IGF 2025 - Day 2 - Workshop Room 4 - Open Forum #78 Shaping the Future with Multistakeholder Foresight

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Good morning. Good afternoon. Welcome to open forum Shaping the Future with Multistakeholder foresight. My name is Philipp Schulte, Senior Policy Officer Central Ministry Digital Modernization and State Monitoring in Germany. I am happy to see all of you here on site and online on the panel and on our online panel. 

Briefly explain what the session is about. Online moderator with us and you can ask questions here on site and online after first round of questions, and `you are very welcome to ask questions and I will also give you a lot of time for that. Since I know some of the people here in the room, have been involved in this exercise, I'm happy to discuss with you.

So what is the session about? This session is about the project of our ministry called Strategic Foresight. Some of you might know that Germany has published last year first strategy for international policy ever and the several measures about this. Fund for IGF secretary we all welcome, but there was also fellowship fund for international digital policy for young fellows which are also around here at the IGF and process for foresight dive into on this panel. And for that, I'm very much excited to have you here on stage and online. We have here Anriette Esterhuysen. I'm senior advisor for global regional internet governance with the Association for Progressive Communications, and former Mac chair and around IGF since ever, I don't know. Yes?

And next says executive director initiative and IGF MAC leadership panel member. And also Gbenga Sesan, not new the ecosystem hire I can say.

Online, we have Julia Pohle, colleague at Burnes Center for Social Change for Research Group Digital, and coauthor future discussing here and intergovernment governance, and in that role, been a task force leader and develop the scenarios we will discuss here online. And Julia Pohle, hope you can hear us.

Result without further ado I will give the panelist starting with Julia online. You have been on the task force in this experiment on Strategic Foresight with ministry and our ministry, maybe you can explain to the audience which might not really be aware of this project, or maybe doesn't know what strategic foresight really is, what was your role, what did you do with the task force members, maybe you can say also a word who was on the task force and what was the outcome.

>> JULIA POHLE: Thank you. Thank you very much. So sorry that I cannot be with you at the IGF, but my son's birthday is tomorrow and I wouldn't miss this, not even for the IGF. I'm sorry.

I'm happy to join online and I'll be happy to say a few words about the process and methodology involved, not so much about the scenarios. Discuss them later.

Not familiar with Strategic Foresights, make a few points what Strategic Foresights is about and explain the example of task force, what we did. Important to keep in mind when speaking about Strategic Foresight, field of internet governance elsewhere that Strategic Foresight is not about predicting exact future, something we all struggle with in this process. Really Strategic Foresight help us deal uncertainties, exploring possible futures. So it's more about thinking how we can prepare ourself for different scenarios rather than trying to guess what will actually happen in the future.

By using strategic foresight, I think that is motivational of the German ministry to kind of launch this process kind of decisionmakers and stakeholder, better uncertainties in the world and which direction they might develop and prepare for disruptions of them actually happening before they actually happen.

Second point, first one is not about predicting future. Second one is about developing future scenarios. Developing scenarios, stories of plausible futures, that means futures that we develop in these scenarios don't have to be realistic. Very likely that none of these stories that we develop will ever happen in that way, but they need to be plausible. In some way they could happen if certain kind of circumstances come together.

So these kind of stories developed, these scenarios we developed to highlight in different ways how the future might unfold and help us understand actions go in one direction or the other.

In the project we're discussing here called strategy foresight Internet Governance 2014, by the German Ministry for Digitization and Transport. Changed the name. Four distinct scenarios for internet governance in the next 15 euros. These four scenarios kind of plausible stories in which we could explore a range of possible futures, which we went from. Contribution of transit digital today, growth and economic geopolitical competition and where this leads, second one was more complete and total systemic collapse and fragmentation of the internet in two distinct networks.

Third one was regulation of the digital world to the degree that everything becomes controlled in some way, and fourth one was about complete transformation of the internet governance structures that we have today.

Turn away from economic competitive logic toward kind of shared commitment and promoting public good. All of these four scenarios are possible future and none of them help us understand what we can see as trends and how we can deal with these trends. Important to keep in mind these scenarios not exclusive of the other.

Parts of them could coexist, could happen part of one and part of other scenario. Help us discuss what is desirable and what risks we want to avoid and kind of see opportunity we want to go.

For this very reason, I think strategic foresight has been a methodology used by international organizations also including a lot of UN agencies and by the European Commission, a lot by civil society organizations since early 2,000. Inform decisions and as inform policies and inform actions tell us more about that and because they probably have used foresight in the past too.

Brings me to my third point speaking about civil society and other actors, third part. First one is not about the predicting the future. Second one is about writing possible future stories. And third one is to do this in a positive participatory way.

We followed various structured methods, but we reached the method through focused discussion with experts and stakeholders different grounds came together inside abilities, discussed different insights, different options, perspectives where we might go in the future of internet governance.

Explain completely through the process. Guide you what we used to develop scenarios for the German Administrative Digital Session, process mandated by the ministry coordinated by the German Agency for International Corporation. And they also provided method expert really kind of helped through the process, task force members guided us methodology through the discussion and how we developed scenario.

For the task force, 50 members invited, selected to represent, kind of diverse community that we have in Germany Intergovernment Governance, academia, business, civil society, and technical community and the goal was to develop these kind for different scenarios for the next 15 years. Basically, what will had happen in the next 15 years in intergovernment governance. I was kind of the content lead. Also meant that I helped drafting scenarios, but it was really joint process between all of different members of the task force.

Task force members contributed every stage of this scenario creation and collected influential factors, discussed what the impact of factors may be based on the methodology drafted these four possible futures, and also next critically assessed the possibility and constantly refined the writing of these scenarios.

Important because all members of this task force were from Germany, represented different stakeholder groups, kind of Germany or European centralized key we had in the task force. What we did, conducted interviews specialists from various world regions stakeholder groups to kind of validate this scenarios will bring in new ideas and bring in more global and diverse perspective. They were interviewed by me for this another process, so that is also how involved in this.

Finally, what we did after we had a good draft of this scenarios and they were validated, we had network kind of workshop in which the different members of the task force, but also additional participants kind of discussed and also used certain methods to kind of develop ideas, how these scenarios, what they mean for their own kind of actions and own planning. And as far as I know, scenarios are being used by the ministry to discuss potential option in the action in the field of internet governance. I leave it at that.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Thank you. Was really helpful for us on stage in the audience to better understand what you did and what the German government, together with what stakeholders proposed.

So one important point that my panelists here on stage interviewed for these scenarios. Turn to you. We how was it for you to be interviewed in this project? Was that something familiar to you? Was it completely new? What was your experience during the interview? What were you thinking but when reading? We come maybe later to that. The scenarios and, yeah, what was your impression?

>> GBENGA SESAN: I have used this methodology long time ago. I have used it in South Africa late 1990s. After liberation first democratic government was in place, it was used in the context planning for development and compulsion and parties digital governance. I found it mostly frustrated. Wasn't a productive participant. I found the abstraction very frustrating, you knew. Much younger, I thought I knew exactly what we need to do, what the problems are, and approaching it in kind of round‑about way seemed to me it was the facilitator was from the US, which frustrated me even more and I really did not find it very helpful.

I'm much wiser, Julia. Very good interview. Been around internet governance for a long time. I think we have become very, what's the word? Quite boring is maybe the best word, but more sophisticated words. I don't think we're being creative or innovative enough. I don't think we are applying critical thinking enough, how we were evolving internet governance. So actually, found it very exciting and very interesting. Enjoyed the process.

Abstraction little issue. Talk about it more later. I found it really sort of stream‑of‑consciousness approach, but guided by Julia to focus on the plausible, but also not trying to think of what will actually happen. And in playing with those trajectories, with the knowledge of the world that we are living in and working in.

So I found it very useful. Very impressed. Actually, Germany had done this and I think my only sort of one I would like to be part of a focus group or group at some point. I would have found it more interesting in some ways to have a group dynamic.

I think my only other question about it as well is way in which you treat multistakeholder, in how you are approaching the future of internet governance. I think this, in that sense, study perhaps not impact or deconstruct what multistakeholder, I would have actually possibly found it more valuable if it was scenarios of governance effective, accountable, whatever, governance. Some, I felt the focus on multistakeholder became a little bit one‑dimensional, civil society, business, government, technical, which I think is actually one of the weakness in our entire ecosystem.

It wasn't my first, but talking to Julia was also very, very interesting. I do interviews a lot either from research interviews, where people are hoping that you are supporting thesis or to media interviews, people are hoping they can pigeonhole you into position. This was very helpful that there was no target outcome. You could think and I think it was very helpful to think on your feet while you are having the conversation.

I done this in 2007, a while ago, as part of the Desmond Tutu leadership, trying to create scenarios for the future of Africa. Interesting process because for us at the time, it was like a compromise. People felt things are going to go this way and felt things are going to go to the other way. Optimist, pessimist, and small group in between doing as possible futures was sort of compromise like everybody felt heard and saw the future in those.

What I also found interesting in these, good that was government, typically, you would have this kind of project by civil society thinking of the future, but it was good to know after one of the things very keen on implementation. Continue to implement, look at the scenarios and adjust.

One of the beautiful things about possible futures is that it won't happen exactly same way, but when something happens close to the scenario that you sort of discussed, then you have opportunity to either align or run away from certain things. Glad that is happening here. It was fun. For exact destination no agenda. Better conversation to allow me to think and speak to the issues as I saw them and what I thought could happen.

The other involvement I had with scenario planning, I think that Anriette Esterhuysen involved with this, 2008 was Elon University, don't remember the name, talking about predicting the future. I remember one of the things I said about the future at that time was we will find confusion between what to contemplate.

Sometime during COVID, sent me an email what you said happening now. Did not predict the pandemic. Just a bit scared that that was going to be something that would happen in the future. I think it was very helpful because when that moment came, I felt prepared because you had thought about it. Beautiful things about creating possible futures.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Thank you so much. Highlighted some our ideas but also some of challenges within the process, but also in the outcomes of which outcomes highlighted some of the challenges of current environment, current community. I thank you so much for it. Do.

You want to react directly? Otherwise, key takeaways or defining event in describing the scenarios, what do you consider to be the defining characteristics of multistakeholder model of internet governance, which you pointed out, was a bit one‑dimensional, I think that is what you said. And maybe actually fun, that you said that after reading the reports, because that is what actually our finding was before starting this process, but so you might know better basis for discussion. That is at least our hope, but I don't know.

Gbenga Sesan, you are heavily thinking about the multistakeholder process and having published about it. What is your opinion?

>> GBENGA SESAN: Enjoyed for me. We don't usually think about potential futures. We look past and present. So for me, also very interesting kind of exercise three times now, internet governance before in different context I thought it was very interesting. Really enjoyed the interviews because really broadened my perspective and learned a lot from these interviews.

Kind of we get to the stage where we really brought scenarios and looked at them with some distance after a while. I think what strikes me most is that most important factor in almost all scenarios, maybe less than last one about complete transformation, but the first one, the key driving factors is actually the role of states and the role of governments. So in each scenario, kind of actions of states, in particular of important states, US, China, but also, Russia, from the EU kind of action, particular states including emerging kind of power relation between states and governments, key defining factor in the defining scenarios. Geopolitics main drivers in transformations in these scenarios, main drivers of the future and main kind of key factors for the future that we imagined. That is to say we actually started writing them and wrote the scenarios before President Trump took office again and before we kind of saw this geopolitical tensions and economic competition that followed taking office again.

So I think today, we would have gone further in emphasizing the role of geopolitics and geoeconomics in these scenarios and kind of written them even more around these kind of tensions that we see. I would say actual geopolitical developments have already overtaken the scenarios that we've written on only six months ago or 8 months ago. The reality is actually moving faster than we thought. It would.

My assumption that actually 10 years ago, had we written these scenarios 10 years ago, we would have given much less prominent role to states and to governments and into the relationship between states and I'm actually, I don't think so, actually, I'm sure we would have given this because I did such foresight process 2013, '14 and '15, they are the key drivers, actually the corporate actors and civil society. So it has changed and I think this is also kind of finding that we see like on how we see the world as well, that actually states and geopolitical and geoeconomic actions do have become more important again.

As multistakeholderism, I have shared also observation and I think what also some distance looking back at scenarios, what is kind of striking and maybe even frightening that in none of these scenarios, maybe for the last one, so different, bright future for multistakeholderism and internet governance.

So I think all of these scenarios, we ended up writing possible futures and multistakeholder process either being hollowed out or kind of completely undermined by corporate actors and state actors. To some degree, basically commitment to multistakeholderism and government remains, at least discuss issue level.

Wrote scenarios. Commitment is only lip service. Multistakeholder processing are being so institutionalize and professionalized and becoming so predictable, actually lose their meaning and lose their kind of bottom‑up character and possibility, also voices that might diverge from the mainstream kind of perspectives, these assess all of these processing all remotely governance out‑lived promisees. Writing them not with that intention in mind, end up seeing the future, give us some reflections on what we are doing to transform our model to make it more meaningful. A lot of nodding here.

How fast politics played out. Remember our conversation at the time talked about it. I don't think anyone sort of could predict that things would move this fast by November, people who were doing scenarios, I mean within considerations. We had to do some planning, part of initiative in November, but there wasn't that sense and I think is this relationship between behind state and scenario planning.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Hindsight, and this is why adjusting as you go is critical. So there are studies planned for and dial into level 7 and get to level 9, and you have to tell yourself, listen, we can't, it would be insanity for you to then take the actions you planned for level 7 when you are at level 9.

I would say for multistakeholderism right now, not only is it not living up to some of the lofty definition and branding, also being threatened. Because of that reason, there are people who are then saying yes, we've talked about ideal multistakeholder, reason everyone is equal partner. Not everyone is equal around a table. Hasn't worked. So let's try this less perfect, but pragmatic model. That is itself a challenge.

Two things for me. One is yes, must adjust, but we must also never lose that opportunity to dream of to wish for a better scenario. It won't be perfect. We have to adjust. We have to be realistic. We shouldn't move optimism straight to pessimism. Maintain element of realism and say that some things may not be working now, but still possible to get things to become better.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE:

>> ANRIETTE ESTERHUYSEN: Let me comment on what you said emerged about the role of states. Absolutely, that is not a surprise to me and, in fact, what is a surprise to me is that there's still reluctance to talk about enhanced cooperation in the space. One of the WSIS things not to be named, word not to say, because reality is that how states engage or not engage with one another has profound impact on how inclusive governance is, how strong civil society can be, how to what extent human rights are respected or democratic institutions are able to grow and play their role.

So much as we like this, I don't know, fairy tale notion of multistakeholder governance as alternative dimension of perfect governance, I mean, I see it as a way of arriving at more accountable inclusive, effective governance, and states are a big part of that. I think what the multistakeholder approach gives us is a way of really putting on the table that states cannot do this on their own. If they do it on their own, probably not going to do it very well. Doesn't mean that states do have quite a profound role.

Other thing, multistakeholder give us a way IGF evolved very diverse ecosystem. Internet governance has many types of decisionmaking processing, types of development and standards‑making processes, some of them might be led by governments. Some of them can be completely sort of technical‑community driven. Some might be more sort of civil‑society driven or private‑sector driven. What the multistakeholder approach gives us is constant reminder that we need to connect these with one more and that they need to overlap and engage with one another, but it doesn't mean that there's this new sort of amorphous more multistakeholder ideal which has to operate across the board. So I do think it's interesting that the role of states is important and I don't think we should feel that this undermines the ideals we are striving for in the space, which is to have inclusive and participative in governance that achieves good results, public interest results.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: I couldn't agree more. I mean, to the world of digital internet, state was maybe a foreign player long time. And now just, I mean, I share the observations here that state, also ministries, show up more and more. Show up more to the IGF, but show up more to ICANN. More to the IUTF right now, age involved. That might be usual process since state was reluctant to show up compared to other political areas or field of politics. Can be healing. As you said, it is still important and can play a role in this, also triggered by our thinking what our role is or good role for us.

When I think about it, I think responsibility of state is more like, of multistakeholders and state is maybe responsibility of state is like to make sure that all flowers, all the different stakeholder groups can perform in the role they want to perform and perform best. Maybe this scenarios can help different groups and one idea behind it.

Leads me to my next question. Report is not published yet. It will be published some time. Asking you, is work daily work?

>> GBENGA SESAN: Very absolutely. Keen to see was how all the ideas come together to define phenomena what the scenarios will be. At risk of giving more work, more work, I think you need to quickly with new realities maybe like an addendum or annex, something we will do most likely. Pick that report and look at the scenarios, will be able to see scenarios in our current reality, some of geopolitics.

Talked about it at the time. Wasn't as deep as some experiences right now. Imagine at least starter for conversations, but absolutely, I think this is something that will be useful, not just content of it, but also the principle behind it, the principle of creating possible future and adjusting your strategy as you continue to see what has emerged and how close they are to the possible futures that you predicted.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: One key role was role of the state. Another key role is role of technology. And so you worked a lot on connectivity, a lot of technical technologies in the area. What is your assessment of the role of technology in report and real life and what can we learn from all the technology implemented and introduced for new technologies and where do you see the dangers and opportunities?

>> ANRIETTE ESTERHUYSEN: You're taking me away from scenarios now and foresight to reality to the present.

I think that one of the strengths of the report is that it does allow us to think of technology both as a force that has actually impact on its own as well as sector that interacts with geopolitical conflicts, different forms of societal change and organization.

I think you were also going to ask me at one point so actively involved in trying to build internet connectivity in Africa 80s, 90s, early 2000s what our hopes was. Shift from WSIS and WSIS+20 I think it was very much I believe naive obviously. Access to technology, in particular, access to communication technology will be the equalizer, that it will be equalizer between rich and poor, center and periphery, men, woman, nonbinary, that individuals, that it would be this set of tools and the processing that creates engagement and cooperation.

Of course, it didn't quite pan out that way, but that is still part of what technology gives us. So I think, I mean, hard part about foresight, also interesting part is to look at how this complex way in which individual and societies engage with technology and are changed by technology, how that will play out in different scenarios.

Maybe this is also one of the reasons why the role of states emerged as important. Face the one predictability, I guess, tendency to look at who are the institutions in this context of unpredictability and insecurity that have the capacity and responsibility to make sure things don't go wrong.

I guess that is also naive because we also know that both corporations and states are unpredictable themselves.

Not giving you a good answer here because I think that it is ‑‑ so I'm going to actually answer the question you asked Gbenga. Is this useful in my work? Not particularly. Is the report useful? I'm not sure the report will be useful. I think exercise is enormously useful. Participatory process very valuable to the people part of it. Make the report useful, EU find a way using it in the context people are able to discuss and think about it and engage in those scenarios, could be useful. Think creatively. This year, for those of you don't know, probably all heard so much about the World Summit on Information Society. By the way, action line on enabling environment. That is what governments are supposed to do, create enabling environment, but when the WSIS was reviewed by Commission on Science and Technology, UN part, body part of eco, a lot of the US government shortly after, taken a position on not wanting to support the sustainable development goals or use the concepts of developments in and sustainability.

It was also shortly after the US had pronounced that gender is biological and just two sexes, these featured in the negotiations around the WSIS where people were talking about have we got digital inclusion, is there security, are we achieving development goals.

I was there as a civil society participant and to see the European states in particular shell‑shocked, it was so difficult for them to operate in this context when a long‑time partner in the internet governance and world summit process, US moving outside or taking on different position.

My first thought during that entire week was I wish these governments had all done some foresight work. Maybe if they had, actually be able to take advantage. Shift. Be creative. Form new alliances. And I think that is why I think certainly for diplomats, I think certainly for governments, anyone who is involved in negotiation in a geopolitical or even multistakeholder context, very useful technique to use.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Gave us a lot of homework here. Speaking about time, we still have some time. Happy to take questions from the audience. If you have prepared already a question, please line up here. We have the mic here. Otherwise, also able to take online questions. We are more than happy if you are in the discussion.

Pick up another point you said. I mean, level of abstract, we have already. Please introduce yourself

>> PROFESSOR ROBERTA HARR: Good morning. Professor Roberta Haar, leading on a panel on day zero, also heading Horizon Project. Remit research. Earn. Could you look at it. Remit part of what we're doing to develop scenario, testing workshop, also developed gains and developed them with the Joint Research Center EU Commission.

Also have this scenario expiration, gets them to ‑‑ shaking your head. I guess you're aware of it. Taken their system and used data from our research and developed scenario games. Also played now first one which he had on military A.I. at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Extremely good results.

We took the data and brought it to people to play and discuss, and four scenarios developing with different data. Still have four workshops to go. One in Rome in April Helsinki in September, April next year, and then also have a summit in Brussels. She's on our supervisory board. Pointed out for me to come today. Anriette Esterhuysen shaking her head.

First request report accessible and answered that question. Then my next one is can we sort of also adapt your data and maybe also have some collaborative and taking your data on in the next step, and game, we can integrate it and then indeed have policy ideas to invited policy stakeholders to our games and play it.

I'm hoping that I've noted all your details out. Went right to Julia and hoping that we can maybe have some collaborative work there. Is that something that you find interesting? So thank you.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: I guess I have to take the question. Report yes. True. Not published yet. As you might know, we are in governmental transition period in Germany. Set up new ministry. This new ministry will also be responsible for Strategic Foresight. Lucky coincident in this case.

We are really optimistic to proceed at some level with the report and also with the methodology for sure and our work we have done. However, one idea behind is report not only for the government, for all stakeholder, happy to reach out. Involved in the project. Some civil society organization in Germany, for example, Wikimedia already taking work and trying to work with it through report and with the methodology. Happy to connect you.

Julia, I know about the agreement project. I went to one of your conferences last year discussing multi‑lateralism, multistakeholderism. I have been happy to also be involved. I think we have to have ministry to confirm since they probably have some kind of control over the material we produce. I think it will be very helpful to take this further and develop it into a game. Fun, kind of connects to what I wanted to say about stakeholder engagement, come to later, challenge to keep people involved in these kind of exercises, making it into, bring to another format. Could be a very helpful learning process for us all, how can we do this differently as well to maybe make it more fun for everybody involved and make it more meaningful for the output, take the output, that can be something that could be used.

>> BERTRAND: Good morning. Bertrand, executive director of National Policy Network. One, first of all, congratulations to the German government for having undertaken this thing. I think it's the perfect place and venue for discussions and mental level how institutions are doing. Tool of scenario foresight is definitely a good one. I am extremely frustrated that you cannot present this because it would have been a perfect session to build the session around this.

Waiting impatiently for the release of the scenarios of the foresight report about these kind of exercises and extremely important we know the limitations of those things. You know the benefit of engaging the people, mostly process developing those things. That is most interesting.

Allows people to express what they see as the trend, what they see as the drivers pro or negatively. However, there are things that are always extremely difficult to anticipate in those environments. Call them the black swan or the unexpected events. For those of us old enough, we can remember that when the Worldwide Web emerged, everybody was talking about America on Line, domination of America on Line, and how the future of electronic communications was going to be those bandwidth companies or telcos. And then something happened on the side. I want to keep faith in the fact that multistakeholder spirit, not the model, because there's no such thing as a multistakeholder model, but the multistakeholder spirit not only will be alive, but it will ultimately permeate everything because the reality is today, because of those geopolitical tensions, we are seeing more than ever that the governments together cannot solve those problems.

I want to highlight, and I've said that in another session, in 20 years, since the WSIS, there hasn't been one single agreement among all governments on digital issues except cybercrime convention sponsored by one of the countries that is the most present behind cybercrime. That is the ultimate irony of the limits of the multilateral system which has to be preserved.

Don't get me wrong. States are fundamental. Our inability so far to bring the different actors around the table in environments like the IGF and other venues is one of the reasons why we're struggling to address those problems.

At this juncture, there is exercise about scenarios. We need to also think a little bit more about what we want, not only what the trends are. And to finish, WSIS+20 process at the moment is entirely focused on producing another resolution in December.

One thing it should say and state, set the stage for, which is what is going to be the future of IGF? When do we discuss 2026 and where resolution of the mandate and evolution of the structure of the IGF, discussing scenarios, thinking about the institutional arrangements is core follow‑up, I think, for what you've been trying to achieve. 

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Couldn't track your question. Comments? Anyone wants to react?

>> GBENGA SESAN: Thanks a lot for that. On the line one, keep in mind what we want, that is something I was speaking to earlier when I said there is reality, there is history, there is data, but there is also desire that we have.

And we may be faced with challenges, but we need to come to the table with the ideal scenario that we want. What do we want? Challenge is if you're frustrated by history, historical data, frustrated by some scenarios that paints a bleak future, there is no point. We might as well just throw up our hands and say, let's sit down and watch the TV.

If there something we want, I mean, what this brings to mind for me is if you are running or sailing or flying against the wind, you could either submit to the direction of the wind, which then means you will go anywhere the wind takes you, or you could drive against the wind.

My mathematics comes in play here. Think of the velocity it uses, think the direct angle of inclination, so that worst‑case scenario, you will not be pushed away and you will end up where you want to go. I think it's really important we know what we want, and knowing what we want has to come from everyone on the table. It cannot be what the government wants. It cannot be what only one stakeholder wants.

We come up with what we want. Have conversations, some cases, have consensus. We will come together and agree on some things. Absolutely important, for want of another phrase, to keep dreaming. 

>> ANRIETTE ESTERHUYSEN: I've known him since he was very young. Sometimes he makes me feel very old. Sometimes not. Today you make me feel very old.

Not been dreaming of concrete things. What is WSIS all about? People‑centered development, human‑rights‑oriented information society. Use technology to improve their lives, to me, more important than having IGF, frankly, but I believe we need the IGF to get there. And I do agree that we have to renew the IGF.

Interesting point about the foresight exercise. I think all of those scenarios, as Julia said, they will all depict fairly, not such a positive picture of multistakeholder, which I think where we should interpret as a real indicator that we need IGF.

We need forums like the IGF. For me, it's an important thing is in that it is IGF which allows the wind in. Doesn't close all the windows, so that we can sit in our sort of safe, comfortable multistakeholder space because I think the reality is we don't all want the same thing and I think that we're not always going to have consensus. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't be in active open conversation with one another.

So for me, IGF, that actually allows us to tackle the big issues of geopolitical conflict, of the dominance of big tech companies which are denouncing international law and, in fact, sometimes have the support of some states that denounce international law. The fact in this authoritarian war, conflict, poverty and technology is becoming active, plays a very active role in all of this.

I think we need the IGF need to be brave and courageous enough to actually tackle those with the assumption that we're not necessarily going to agree, but at least when we need to have where the multistakeholder is valuable, have conversations, come from different perspectives and different beliefs to talk to one another.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: My impression that picking, like starting from your comments, better knowing what we don't want instead of knowing what we want.

So my question is, how do we get to how do we know what you want? Like is it this project, or do you think about other projects, or what would be now natural follow‑up steps to better know what we want and to implement it?

Maybe you can start here, Julia. Can start here? How would you continue the work, what you think there's a better option, better process?

>> JULIA POHLE: Interesting question. First, possible, maybe in retrospect, looking back and what we did, I think, concern that I had, I had a different role because I was kind of leader of the task force, all stips writing scenarios, kept engaged a lot of the task force members over time, all very busy and have kind of limited time and limited resources and we have to kind of believe in a process in order to kind of be part of that process.

And I think what would be really helpful is to do this kind of process or even take what we did now and move forward and see why this matters to members who wrote the report and kind of show them the kind of clear benefits, and I think one of the ideas on how to make this more meaningful, to actually see what now, for example, the German government mandated this process with doing whatever ideas we develop and how these ideas kind of helped within the ministry, within the government, to gather what they want, as we said, or figure out what they don't want, how it's impacting whatever the government should be doing or not to be doing.

Opaque part for us, and not meant as criticism on our task force itself because we had a difficult kind of picturing where we were going, process itself because I also know that how it was organized, government change in between and whatever. Funding was meant to engage stockholders open with each other. Help from the ministry in the task force when you do take it to the next step.

Interesting to actually have people talking to each other about where this leads us and where would we want to go. Help the task force member better understand what contributions are leading to and have government who is mandating this process, mandating process, better understand where the ideas are coming from, what kind of computing perspectives or compactible perspectives. Take this forward or make it better in the next round. 

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Valid points and good to hear that because we were reluctant to be on this task force because we don't want to have a government process writing our scenarios by stakeholder use them as lip service to well‑wanted, not really to get into the scenarios, I mean, and I agree. That was a lot of work and this was also the reason why stakeholder group was mainly people from Germany or Europe because, otherwise, would be even more like harder to bring them all together to Berlin like two or three times to work on the scenarios.

So there were some restrictions, as I said, but our hope is that with the new government and with the new responsibility, ministry, that we can learn from this process and take it to the next level.

Coming back to this original question about like implementation and alternatives. 

>>GBENGA SESAN: Back to this word, want.

Of course, I agree with you on starting times from what we don't know, what we don't want. In fact, in itself knowing what you don't want is knowing what you want. I want not to have what I don't want. We had conversation on leadership panel August 2022. We had a lot of conversations and it almost always ended when we don't want this, we don't want that.

Many of you, I hope, have seen the Internet We Want Paper panel put out. That was the idea behind it. We have to, at some point, define certain things, certain things we are. We don't all agree on everything, things people will not feel too strongly against and we could start with that.

Internet, one paper talks about certain things that show some people read and say, hey, write online. Maybe we don't want that, but at least it is out there and something a certain stakeholder and majority of people desire to have. I thinks absolutely important.

Yes optimism, yes dreaming, but also putting down in clear terms what we want because at times, when you go into situations and you see reality, you can then say this is the reality, what I want, and your action is then created a pathway between where you are at and where you want to be.

If I want to face reality, I definitely will resign from my job right now. I mean, I work on a continent to talk about digital rights and inclusion, wherever other conversation I have with governments in the region is about calm down or explaining the way Dalai Lama studies. Helps this is desired destination. It helps with where we're at. Tough work we have to do from point A, which is where we're at, to point B., where we would like to be.

I think that sometimes we say what we want and particularly when we try and say it, multistakeholder sounds like watered‑down set of wedding vows or whatever. I can't think of a good analogy.

I want fair tax payment by big tech companies, need revenue, can build fiberoptic backbone, to feasible reasonable internet institutions for resources in the country to reasonable resources data flow is not based on extractive colonial type model.

Want competition between the private sector, and I want local private sector operators in developing countries. Lots of things I want that I think will create enabling open‑ended inclusive internet, but it's almost impossible to say those things in the context of so many multistakeholder fora.

You don't want to offend the private sector. Don't want to offend government, shut down the internet. You don't want to talk about the great firewall of this or that country.

I think we have to be able to be willing to use this sort of multistakeholder modality with a little bit more courage and openness and honesty, then I think it will help us get there, but I do have a concrete suggestion for the IGF. I think this methodology is so powerful. I think one of the things that makes multistakeholder fora IGF as its evolved made it maybe also more difficult. It's much more not about individuals, but about institutions.

I mean, if Philipp came to IGF 15 years ago, might have just been there as an individual rather than representative of the German government. Pros and cons both ways.

If we can maybe collaborate, yourselves collaborate with Roberta and her team, come up with a game next IGF to play, not like rooms like this where we sit here and talk and you sit there and listen, engage with one another in an interactive way. Everyone participates.

Thinking about facilities or a site and change. No reason you can't do that, room of 500. Methods allow that. Redesign the IGF. Braver IGF. Participatory, creative methodologies we use for sessions. Braver IGF. Ask difficult questions. Not going to be consensus.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Absolutely. Really good proposal to have. Not only workshop, lightning talks and games. Might be really good new session format for the next IGF.

Any other questions in the audience or online? Happy to take them now. Invite my panelists for final remarks. Partly have answered them already, but you might summarize it and make it more precise. Write that down.

You have articulated WSIS for the IGF. Might also articulate wishes for the German government or other governments know would get funding for another process. What are your three main wishes, what should be outcome and which is important?

>> ANRIETTE ESTERHUYSEN: Why don't we have Julia start. 

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: As you want.

>> JULIA POHLE: Tough question. Should be German government doing this. What I would like to have this kind of exercise on, maybe we have to be the more courageous tackling elephants in the room.

One thing I would like to see for exercise practices, big technology comes in creating digital barrier and close ecosystem, a lot of talk recently about potential fragmentation of digital space due to government and government regulation and digital sovereignty and a lot of fear related to this, much of it coming out of a particular idea that we need certain kind of digital space, even free from governments.

Have this discussion right now. I would like to see attention being paid to how the dominant business models of our current platform economy, fragmented online space and lead to other phenomena. Just mentioned I think that would be one of the issues that should be tackled. Whether the German government is in position to do this, I don't know. Maybe we have to be courageous.

>> ANRIETTE ESTERHUYSEN: I Support what Julia said. Because of the roles states emerged so important in the exercise, maybe some activity to look at the role of states, but in a more creative way. Not just look at digital service digital market. Often, I feel government fills in the toolbox, basically repression and regulation.

In fact, governments have a huge toolbox that they can use. They can do so many good and engaging and, exactly, Philip saying this kind of thing, but maybe to use this in the IGF context perhaps to work with other governments about what is it really that governments can do to help us to enable this, what the multistakeholder ideal represents, which is inclusion, accountability, creativity. Instead, governments being the silent partner or sometimes problematic partner in the multistakeholder journey to really enabling partner. That would be something exciting to do. Other remarks already made.

>> GBENGA SESAN: In the spirit of dreaming what I want, permanent mandate for IGF that has review mechanisms built in it. I want IGF where we can have conversations, don't pretend to hide behind diplomacy for conversation about everything.

Getting frustrating for clear elephant in the room and tiptoe around the elephants in the name of diplomacy or something else. Should have difficult conversations because, ideally, we want what is best as a final scenario.

And one very key thing for me, if there is something IGF has done, it is that has thrown off the value of national and regional initiatives that are mostly self‑run and don't have as much support as possible. Great to see a lot more engagement within our eyes in spaces where governments are still sort of standing by and watching them do what they do.

>> PHILIPP SCHULTE: Thank you. I know all points known, and especially on the last point, we are doing a lot of things right now in Germany to bring together a lot of people. IGF Germany has been involved also in the stakeholder group.

So only thing I have to say is thank you for being here, for sharing your expertise, and but also impression and your criticism that is more than welcome, and I hope we can present the report soon and, yeah, work together with the reports or with other methodologies and think about the issues we are concerned for in a new and refreshing way. Thank you.

[applause]