Summary of the IGF 2024 Session #170: “2024 year of all elections: did democracy survive?”
Introducing the session, moderator Giacomo Mazzone (EDMO) reminded us that over 2 billion people voted in 2024, and that there were interferences coming from social media and the internet. Based on experiences from diverse parts of the world, it is clear that measures that have been put in place have had an impact. Europe probably having the most comprehensive and articulated set of measures, it is only natural to start by considering this European model.
Alberto Rabbachin (European Commission) pointed out that 2024 was an intense election year in Europe, with the European elections and several parliament elections in the member states. The new digital ecosystem poses new challenges: 38% of European citizens consider that disinformation is a very serious problem and a threat to democracy. The Commission therefore adopted “quite a complex ecosystem of rules and initiatives”, mainly based on four “pillars”:
- The Digital Services Act (DSA), a new regulation which is the first global legal standard for preventing illegal and harmful activities online, which regulates very large online platforms with the aim of preventing illegal and harmful activities online while protecting fundamental rights such as freedom of expression. This is done on the basis of a mandatory risk assessment and mitigation by the platforms, and includes access to platform data for researchers.
- A Code of Practice on Disinformation that is a self regulatory framework for major online platforms and other relevant stakeholders, that includes a comprehensive set of measures to address online disinformation and the set-up of a Rapid Response System for elections
- The European Digital Media Observatory, an independent community of fact-checkers, researchers and media organisations, financed by the Commission and based on regional and national hubs, whose tasks are to detect and expose disinformation on a daily basis, conduct research and devise media literacy campaigns in all the languages in use within the EU 27 states members.
- And the recently voted (but to be implemented starting 2025) Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising to counter information manipulation and foreign interference in elections.
Mr Rabbachin then illustrated some aspects of how the Commission actively intervenes and supports the implementation of those pillars.
Giovanni Zagni (Pagella Politica, and head of the EU24 Task Force) shortly presented the EDMO and highlighted the importance of connecting the 14 national and regional hubs working in Europe, with its variety of languages and media landscapes: “the challenges posed by disinformation are clearly very different from Slovakia to Portugal or from Finland to Greece”.
Thanks to the unique width of its scope and multi-stakeholder structure, EDMO is able 1) to monitor disinformation across the continent through its network, 2) to provide analysis and suggestions in the policy area, 3) to coordinate and promote media literacy activities, and 4) to promote and coordinate research in this field.
As conclusion, Giovanni Zagni offered the following pieces of advice:
- Build networks, a crucial activity as disinformation crosses disciplines and fields, as well as boundaries
- Connect the different practitioners, a simple newsletter can be sufficient
- Produce sharable outputs,it is essential to communicate results and attract new forces for your efforts.
To learn more about EDMO’s activities, there is the site edmo.eu and also the possibility of a direct contact through [email protected]
At this point Paula Gori (secretary general of EDMO) took over as moderator and introduced the next speaker.
Delphine Colard (spokesperson of the European Parliament) reminded that the Parliament was active in this domain since 2015 and as co-legislator has pushed for the legislations that were presented earlier by the representative of the Commission, so as to protect the citizens from the harmful effects of the internet, promote freedom of speech and guarantee access to trustworthy information. This push will remain at the core of the next legislature.
For the 2024 European elections the EP, hand in hand with the member states and the other European institutions, launched a series of initiatives to counter and prevent potential disruptions.
For example, the EP organized workshops for civil society participants to foster resilience against disinformation. The EP is especially proud of developing contact with youth and first time voters through the EP Ambassador School Programme (EPAS).
There is a need to remain vigilant and continue to monitor and analyse: disinformation is not something that happens during the electoral campaign - it is something that is slow dripping.
Delphine Colard concluded by stressing that “good intentions and volunteer reactions are not enough. Legislation and regulations play an instrumental part.” And “a whole of society approach, learning from each other’s practices” is necessary to double the efforts to make society more resistant to disinformation attempts.
Paula Gori (moderator) summarized by recording that information is a drop after drop long process. There are many keywords for this: media journalists, fact checking, emotions, addictive design, media literacy, digital platforms, ecc. This makes the “whole of society” and interdisciplinary approaches a necessity.
After having considered Europe, the workshop then focused on other parts of the world that also experienced an election year.
Benjamin Schultz (American Sunlight Project) explained how the US were this election year in a very different situation from 8 or 4 years ago, when the platforms were very active in terms of content moderation, and trust and safety. In this last campaign, there has been a regression. “Whack a troll” seems to be the best way to describe a fight against disinformation with limited results; furthermore, under the guise of defending freedom of speech, platforms seem to have given up on this fight, allowing a proliferation of hate speech, false information, false election advice and attacks against election officials. This has contributed to create a toxic and polarised political system.
There also has been a “democratization of in the most extreme way of artificial intelligence and deepfake technology”, including plenty of evidence of foreign bot networks. Deepfakes have become more present; algorithms favor content that is emotional or gets people riled
up, which increases the number of clicks, so malicious, fake and actually illegal content makes it into peoples feed.
However there is no (politically possible) agreement on where the boundary - if any - between legal and illegal content should lie, and thus there is no regulation on deepfakes or one the protection of election integrity.
For the immediate term, any kind of agreement on a set of regulations and rules for technologies and platforms or on election integrity seems out of reach.
Paula Gori then introduced the next speaker who again moved us geographically.
Philile Ntombela (Africa Check) introduced Africa Check which is the African continent’s first fact-checking organisation with offices in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal, and considers both misinformation and disinformation.
In this election year common patterns emerged across the continent:
- Accusing journalists or media houses of bias if they attempt to contextualize or fact check politicians in their reporting.
- Spreading rumours that electoral bodies are not independent and/or favour a specific party
- Denouncing the politicisation of courts when rulings favour journalists or voting institutions
Platform accountability in Africa is still a work in progress, even when there is cooperation with the platforms.
But anti-misinformation regulations risk backfiring as they can be used to stifle criticism, promote censorship and be used against journalists; they might also push misinformation into channels more difficult to monitor and criminalize well-meaning people who spread misinformation without knowing that it is false.
Therefore, rather than a legal instrument, a collaborative accord such as the one reached at the 2024 Africa Facts Summit in Ghana, the “Accra Declaration on Information Integrity and Resilience”, might be preferable. Fifty fact-checking organisations from more than 30 countries set common key goals.
The last speaker, Claes de Vreese (University of Amsterdam) assessing the risks around generative AI and elections, stated that “we’re somewhere between relief and high alert”. Worldwide there was not a single election in 2024 where generative AI material did not play a role. But contrary to initial fears the electoral process was not overturned by AI.
However the discussion is far from being over in 2025 and it is necessary to better understand the role AI plays and will play in the ecosystem of elections. This can only be done collaboratively, within the European Union and with centers, researchers and civil society outside the Union.
To conclude the session, moderator Giacomo Mazzone asked the two non-European speakers whether a European-like regulatory framework could be a model for their specific circumstances. Philile Ntombela reaffirmed her preference for collaborative agreements similar to the Accra Declaration, and Benjamin Schultz while being favorable to such a framework expressed doubt on the possibility of coming to a political agreement to pursue such a course, or even of legally implementing it in the USA.