a distraction. Diversion of all of the energy that we should be devoting to developing new forms of Governance deal with that fundamental problem into channels which are very comfortable, but really not affecting anything. Not really to go doing anything. Leave it at that and may the debate begin.
>> DR. EMMA OTIENO: Thank you everyone for your very objective and smart takes on this very important question.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Bill, you talked about WSIS. Not being about ICANN of but more about digital transformation an development. Alexander you also talked about overall compromise of WSIS evolving could look for connections with the broader development agenda as captured through the SDG process.
Account WSIS process the way it is functioning today, survive the potential crisis in western democracies and lack of consensus multistakeholder mechanism see US receding from these multi‑lateral constitutions. How is WSIS supposed to take up this challenge what forms do you think it should, it will evolve into? Institutions the question is open to everyone.
>> PARI ESFANDIARI: I think it could but only if it evolves beyond centric architecture initially suppose supported it. Geopolitical consensus once under pinned multistakeholderism is under strain. We know from national agendas authoritarian, declining institutional trust. Doesn't rest solely on the Global North. Rests on the ability to convene diverse actors and institutional pluralism.
Survival depends on renewal. Design leadership, depending on leadership and governance is grounded shared nonopposed values.
>> ALEX KLIMBURG: I'm going to quickly comment on what Milton said before I didn't say is that WSIS. Wrote the note down. Actually WSIS somehow created ICANN or legitimized modeled. Also plays indirect role in legitimizing ICANN management internet domain space. Name space as well as IANA large. Reason why I stated that it says clear article 55 and 62 makes messages day‑to‑day management, ICANN at that time. Part of whole idea of Tunis while we all agree, protect it.
Therefore, in my opinion, if you remove that protection, again, I grow with everyone else here, that would require active brute force. Then question is, what happens next. I want to make that clear on the record.
Thanks.
>> AVRI DORIA: Thanks. I guess couple things based to look at. Build on what Pari said. I actually believe that whatever there are of multistakeholder models is what can actually keep WSIS running. Because not only is democracy still a baby under attack. Multistakeholder model form of democracy newer forming itself and under attack always going to be under attack. But it probably can patiently persevere. And it's that kind of motion, it's people in the various countries that say, no, I need what the WSIS programs. SDGs bring us. We have to keep working on that. That is actually the force that, so as opposed to it being there is no multistakeholder, multistakeholder will disappear, people keep going back to ICANN. I think that's kind of like old chestnut. ICANN has problems. ICANN has really clever model for combining top down business and bottle up multistakeholder policy? One model haven't dove deep enough yet to understand. Irrelevant to the notion of SDGs. Irrelevant to the notion of the needs that need to be met. That can only be met not I think as use as some say by industry, not by unilateral or multilateral forces, but by very extensive multistakeholder push to sort of get things done in the ways they can be done, in the places, where it works and it takes a variety of models an ways do it.
So I believe when I think the only way to kill WSIS is to leave it at it is and ignore. But if you really want to kill it, you can't do anything. What you got to do is preserve it pause we really do need because we really to need, countries do need, that incentive, that ability to find their path. To the development goals thanks.
>> DR. EMMA OTIENO: Thank you poignant statement. Only way to kill ignore and not help it evolve.
>> DR. EMMA OTIENO: Thank you for poignant statement. Bill? We have time good on time.
>> WILLIAM DRAKE: As long as everyone else.
>> DR. EMMA OTIENO: Yes.
>> WILLIAM DRAKE: Device collapse of western democracy what is the relationship? United Nations general assembly going to adopt a statement saying okay, the WSIS process we reviewed it 20 years. And now, it goes on to the next stages.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Can go on fumes. Process can evolve regardless what happens in the United States with Trump or other kind of things. Doesn't mean there be effective necessarily Trump administration to cut budget for 22% of the UN budget, that it pays, down do nothing, feebles a lot of UN processing obviously that affects everything. Not just WSIS, that effects FAO, every organization, every set of processing.
WSIS is not uniquely endangered position because of what's going on in the west. But more generally, come back to Milton's kind of point. All the stuff going on in the digital world is that's important. Is not being decided through these UN processing. That may well be true. We're not solving the conflict between United States and China in the unite the nations. That doesn't mean that what the United Nations is doing doesn't matter to everybody. It's still involved in a lot of stuff issues that may be you don't follow or care about. But global digital divide issues are huge for developing countries. Spend enormous amount of time and energy in the ITU, in UNESCO all of other bodies working on questions. Ongoing work program around them important things that they might be not be top of our personal agendas. But there's a bigger world out there. Same is true with all of these other aspects. So I just think we have to recognize, be aware of false binaries. Important stuff is going.
>> Perhaps make everyone mad at me by changing that notion that the United Nations multilateral processing, have anything serious to with economic development and digital economy. If your paper describe the fate of digital solidarity fund. Big part of WSIS. What was that? 10 just corrupt bureaucracy raised $6 million. 1/100 of the amount of capital you need to started bying networks in the developing world? In the interim between the time of so‑called digital solidarity fund and today, there has been enormous economic development in the developing world around where does it come? Is it fundamentally rising capital foes and investment telecommunications industry and that continents to 1% to infrastructure to 70, 80%. Same is true will the application layer about software and those generative models, that development is does anybody really believe that the unite the nations is going to somehow facilitate development of expertise in software and artificial intelligence in developing countries? You think maybe some form of knowledge exchange, IGF facilitates, and we support the continuation of the IGF. Talking about economic development of the digital economy, it's not going to come from multilateral institutions. Be realistic about that.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Thank you for your ideas and statements. Talking a lot about the multistakeholder model achieved so much and now maybe we should reflect on how has this been successful in redistributing power meaningfully among stakeholders? What has been WSIS legacy for building global digital divide? If there are any great examples I think this is the time that you can bring it up and bill, I would want you to start here because you is very optimistic and which want to share your optimism.
>> WILLIAM DRAKE: I'm not necessarily optimistic. Simply saying that in the real world, there's a lot of activity. And in activity lots of actors are engaged in, that makes some difference on the ground, and that is why these things continue to develop.
I hate talking with these things. I'm not saying United Nations solves all problems, not. saying United Nations is the central player in global digital economic development. I'm saying that it plays a role especially in environments where the market, sorry Milton, does not solve everything.
If your Tanzania village liberalization in telecom 1995 may not solve all the issues you have with respect to digital inclusion when you and UNDP exists spending billions of dollars on the ground in developing countries all the other programs associated with UNDB and World Bank regional development banks and other apparatus, goes out there and does stuff? Try to provide source prosources expertise can make a difference on the ground.
May not be things we pay attention to. Doesn't mean their irrelevant to those people live there. We can't just look at this the top down. We have to look at all of these processing for from bottle on. WSIS is doing? Much? Bottom on, not just a question of multilateral organizations. WSIS created a overarching holistic framework for thinking about global information society issues. And for justifying the continuation of actions within larger framework. Establishes a framework that the united initials continually going back and doing reality checks, how is this going? How implementation? By what metrics? So on. Member he mechanisms put in place for that. Just sounds to me that like you mapped all of that Out of your consciousness as things that are going on. But they are. Encourage you to pay attention. What goes on with multilateral organizations as well as ICANN. Because within multilateral organizations lots of people doing also lots of things lots of activity and some of it does matter.
>> MILTON MUELLER: I need to answer that. Okay. UNDP does not rely on world summit for its existence and it's funding does not rely. So sure. If there are eight agencies in the United Nations want to support telecommunications or digital development, what stopping them with or without WSIS? I don't see the contribution. Furthermore, if is this COP assistant monitoring process. Constant, where are the results in why can't you point to specific accomplishments that are coming out of these WSIS reviews in which we say, oh, here's how we increased telecommunications access in Tanzania by 10% because of WSIS.
>> AVRI DORIA: I don't have your tangible proof. So I guess I'm actually the optimist on this panel. The one that actually makes almost standard of faith. Like a belief in democracy even though it fails constantly. Just like I believe in multistakeholder? FATE) I personally don't believe in UN a whole bunch. And I think probably agreement with Milton. I think multilateral is problematic and therefore, want to see more of those programs become more multistakeholder.
Include more of the stakeholders on ground. In making the them work and not so far as the sovereignty notion, but just the participatory notion and that is as opposed to sort of say, well we have UNDP and they can do it all. Then central, top down. It's not WSIS that opens up the possibility of making it at the ground level be something that can be participatory by the people, who would gain from it, and therefore, again, act of faith, multistakeholder baby of 20 in a world of thousands.
So the fact that I have faith this baby will grow up and be useful, I think I've seen little pieces, I didn't do the work to come up with a list of facts and figures. But I'm willing to bet at least a dinner, that there are those factors that probably people out there could probably even quota at us. Work constantly stay within WSIS, within the these action lines? Dedicated their lives to them and maybe PARI will have something. Really, I just don't believe this multilateral system. I think that much is probably playing from almost I've ever said or written what we've got. Got to cope with it I do believe we need to, use the word in infect, ineffect the multi‑stakeholder model and eventually replace it with multistakeholder models of various kinds. Thanks.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Put on spot. Regional IGFs, kind of IGFs efforts that are stemming from WSIS, impact Global South, from your experience, what has worked with the WSIS process so far in?
>> Tall order to expect WSIS+20 resolve all the poverty distribution entirely, but we shouldn't forget that why WSIS hasn't managed to redistribute entirely, too loaded but it has for the WSIS was first forum to full normally reorganize participation of Global South. Not as a recipient but as a governance actor. Big achievement we shouldn't undermine. Big governance lying in inclusion even imperfect. Inclusion must lead agree he. Next phase I believe lies through equity requires WSIS move beyond representation towards structure reform. Linking capacity‑building with agendas setting, and ensuring that southern voices shape not just discussions but decisions. Equity is not legacy, continuing obligation. So I think WSIS has achieved a lot. But it needs now to go further. And we are in that moment.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Thank you. Also don't feel capable doing sum total accounting of the contribution of WSIS+20 alleviating global poverty or oversees aid, development along those lines I do hypothesis effectively agree with Avri very much here. Plays a role drive the notion of multistakeholderism and importance of the internet community of and that in turn has other follow on effects that are incredibly important. I find it difficult to imagine Diana transition which obviously played also due to the political circumstances of Snowden revelations would have have been conceivable US government space without longer lasting narrative of multistakeholder model that was effectively driven through the WSIS process. For me, that's already one example of why it may be good thing to keep continuing because I also believe that it is evolution of democracy to continue multi‑stakeholders of model. Building on WSIS best way to keep it live. Leaving it static would be a good way to kill it.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Consensus don't kill WSIS but it needs to evolve and that leads me to my last question for the panel. Before we open up the panel to the audience.
What happens if WSIS actually fails to reform? We have seen competing in tariffs like the GDC, seeing digital trade initiatives, a lot of these very high state technology development is happening through bilateral agreements multi‑lateral trade crisis countries are also grappling with sovereignty claims. Where do these issues go if the WSIS process doesn't reform enough to take on these contested issues? And how can WSIS actually evolve in a way because we've been dealing with this question for many, many years. Is it like, it's supposed to be about cooperation but it really can't pick up any serious issues. Because we don't want to ruffle fathers. What does it reform really look like? Why with you like to begin?
>> AVRI DORIA: Sure. I guess first thing is ruffled feather basically. The thesis I would have anything that is run by the.
Is going to have many failure modes basically. UN is fairly good I think at, initiating things. Getting bunch of people together and saying, go forth and do. But once it says the go forth and do, it should pull back and 10 year later come back and say, so how did you do? And actual have a good methodology for reviewing, in other words, if the UN could sort of center itself on having ideas, sending them forward and analyze results may actually be useful because it does get a global picture. It does create a space like the IGF lots of people can come together and spout off their views of things. Give their opinions.
But it doesn't do a very good job of doing anything.
So my view of getting WSIS+20 work is sort of pulling UN back and moving forward with various multi‑stalk holder kind of initiatives that can actually get the work done.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Earlier panel we had some of these same discussions should WSIS do something or is it just very importantly forum for con‑con convening different stakeholders different ideas doing something would negate that. What you do I in? Convening).
>> WILLIAM DRAKE: I think we should be realistic about WSIS and it can't both be, ineffective irrelevant thing and a too big albatross on the world thing. It's obviously somewhere in between. The WSIS is just a process by and large on basis coordination among different programs got 39 different bodies that are coordinating and sharing information and checking against each other and saying, what is going on with this? How are you doing there? Et cetera. Under holistic rubric tries to tie together initiatives in different places to try to increase their coherence and so oar that is just ongoing institutional process. Not something that can solve the world's problems.
Now, there are questions of course obviously is going to happen with this review and what will the general assembly agree to. What should they agree to? I certainly hope that review process is not going to get bogged down and relitigating intergovernment governance. Not going to be getting enhanced cooperation up the wazoo again. Complete waste of time obviously. I think efforts to try to like get bold initiative. Society coalitions demanding global justice and we should redistribute income and establish new global mechanisms for all of that stuff not going to happen. Geopolitical conditions to do big bold things through the WSIS process are just not there.
Most we can do is reaffirm Tunis agenda and fundamental line try to do procedural reforms to increase multistakeholder participation and thing like CSD participation process and try to maybe, fold some of new areas where people want work done AI, data things like that into the existing action lines, given budget resource very limited.
No big new pronouncement it's. No big new negotiations because just not going to work.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Reaffirming agenda enough or do we need more?
>> PARI ESFANDIARI: I think we need more. I do support some degree of independence. Between IGF and WSIS. I think that is what would be helpful. But however, I don't think that we need to get rid of WSIS for IGF to be completely independent.
I think they have different rules. They're complementary rules. But I would support some degree of independence. Because I think that that would help it to be more innovative and more experimental where risk is more connecting layer? And to continue to role without WSIS I think guy would lose legitimacy and influence. Focus on WSIS and try to increase impact. Some imperfections participatory needs to being worked. Generally, I support what it has been said that it needs to evolve but WSIS should continue.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Is IGF independence actually necessary evolution or existing risk?
>> MILTON MUELLER: I think it's definitely necessary evolution. I believe that one of the reasons to end WSIS is to make the IGF independent or more independent of the multilateral process. Essentially, make it as freestanding. Good to have the nexis with governments and multilateral system. But the degree to which IGF has become kind of hierarchized turned into, something that dominated by states, I don't know how many of you were here not early days of the IGF, but the atmosphere is so different now. Separate tracks for parliamentarians. Half governmental and half the rest.
Talk about half governmental, reaffirming WSIS renewing WSIS, I would invite you to read the key phraseses of WSIS about governments have sovereign rights too make policy and rest of you doing operational stuff or you're read the role of Civil Society in the Tunis agenda. Not even, there isn't a reel there. Like it's important. Not a role there. We don't know what your role is.
Why we want to reaffirm is that? What is it is that we are salvaging by reaffirming an agenda that was a political compromise between hard core sovereign tests and 25 years ago, and advocates of governance by nonstate actors. I think need to realize that fades is over. Phase is over. And let's move on.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: How is WSIS navigating geopolitical tensions, sovereignty challenges, are all of these parliamentary tracks future of WSIS?
>> My reading WSIS document differentiation between public policy sovereign rates rights underlined multiple times. Intergovernment governance layer effectively left the private sector and Civil Society. That is in my opinion, pretty clear there. Which is why definition on internet and of internet is pretty helpful. Leads me to underlying WSIS protection of that role, which I think it does. Does quite well.
Also, to the IGF may be should also consider doing. Where I think we should be careful about having too many different types of topics integrated into IGF. I don't think it's necessary to deal with all quantum related issues or AI lethal autonomous weapon system within IGF cyber policy world. We deal with those issues UN group of government expert and open‑ended working group and other issues. Good bodies for that. Look back to first draft of the digital tactile you compact idea of digital corporation form replace the IGF completely. First ideas slides floating about. Obvious lay is this come quite a long way. GDC had a very difficult birth. Top down policy initiative and multistakeholder language was very much watered down to beginning took a lot effort to get it back there. Also think perfectly descent space to deal with many issues that distract diagnosis DOP and this agreement we have. Document. Public policy sovereign right of state. Certain things related to road itself, not behavior on the road, should be left to N community.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Thank you everybody. Hopefully provocation has work and audience has many questions. We'll take them now can have a show of hands.
>> Wolfgang. Academic from University. Problem was not disappear if we close WSIS. Digital divide, digital economy human rights centered, all of this on the table. If it would close, annual conference, climate change would not disappear. What would be you need an alternative process. So if I think Milton's argument to close WSIS and when he said, what this is process produced to the end, then you reach a point where you say, okay, leave everything in the hand of private sector, rest will be managed by battle between the government of the people republic China and United States of America. And rest of the world is doesn't matter.
I think this is more or less not what majority in world wants to see. Probably this is to reality. The very close to the reality unfortunately. Tech oligarchs political battle but to have this mix of multilateral and multistakeholder mechanisms is more or less alternative. Not solution to the problem. We should not over estimate, what WSIS process can produce. But you know, it's very additional instrumental channel and to imagine certain problems in the right direction. Fully support when bill argues it's a process. Not one event or the IGF also was not one annual conference. It's a process. If I understand this, I'm in favor of WSIS plus 30 and probably also for WSIS plus 40. Thank you.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Any other questions? One online question. Asking if the internet bare yeses between geography get firmly established. How would America sell motor cars to China? Through the Post office and AT&T. Not sure what the question is. I'm obliged to read it I will use my moderator's, why don't you go ahead first.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Thanks. Really enjoying this discussion. Cranky old Belgiun I would like to add a bit of support to the discussion around the idea that this is process. For me, this is experiment and Rome was not built in a day. What they say. And internet governance space will not be, governance mechanisms will not be designed in 20 or 50 years. This is big thing. There's a lot of tensions that are fighting in different ways. My question to panel, more about expectations of all of the stakeholders that are involved. What I'm hearing is many people see these different spaces as being able to achieve different things. An I'm wondering if you could reflect on what second takes do you think happens expectations do you they have been set by different actor it's that states will be able to still be states. And civil society will still be able to be global civil society might have some impact. Might have impact through states.
What are the expectations of all of these different Angelina actors in this space and do you think they they'll able to suddenly become global governance rule makers? Different actors) without actually thinking about all of those different types of expectations that are being put in this part, whether you're talking about WSIS, IGF or other spaces. That's the question I don't know if 80s question. Hopefully it's something to think about. Don't know if it's a question. Think about and cover.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Thank you. Also add my question to the pile. Which is like Alexander you talked about, whether is multistakeholder cooperation happening around cybersecurity around content moderation and multistakeholder as a model is not tied to WSIS and IGF. Internet forums grown and owe involved and certain specific issues, then should we look at, other alternate models where this kind of convening could happen? Or should we put all of our eggs in the same basket which is WSIS, and IGF and this part he have evolution of WSIS. Continues ruffling fathers other venues willing to ruffle fathers and also multistakeholder and we should created space for them. Yes, panelists can go in any order they like. Alexander?
>> ALEX KLIMBURG: Thank you for example questions. The way what actors might perceive they might want to require from this is interesting.
I think comes back to where if you look political science, multistakeholder is located, often assigned deliberative democracy, not consultive. IGF needs to decision‑making organization because if you don't, decision not legally binding, it means nothing. Opposite philosophical model talking about something, you're part of decisionmaking process. Even if you don't have the final vote, you can disagree with the outlook view.
And essentially, I would think many people say that IGF fulfilled that obligation fulfilled that mission over the past. By simply having topic to discuss, and circulating topics providing sounding board for ideas fulfill certain important function. Previous session basically, aired that governments don't come to the IGF as much because they're not getting answers that they want? Erred, feedback go someone else to solve operation Allan issues. Two different discussions there. Not come here to adhere to operational issue solved come here to get big ideas bigger topics questions from other constituents. Don't normally talk to and similar. That was my understanding what the IGF was supposed from the beginning. Really information exchange platform I do think that this job has been sufficiently fulfilled in past. Danger that I also heard from the previous panel were actually a number of new actors perhaps or people wants, applied to be heard here and to speak. Don't get the chance to do so. I think that partially might lead to question of redimensioning IGF around maybe more tightly. Or topics or more struck to make it more bottom up. But certainly, change slightly make it more responsive to the need of some constituents feel like they haven't been heard. Don't mean Civil Society organizations or Global South overall. I mean individuals feel they make submissions and three, four times and don't have a chance to speak. That process alone involving those individuals in the topics? Helps discussion helps effectively lower the pressure, on the entire discussion around the role of technology and political systems in my preference, role of technology and democracy. Without these voices being able to communicate their frustrations or concerns or also where they think technology is developing, you think we end up staying in the silos that we are all basically trapped in? How busy we are and can't get out.
IGF for me, I consider myself a tourist in intergovernment governance space. My chance to get out of the cybersecurity bubble and hear interesting things. I wish more people from intergovernment governance to go to cybersecurity bubbles and listen what they're talk about. Until that happens intergovernment governance forum good place for us to meet.
>> MILTON MUELLER: IGF conversation melding into the we conversation. What it means for the IGF if the WSIS was ended and I believe, that if the UN general assembly says can obtain consensus on we're going to stop WSIS and we're going to continue the IGF. Then that would mean that IGF would not be diminished, not be delegitimize and we could continue working on that. Of course I would like to see whatever reform, consensus on this panel, WSIS cannot stand Pat. It has to be reformed and improved in some way. So think that's progress. If is going to be reformed, then what direction is it going to take? And I agree with L EA ALEX IGF should not be decision forum. Multi‑status multistakeholder back to ideal and it's okay to be anchored in the UN doesn't mean state dominated think people who want to continue WSIS have obligation to tell us exactly what this reform is and how feasible it is if is to going to be reformed I haven't heard any coherent hide ideas about that frankly. If you hate me, and by the way, the somebody in the secretary told me that everybody on the leadership panel hate it's me because of our at calling for the end of WSIS amusing. None of them TATA audience. Leaders are not leading and not listening but I find it amusing, if you outraged, call for ending WSIS, tell us what we're going to do that's going to make things better. Tell us how we're go to reform WSIS and make it coherent and politically feasible idea.
>> WILLIAM DRAKE: I'm not outraged at all. I just think it's completely irrelevant. Because the world government are going to do what they're going to do and don't care what they're saying. WSIS process will happen. They will adopt statement and processes will continue.
I want to flag two things. Quick. One, IGF thing, I think IGF should be fully, get a permanent mandate. That would give it a lot of these. Increase ability to take on controversial audits of independence. People always terrified IGF going to lose its political support. 20007 couldn't talk about critical internet resources? Now we can't talk about this we can't talk about that. There's so many issues becomes verb owe them. Governments will object and UN will pull rug out from under us. Need the IGF more independent if we can. I think realistically, governments not going to agree to do that unless they he get something in return that could mean more enhanced cooperation stuff. We could have a whole new trajectory work G77 and China are pushing that. See what happens big waste of time. We can agree on that.
Last point I want to flag. Academic meeting, part of question I thinking about WSIS, sometimes people talk about WSIS and they dismiss it because it's nonbinding kind of normative type of thing normative type of thing. Difference between rationale choice based theory and constructive type theories way we think about these things. Come from more constructivist side.
I look at this process WSIS contributed greatly to institutionalization at the global level of internet government intergovernment governance and digital Governance issue around the world. Saw governments and NGO and others build up capacity build up resource around this stuff and didn't exist before, 2003, 2005, collective learning as we all adjusted to each other.
Learned about these issues conceptually instituted space. WSIS can be vibrant. Process look it on the future try to about digital environment, relationship between intergovernment governance and digital governs, things like that it could be really useful. Unfortunately I don't see Governance having the internet governance vision to do that I think we're all in hunkered down mode, budgets are collapsing, geopolitical conflicts are increase. It's going to be a miracle if the WSIS process just gets through the UN general assembly and we document the text. So document the text. Not the time for bold revisioning you would like to think? Adopt) if the thing continues some way to leverage it. We could find some way to use it, leverage to expand that aspect. I'll stop.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: No bold reimagining incremental improvements. Do you agree?
>> AVRI DORIA: I'm not sure that I agree with doing nothing bold. I find it hard to say no, no. But what I really wanted to is a say I think there is a big role for discussion of further separation of IGF from WSIS. That dependency should eventually disappear. I IGF should have a long life. Should be more independent and in other words, should have long life. Multistakeholder up to the top should not be top down UN unto the multi‑stakeholders. But rather it should really become what it was meant to be. In multi‑stage holder organization. Initiation does not mean ruling? Multistakeholder) if we can get just that notion across just because you start something r, doesn't mean you get to control for all eternity. To the point of we really want the IGF to be multistakeholder. Not UN run.
UN participating but not UN run.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: Thank you.
>> PARI ESFANDIARI: Thank you. I think underestimate achievement. WSIS and IGF. I think IGF has achieved a lot. Brought a lot of conversation to the floor and has changed context. It's a place when discussions take place and then starts to evolve in other spaces as we have seen. WSIS itself, has been in my opinion, beyond its original mandate which is has also achieved a lot, has a lot of achievement. So I think we shouldn't underestimate achievements so far. But yes, there is need for evolution and for it to evolve influence. Terms IGF and WSIS separation to some degree support independent of IGF I have don't think they should be completely separated. Serve different functions one is experimental, other one is connective? We need both innovation from IGF and struck from WSIS+20 build a coherent around inclusive governance future. Risk isn't IGF independence. It's losing encoding framework that links it to broader digital cooperation. So this will weaken influence and global policy dialogue. To me, got to keep the connects but some degree of independence. Thank you.
>> JYOTI PANDAY: With that, we are over time. I would like thank all of my panelists indulging provocation and bringing thoughtful insides thank you for the audience essence for your participation and amazing questions. Audience, next panel discussion. Thank you.
[applause]
¶¶.
GIGANET FRONTIER PAPER
>> NADIA TJAHJA: Hello everyone. Nadia Tjahja. Introduce next presenter. Research is incredibly important to continue the discussion on stakeholder participation in intergovernment governance processing. We started this afternoon with a discussion about whether WSIS should end and where they discussed past and future I want talk about right now much owe last few months internet community WSIS field. How can stockholders contribute discussion about the future. This research is extremely timelier. Reflecting about how stakeholders were able to contribute recent bottom up and top down processing. What are the lessons learned to improve meaningful participation in intergovernment governance. Like to give the floor to Jacqueline presenting the coauthored research on reframing intergovernment governance struggle of multi‑stakeholders in the face of multilateralism. Jaqueline Trevisan Pigatto.
>> JAQUELINE TREVISAN PIGATTO: Thank you so much. And hi everyone. Very nice to be here. Dr. Jaqueline Trevisan Pigatto, with San Paolo State University, representing, Mark W. Datysgeld and Laura Gabrieli Pereira da Silvia same institution first GigaNet symposium. Honored to present this paper.
Okay, so this paper follows up on paper we published in 2021 which we explored polarity in intergovernment governance, Tripolar approach for intergovernment governance we are analyzed models of US, European UN, China, and spheres of influence. Last year interesting case that was initial idea for this paper. Regarding two processing. That happened on the same year. Next one WSIS+10 and global compacts of United Nations. Both process, spotlighted this growing tension between multistakeholder and multilateral model and we did this brief analysis on the two processing in terms of consultation and participation. And use this methodology quantitative and qualitative analysis.
So we have some fundamental questions that we started to think for this paper. First one is about shift of from bottom up governance to state led multi‑lateralism phenomena observed for the last I think 10 years. Multilateralism. This brought up another question for us. Regarding the balance, or the concepts of intergovernment governance and digital government. 20 years ago talking about WSIS+10 far, we talked a lot about intergovernment governance. Now, we used to used term digital Governance questioned if this this would be a shift for more multi‑lateral approach. Not just of the UN but also, another policy forums discussing digital Governance as digit 20, digit 7, OSD, other international spaces. Of course, UN, UN system in total.
The other question is how do state led versus this community led consultations unfold. So we started to question the role of the stakeholders and what makes their input matter.
Specially because in the end of this processing, neither of them was broadly accepted. We can say. Net+10 limited government at participation and engages GDC sidelined no state actors in final phase of negotiations.
So for our theoretical frameworks, had some assumptions based on literatures of our stakeholderism. Being open to centralized nonbinding with participation from civil so siding? Technical community, private sector academia and government. Most lateralism state central for formal binding outcomes emphasis? Based on you are approach multi‑lateralism more legitimacy through sovereignty.
Related to traditional power. Multistakeholder there is this legitimacy through inclusivity model that everyone agrees. And of course remembering the famous paper by Jannette Hoffman about stakeholder being fiction put into practice. And then we have this legitimacy dilemma of inclusivity and enforceability.
We had analytical lens with intergovernment governance. Competing legitimate interests with different designs to establish control. So the US with technical sector and infrastructure dominance. And very market freedom approach. EU with normal settling, with transnational reach. Human‑centric. Human rights approach. Regulatory democratic way. Chinese influence state super vision with some predictability very plan, and very proximity with the central governments and private companies. We are not saying that every state agrees with the mull day lateral model per se. Different views on how, stakeholder engagement can happen. multilateral why we thought this could be continued of previous paper. But also, here on this one, we tried to add the resilient view as Global South leader tries to bridge multistakeholder and multilateralism. Methodology analyzed submissions basically of the two processessand we have some results here.
In the case of Net+10. More commissions from Civil Society. And for the GDC, have more submissions by government, expressive participation from Civil Society. Process is totally different. In terms procedures and how this participation was enabled. Here is the comparative of the two process it's. Then I want to focus more on the discussions of our qualitative analysis.
For stakeholder categories that are not coherent, that is a first topic that we analyzed. About Civil Society. And even governments, are off IP fragmented, so for instance, Brazil have different government bodies kind of disputing digital policy issues? Future research different, actors, stakeholder. Second point is that this governance crisis also mirrors broader democratic challenge discussing with the panel because there's a clear public demand for deeper Civil Society inclusion, deeper global decisionmaking not just intergovernment governance. But it's environmental WSIS, for instance.
The third point we blurred lines between procedural and substantive issues. I believe there's some kind of confusion especially for new stakeholders that are now standing now to engage with in processes about what we are discussing if this is governance institutional approach to how we are dealing with this issue, so this is like mostly discussion we had on the previous panel on the WSIS+20. Also Global Digital Compact, relationship. How this process is are connecting with each other. Where WSIS+20 and also there's another part of this discussion issue. Protection platform accountability, freedom of expression, numerous topics, so think there's discussion here and I would like to hear from the audience about if there is a consensus on the understanding of intergovernment governance. More reel the to Governance procedure that actually topics of management and use of the internet, and if this is related to the other question that I made earlier, about we call it intergovernment governance or digital Governance. Of course topic about the IGF. That we are analyzing if this is still main stakeholder venue. Of course there is this global consensus and recognition role of IGF lacks strong government participation bridge in gap exist between stakeholder and multilateral process. Decisions led in state‑led and not stakeholder environment.
>> NADIA TJAHJA: Thank you very much for your presentation.
>> JAQUELINE TREVISAN PIGATTO: One more if finish. Point of institutional innovation crucial. Here we bring the role of that is the UN for digital emerging technologies. Challenges of enable this inclusive negotiation format to oversee participatory implementation of GDB develop hybrid governance model and invest in more capacity building for under represented groups.
The dialogue need to be more dynamic if stakeholders actually to keep pace with innovation and also, to have enforcements decision‑making. We have some future research directions that we're going to discuss this, but for the sake of time, I'm going to finish and we can have the Q&A mainland some of this questions in other questions. I can stop here. Thank you.
>> NADIA TJAHJA: Thank you very much. The question has been raised to you, your ideas about intergovernment governance or digital governance. There's also been question about consistent understanding. Are there any questions or comments regarding this from the audience? You see professor Miller. Please take the floor. Just question.
>> MILTON MUELLER: Can you hear me?
>> NADIA TJAHJA: Yes.
>> MILTON MUELLER: Military definition of multistakeholder
>> MILTON MUELLER: ICANN and regional internet registry would not qualify as multistakeholder organizations because they make, binding decisions and their decision‑making process is centralized what would be the implications of that for your analysis?
>> JAQUELINE TREVISAN PIGATTO: Okay. Thank you so much professor Mueller. Right. About ICANN take holder model. Binding decisions. I think actually, we miss formulate on the slides. But we are thinking that major multi‑stakeholders processes usually not binding. And it's more related to public policy issues of intergovernment governance and not technical issues such as ICANN and other multistakeholder spaces that deals with that.
>> MILTON MUELLER: Intervene on that. Think ICANN does make public policy. Issues. I think that is one of the things that came out our last debated. Is that this idea that's just making technical decisions is completely wrong. I mean, everybody involved in ICANN knows that when it make a decision about who right to a name and resolves trademark domain name conflicts, requires the or does not require the public education of personal information for The WHO is.? Publication j all public policy decisions and bowl point of multistakeholder governs whole point j that these policy decisions made by nonstate actors? Governance) and that is a think why I don't like term multi‑stakeholders because it confuses participation with decisionmaking authority. I'll shouldn't.
>> JAQUELINE TREVISAN PIGATTO: You're absolutely right. About this confusion of participation. Decisionmaking? I'll shut up) there so some confusion and this includes government actors. About public policy.
>> That are more closed to final user of the internet and this technical matters not so close. So now, we are seeing this environment of digital governance discussing more issues of public policy that are close to the people, final users and these I think is where major discussions on multistakeholder, multilateral are happening.
I think we have a had a face of discussing intergovernment governance with ICANN and technical.
>> That is more consolidated but this is not we are not seeing same thing for this new issues of public policy, close more close to the user.
>> NADIA TJAHJA: Meantime encourage those online leaf questions in the chat. Having conversation with the people in the room and globally. Discussion for you. I would like to ask professor would you like to unmute yourself?
>> Hi. I assume you can hear me because I can hear myself. That works.
Thank you very much.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Roles on nicely from the previous discussion we had Milton was part of and I would like to echo that kind of discussion around multilateral, multi stakeholder. Which is the main name your paper with a comment and then there a question behind it. Try to be brief.
Felt to me that descriptions that you put on the slides at least, you were mixing up The WHO and the what. And that might already help you to think about when you're talking about multilateral institutions, whatever, or multistakeholder institutions, Eyre you're talking about series of actors but also talking about where what those actors do. It seemed to me to be a bit mixed in the paper. At least.
I'm wondering what you thought about that.
Two questions though. They're both related to the tripolar thing I understand was a previous paper P but I'm going to come back to it if file allowed it. I find it interesting. I also find global setting, global discussions that we're having right now, to focus on three main powers. If you like. To say that everything is driven by these three powers. Is problematic. I would also like to say the characterization of those have very difficult. Not OOS's I do say China empire in digital world. European UN perspective most familiar with you talk about the E up being human centric. Actually, if humans are functioning elements of economy, it's humancentric. But it's not social humancentric. It's more economic humancentric. I'm thinking about things like that are that question behind that is, in the tripolar middle, can you think of pentimodel. Do you think it think in terms of poles is essential question? Do you really need to say there are three great powers? Where does the UN fit into that or where does global model fit into that? Thank you.
>> NADIA TJAHJA: Thank you so much we can look back definitions of stakeholder and multilateral actors that you mentioned. I'm going to answer the question off the tripolar approach.
>> JAQUELINE TREVISAN PIGATTO: Yeah, I agree that it's problematic to focus on three models, study case that we did three years ago, four years ago. And we were trying to like map some different models of governance based on the state's actor. So that is, this is where EU, China, United States actors most prominent international space in general. That's why we started analysis with those three.
I think we have different models like we could include India, Russia, Brazil, of course, Brazil, we are Brazilians, close to the model but I think there's a lot of proximity with the EU model in terms of right space approach for digital governance and question about the UN, I, think is like million‑dollar question because we're he trying to figure out this year with the WSIS negotiation and Global Digital Compact I see there is, trying to actors in general trying to complement it multilateralist, multistakeholderism. We don't know how to have effective multi‑stakeholderism because we have this consultation with the UN Global Digital Compacts listened to every stakeholders about your in the end, you have the negotiations close to state actors. Same thing happening right now with the negotiations for the AI panel and global dialogue emerged from the GDC. So I think challenge is to try to conciliate meant of stakeholder final negotiation of states all that have has special role to try to coordinate this that is like one of the final questions of our paper. And I think that is where UN fits because they are proposing to be that actor that we tried to coordinate all of these efforts.
And discussion that we are having on the last panel was also, bringing to this like we have this architecture of voices in the IGF that emerge 20 years ago, basically, in Geneva and now having this change of UN processes to New York, that whole other approach different approach. So yeah, I don't have clear answer but yeah. I think that is about it.
>> NADIA TJAHJA: Great. We'll take is there anything online? We'll take one last question. Please, sir.
>> Thank you. Ros University of Zurich. For about eight years I was member of internet serving vice chairman on under Milton. My question is short. I was listening to your presentation. Whether your definition often force ability is not really too narrow. Enforceability) because not only governmental regulations are enforceable, also contractual, duties and obligations are enforceable and see multistakeholderism as social contract, might come to the conclusion that agreements within social contracts could be enforceable. Thank.
>> JAQUELINE TREVISAN PIGATTO: Thank you four your comments we do that think about that, broader concept often forcibility totally because we are looking more at how states are dealing with these issues. Even with states to have like a hard law or something, that's difficult to actually enforcement in practice. So how could we cooperate with other actors to enforce that thinking about private sector big tech, et cetera. We will definitely think about that. Thank you.
>> NADIA TJAHJA: Thank you all very much for all of your questions.
>> of course, to our presenters. For answering the questions and presenting the work. I hope that we were able to come together and learn more of all the research that we've been contributing it today and hereby, I would like to end this particular section. I please urge you to stay as I hand over my session now to the chair. Of the program committee.
[applause]
>> SOPHIE HOOGENBOOM:
>> I am Sophie.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: My name is also Jamal. Where tradition that we start, start in our last. Steering committee meeting was to say we would have an open, mic session at the end of our steering committee meeting. Not today, formally but meeting of GigaNet members. All GigaNet members online are here or some of them are online are here and we wanted to have 18 minutes and 19 seconds of open mic session. Idea behind this is to see what people in the GigaNet community would like for us to do in terms of things that GigaNet does. What people would like to help co‑organize, what people would like to help share.
What people would like to organize themselves. Or just participate and so we thought that best thing to do would be to just open up for a few minutes. See if there are people who have an ideas for our community. And willing to share them with us. Is that right? Sounds more or less good angle for the next open mic session.
Everybody is familiar. Should everybody just introduce themselves briefly? Start? Okay. So Trisha introduce yourself and say the role that you have and then we do introductions and then we'll go to questions. Dr. Trisha Meyer professor digital governance and participation at the University of Brussels, colleague of Nadia, and I'm the vice chair currently.
Dr. Milton Mueller professor at Georgia Institute of Technology, and director Intergovernment Governance Project and I am the communications director of GigaNet.
>> SOPHIE HOOGENBOOM: Hello. Ph.D. student at from University of Bristol and United Nations in Bruges, currently here in my role as chair of the program committee. First time that I was involved with GigaNet when we did alternative program compared to other year. Also be very curious to hear opinions about that.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Dr. Jamal Shahin, chair of the GigaNet Academic Network, and also working at the University of Amsterdam and Brussels.
>> DR. BERNA AKCALI GUR: With Queen Mary University Center for Commercial Cities, currently Membership Committee chair of GigaNet.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Maybe I would introduce you online. Is he online? Does he want to introduce himself or shall I do it? Vasai, secretary‑treasurer. He is online from Mumbai. Did you say there was a question online? You need to mic yourself. You need to mic yourself.
>> TRISHA MEYER: I'm not sure if Mark is able to unmute. Raise the question yourself. I'll wait for the moment. I'll read it out.
Mark had a few comments for the previous point of helping out his copresenter. Specifically for this particular open mic session, he said, are there any plans to increase GigaNet visibility in fora other than the geography IGF? That would be great stuff other than the GigaNet.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Will be difficult if Mark's mic doesn't work because I would like to know what Milton, who we should also mention that Milton is one of founding members of GigaNet. Has been a chair as well. May have some ideas and can tell us about the origins of GigaNet particularly within the context of the IGF.
Do you want to say a bit about why we were set up in the context of the IGF, Milton?
>> MILTON MUELLER: Well, I think what Mark may be asking is could we break out of the IGF and be more prominent and visible as academic association outside of the IGF? But yeah, our history is definitely that our origins were tied to the IGF and annual symposium. After five or six years, debate the detaching the two and decided we definitely did ant what to do that. And also, there was we do have alliances with other academic institutions and conferences, so for example, GIGA arts is kind of annual academic conference on intergovernment governance that kind of evolved out of GigaNet. But separately run more like program committee without a membership. And all of that.
But we typically affiliate with them and sometimes region like Joanna's regional conferences in have had endorsement by GigaNet and before that, we've held conferences in Korea and North America. So if I think what you're leaning towards Mark is if you want to form a conference in brass Brazil get endorsement of the GigaNet for your conference we would be open to that.
Nadia?
>> NADIA TJAHJA: If I could add to that, at UDCI session where GigaNet comes and presents GigaNet does to the youth day community and some of the European stakeholders. Youth day and explain how they can contribute how to get involved and you contact membership chair.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: It may be worth while adding to all of this by saying we do have endorsement policy. You can find it on the website. We do like to partner up with additional conferences but the root of GigaNet is the essentially tied to the IGF for better or worse. And there are other conferences that talk place. We're also community that is very multi‑multi disciplinary. And some of us participate in different spaces. Where we also do organize panels abilities things like that. Sometimes fall under the rim of GigaNet. Maybe we could do more to get peel to mention GigaNet when they go to things. But I think we are quite visible as members and people working in that space. Thanks for the question, Mark.
More questions?
>> TRISHA MEYER: Mark is unable to unmute now. He said we can take other questions and he doesn't want to monopolize the time. He can intervene if we would like that.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Any more questions from the members of community here? Sure.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Siva asks what proportion of GigaNet membership comes from outside of America and Europe? Has there been sufficient outreach worldwide?
>> So that would be a question to me. We have not done a study as to where, regional study as where our members come from, but our membership is open to anyone who applies. And from my observation, that if is definitely not one of by North America. Quite few members from Europe, Asia, increasing number of applications come from Africa, so I would definitely not perceive GigaNet as a consisting members mainly from North America.
I think it has started that way, where collaboration from European academics definitely reaching out to broader geography and we would like to do more. If you have more of these sessions, I think we would definitely have more diverse membership. And I encourage all of you to apply so we have more diverse membership here.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: I think because as membership committee chair, you also have a committee.
>> Yes, thank you. So I would like to shortly explain how we decide on membership applications. We have youngest member is leaving. So okay, so there's an online form. Fill in the form. And every month, there are five members to our Membership Committee. We meet and we evaluate applications.
If you're diplomatic established academic publications intergovernment governance field, call the five for membership. If you are emerging academic, you would need a sponsorship letter from your Ph.D. supervisor or current member to become a full member.
India intergovernment governance in the field but more active as a civil society organization, then you become an observer. Being an observer means that you will be added to our mailing list, essentially be like a member. You just cannot nominate yourself to take a role in the staring steering committee. Isn't much a difference in terms of how you benefit from the activities of our GigaNet steering committee. If you have any questions, I'm here for three days. If you see me around, you can ask me questions and yeah.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Thank you. Membership is important but only in the sense that as global organization, we do try to make sure that we reach out to all parts of world. If there are people who would like to join but think oh, no, that's just not the case, we are aper an open organization and really want to participation engagement from all parts of the world.
>> We need to emphasize multi‑disciplinary group, social scientists, engineers, and open to academics from all sorts of background.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Thank you. Trisha, was there another question?
>> TRISHA MEYER: I think I invite Mark, who continues to have some comments perhaps to unmute if you're able to do that now to continue the discussion on the visibility of GigaNet.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Then I would have a question.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Go ahead, Mark.
>> MARK W. DATYSGELD: Thank you. I hope you can hear me now.
>> TRISHA MEYER: Yes.
>> MARK W. DATYSGELD: Just complementing on what I was saying before. Thank for all the insights in the chat. It is the GigaNet is pretty much the reference when it comes to academia in our field and while I see example of how it penetrated in some other regions, when I speak from the lack region in particular, there is very little awareness of its presence here as an example. And I would like to bet some other regions, there is also that lack of awareness as the project keeps expanding giving more visibility within the IGF environment.
It would be interesting if, at some point, in this plan that the community is leading toward, think about this issue. That the community is I don't think it's priority. Something that should be on the roadmap how to raise awareness and bring papers to other region. Showcase actual work not only, hey, how to get involved not just outreach how to bring this research to other regions and raise awareness of the research being done. Thank you.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: I think you just volunteered for the role as GigaNet board to the LAC region. Is that correct, Mark?
It's definitely an interesting way of thinking and, for me, one of things really makes the GigaNet important, the annual symposium important, is we are able to sit in a space that is dominated by a lot different stakeholders. Few people in the room who normally aren't listening to academics talking about things. Translation issue that we need to get across. We need to ensure that this space is heard in those different by those different stakeholders. I think that's important.
For that, I would maybe like to ask a question to the people who have been here organized, Sophie, been organized in this session. Maybe it's a broader question also for the community. Have you felt that this kind of way of organizing the program this year, although it's been very fast because used to six months more time for GigaNet, but have those been quite fast, do you think this is a format or did you find this interesting and have other people found this interesting to actually organize these panels and bring together these different experiences throughout the session?
>> SOPHIE HOOGENBOOM: just to give some context for those not aware of how we do things in the previous years, but normally we have paper call and reviewing process, but because last IGF was in December, in Saudi Arabia, we didn't have the time to do it this year. So out of necessity, we were forced to think about alternative ways in how to design this program.
And that's with why we came up with different variations. For example, panel discussion we had after lunch, but also, to include research project in entirety as one session.
I would say, personally, but I would love to hear opinions from the wider community, I was very enthusiastic different sessions. So I would say that we should continue to explore these different forms. I think also, especially by including different research projects or academic projects, also way to bring in more members to our community that maybe not aware of the existence of GigaNet, say to make sure that we continue to have open academic rigorous forum, I do think we should continue with the official paper call and reviewing process, also because I do think that we have to be wary that we are not continuously inviting same people or people that are already active in our community.
I think open paper call is the way to inspire people not involved yet it apply and try. I would also love to hear your opinions because as I said, first time that we did it in this way. Look forward to hearing your opinions now or later this week.
>> SOPHIE HOOGENBOOM:{Thank you so much. Any other insights or experiences or thoughts that people in this room or virtual room might have Dennis? Yeah, he's taking open mic literally. Yes, go ahead. Take an open mic.
>> DENNIS REDEKER: If I may, do it like that. Thank you. So someone who submitted a proposal for a set panel, I think we enjoyed it tremendously. Thank you again for everyone to making this possible and chair, thank you so much.
I think what I liked about this year is a mix of things. Fact that we I think presented three papers where it was only paper call and nice really good. But you very long days of the same kind of setup change. Having roundtable, having set research project, presenting results I think that is nice mix up. Thank you. Really enjoy that.
>> JAMAL SHAHIN: Thanks Dennis. It's great to hear from the experience was mutually beneficial and pleasurable. We have two seconds left.
Are there any other comments or questions or anything before we welcome you warmly to the IETF event. I hope you all registered for the IETF. If you on the GigaNet mailing list, you would have received, the registration details that were passed through.
Meeting around 6:00 to have wonderful collaborative event in a very nice setting middle of Olso where Milton will be talking again along with two other colleagues from different networks about this. 6:30. Well, if I say 6:00, might be there at 6:30.
So without further ado, I want to say thank you very much for Sophie for putting everything together and to all of the other members of the SC made this happen and to all of the speakers today, all people engaged, also engaged wonderful people in the back made sure we could hear us ourselves, and others while everything was working. Thanks a lot everybody.
[applause]
