>> MODERATOR: We will start with the next session and I expect that we will have silence in the room. If you would like to have private conversation, you can do it outside.

     >> MODERATOR: Good afternoon, I'm Hartmut Glaser, CGI is the organization in Brazil responsible for the recommendations, standards and strategic directives for the Internet in Brazil Based on the participation governance model. We're meeting here for the open forum fostering open stakeholder debate on Internet and elections. The panel is composed by Brazilian Internet Steering Committee members. We have Flavia -- a representative of the Civil Society. We have Mr. Enrique Paul Hasber (sic) of the business sector and Mr. Castro as a representative. The role of the Internet for Democratic process has been a permanent issue of the Internet governance agenda in the last decades. Initial of unhindered cosmopolitan and direct political participation for citizens throughout the world has progressively given room for some skepticism. The Cambridge Analytica scandal revealed a systematic effort by state and non-state actors to influence Democratic practices through campaigns to spread misinformation. This open forum presents for the IGF community this year, 2018, the activities undertaken in Brazil by CGI.br, the steering committee of the Internet in our country to foster debate about Internet elections and democracy. The debate will focus on the contributions provided by CGI.br and details the participation of our committee in the stakeholder working group on Internet and elections, created by the Supreme Court and multi-stakeholder seminar on the issue and workshop representatives from different sectors, the production of materials for general public. I have a booklet that you can see, Internet, democracy and elections. And other materials for general public debate on the Brazilian law for electoral complaints.

     As you know Brazil concluded the last Sunday in October our general election where we choose a president, federal, and state deputies and senators. For sure the impact of the Internet on the election in Brazil was very strong. We cannot discuss this. It was a real reality. It is of great importance to understand this phenomena more deeply. We will start our conversation about this process that we already discussed in our country and now we will present to the community. The format will be following. Each panelist will have 15 minutes to introduce the point with different aspects. Then we will have on the end, a discussion with the audience. We will start with en Rika who will explain some of the details and the procedures that we apply for our material prepared for the steering committee in Brazil. Please.

     >> ENRIQUE: Good morning to all. I am one of the representatives of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. I represent the sector of information technology. A Division of our explanation year, I will talk more about some information about the Brazilian elections and I will not focus primarily on the CGI efforts. Of course, I will talk about them but I will try to a little about Internet election in Brazil as an instance of the issue of Internet elections, generality.

     First I will make a disclaimer about my speech today and IGF. We're here to understand elections. I use Brazilian elections as an -- I'm not here to discuss politics in Brazil but the Internet and on elections and the trends all over the world. CGI.br had big discussion about Internet in election Brazil. We promote several debates on fake news or misinformation, we shared this booklet with guidelines about this issue to educate people on Internet use and -- (inaudible) CGI.br we support the stakeholder approach putting together government, private sector. In sometimes it's difficult to reach consensus between the board members about some things. My talk here is personal and does not reflect the CGI.br official position.

     After this disclaimer, I will talk shortly today about the great importance of Internet on this year's election in Brazil. It was not a surprise to see the increased role of social networks, messaging and online communications on Brazil presidential elections. After what happened in the last elections, the expectation, etc. We had a general election last October in Brazil where state government, state and federal were chosen. As you know, our new president was elected and starting in January of 2019. He was a candidate from a very small political party, PSL, which has in this only one federal deputy in Congress. But in the next election, 54 federal deputies, 76 state deputies and 4 senators last October. There was a candidate has just eight seconds or -- (inaudible) which represents less than 0.01% of the total time. People tuned into the depart and after has been -- on September 6 he did not participate in regular debate and just make a few TV interviews. In Brazil, you know you have use of Internet and (inaudible) based on that survey, about the use of the Internet in elections on October 3rd, 68% of the electorates had an account on at least one social network. Huge use of social networks in Brazil. Also on the election process.

     They elected the President of the republic for October 2018, the mark of 20 million followers on his profiles on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. The data comes from the bytes -- (inaudible). With 20 million followers, the list of politicians who had the largest numbers in the world. To America the Brazilian is most followed. He have is ahead of another candidate and the newly elected -- with 9.2 million. He has more followers than Macron who has seven million. .5 less than President Donald Trump who has 7 million followers, as you know.

His campaign on the Internet through Facebook and huge messaging from their friends through WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter and other portals. For the first time in Brazilian elections paid advertisements on Facebook are allowed. On TV are forbidden. How much ads are placed on platforms and surprisingly (inaudible) Internet ads at the moment. Based on some evidence of feeds on Facebook and WhatsApp the Supreme Court asked the platforms about Internet and expense but to allow there was no response from that inquiry. But there is a deadline for this text week. Fake news or misinformation was used in Brazilian elections. It is hard to calculate the volume of that or even interpret how this practice has been important for the election result anyway. In fact, WhatsApp which is used by candidate supporters declares the size of their message groups to 200 participants in Brazil. But it was the fact, for example, that PSL using WhatsApp group from the U.S. to overcome this limitation.

     They elected on the Democratic basis following the rules of the game and elected the Supreme Court, the judge said he has broken the law. Otherwise the campaign through the support of social media -- (inaudible) misinformation as a tool to capture more attention and engage supporters. In Brazil they used the same social media tricks. It's a fact. I believe -- could avoid such practice. It is hard to elect a Supreme Court judge after the election and try to find evidence on social media and (inaudible). Our election process I support the social media in a way that was tried in Brazil in this election putting together the elector party and officials, and find ways to trace illegal activities which can effect clean and Democratic elections. In fact, some of us CGI.br participated advisors to the special commission on elections to evaluate the use of Internet in elections and fight against misinformation, interact in order to have help from them. This was not so successful in Brazil because it was the first election that you had so much on the Internet. What I believe we should insist on this. We live in tough times. I called the Canadian thinker who more than 50 years ago said media is the message. He said that today social media is the message. Social media platforms are kind of interactive an environment which facilitates misinformation and manipulation. Because this media -- so deeply and so fast it makes old media, TV and radio, which are considered in the past as alienating platform as a kid toy compared to the power of the present Internet tools. There are no easy solutions for the use of Internet. I believe there is a challenge for us to continue to discuss this as an issue and address seriously regulation in order to preserve democracy and trust. Thank you.

     >> MODERATOR: Thank you. Some introduction about numbers and statistics and network in Brazil. Now we will hear Ms. Flavia --.

     >> FLAVIA: Good morning, everyone. I want to thank the IGF organization for opening to us this space to share our significant experience now in October. As en Rika reported talking about legal retribution with the creation degree and -- to match our Internet law, decided to follow the use of the Internet for political propaganda. Our objective was to contribute to the important rights for the preservation of the Internet as an open space were not affected by the actions of the parties and bodies. In this case, the superior electoral court. Brazil spent its last October through the electoral process for president, federal and state deputies and senators. The electoral process was being marked by usage of personal data for the massive sending of message. Many times in respect with the electoral legislation and with (inaudible), our Internet. Researchers institutes and universities showed that those messages had a very strong information disorder corrector, through WhatsApp, by specially the part of the social liberal political party candidate, which represents ultra, ultra right positioning, which has ended being elected along with 52 of his party. It is worth saying that in the last election, it counted only with 8 deputies. This scenario has revealed that had happened the message sending with not only lying contents but offensive to the moral in the left candidate by the workers party. The Brazilian electoral law underwent recent reformation in 2017 to regulate both political propaganda message with the Internet.

     According to the change, fake political propaganda on the Internet was -- but an exception was made. Contents on Internet sites. It can be identified in an unmistakable way. By the party or their representatives. Only viewing the promotion of candidates or their associations. The law criminalized the message sent or commentaries which have specific finality to offend the owner or denigrate the image of a candidate, party or association.

     Apart from the omission of the supreme electoral court regarding the facts, the announcement by the media, we must certainly think about the role of the platforms in electoral process and its responsibility to work as stage of public debates in view of commercial practices that are causing damage for the Democratic institutions of our country. The Brazilian case was not the first that revealed some serious problems related to the commercial operation of the platform, such as illegally obtaining personal database of million of users as happened with the Cambridge Analytica and Facebook as well as three other leaks in less than one year involving the same Facebook. Using analyzers of personal data for the modulating behaviors and voting and three, lack of commitment of the platforms to follow the massive flow of misinformation in their networks without any control. And no compliance with electoral law. Having identified the main problems that occurred in the elections, it is unquestionable that we must take care in way to not jeopardize or compromise relevant rights as the guarantee of freedom of expression and to avoid censorship. We don't want, for example, to compromise legal tools that prevent content providers from liability as expressed in the -- (inaudible). We don't want, for example, to compromise the legal tools that prevent the providers responsibility for the people's contents as it is expressed on the Brazilian Internet law.

     On the other hand, we also do not want to relativize the civility of the platforms for the maintenance of personal data and for the transfer to other institutions or for the illegal control of the flow of information, and net neutrality in this case, and for putting us in a vulnerable and insecure situation when they have those services. Because this would mean that rights concurred with a lot of effort would be compromised such as the consumers protection law, (inaudible) and the guarantees enacted with the electoral law. Thank you very much.

     >> MODERATOR: Thank you, Flavia. We will have now the third participant Luis Fernando, you have the floor.

     >> LUIS FERNANDO: Thank you. Well we listened about the process and the action of CGI during the electoral period. In the morning I had the opportunity to present the guideline that we have prepared for the election and for the themes. And maybe not all of you were present at that session. And I will make a brief explanation about it. In the beginning of the year, we from the CGI have been invited by the electoral Supreme Court to join a group advisory board on Internet and elections and to try to avoid fake news that is quite new problem, but all of them were aware of the problem looking at the experience in U.S., France, and they were afraid how to deal with this problem. And they believed that asking some specialists to join this group they could avoid or minimize the problem. And in this group, we had people not only from the CGI or from academia, but we had also people from the federal police, ministry of defense, army, and we from CGI realized that the court was dealing with the problem as if it was a national security issue.

     In accordance to our principles, we were very preoccupied that the election could be controlled in terms of free speech or that it could exist some kind of censorship. And we insisted not to try to monitor the network and not to try to monitor or to censor the debate on the Internet. And I can say that this point of view prevailed. And in a certain way, the court felt comfortable because they didn't have tools or people to manage this. I listened from the President of the supreme electoral court that we have only 200 technicians or assistants to monitor the whole country. It is very complicated. And they decided to work on a post factor execute. That means let things go and those who commit any fraud will be sanctioned. That was the idea. Then in our side we had made a very interesting and very comprehensive seminar in the month of April 2018 with most stakeholder participants from different areas, from -- as lawyers, journalists, social scientists, technicians, and from this very rich three-day debate, we got the material with which we prepared this guideline. And we started spreading this content for the people. And I proposed it and it was accepted to make kind of partnership with the electoral justice to communicate this work for judges and for assistants, judicial assistants who would work in the elections. To explain how the net works, social media works.

     We had a problem as Flavia brought to us that our legislation authorized the pushing of information in the network. That means people could buy support. I say this is a fake support that you can obtain by paying the platform. And I believe that it is now not very healthy for the election because you create a not real audience for any candidate. Well, after the election, or during the election, we had a very, very, very hard problem. I don't know if you are aware, but in Brazil we have more than 30 parties. And at least half of them had candidates. What happened? What happened was the big center or the parties that are situated in the middle of the spectrum of politics presented several candidates. And only two of them from the extreme right and from the extreme left came to the second term. And I could say that none of them represented the majority of the country. And both of them, maybe one can have been more able to use the network, and they started using all the measures, all the ways to bring their propaganda.

     There are several aspects that Flavia brought that are now under investigation by the court. As for instance, financing by companies. That is prohibited. The buying of databases that is also prohibited. Sending messages from abroad that is also prohibited. In the case that any of this practice is fully proved, the candidate may be sent away and not legalized, not authorized to take power. What is very, very rare, and I don't think it will happen, because anyway, as en Rika told, the right-oriented candidate, there is a very, very, rough man. Course. That had a course speech, he was elected by the majority of the country. Mostly because the other sides was a little -- how -- has not so much prestige in that moment. Because I should say that despite the fact the candidate is a very good man, he is a socialist, Marxist. He writes very good text but is 100% left oriented and I should say that the country didn't want this for the next years. And the other guy got the opportunity to be elected.

     At the end of the day, I think there is many things to be learned from this process. I insist, as I told in the morning, that we don't have to censor it. No censorship net is good. I think that our tribunal, the court was very passive. They leaned very much on Facebook, on WhatsApp and they expected the platforms to do what they were not doing. That means they expected the platforms to control any access. I remember during one session of this committee, of this committee, the prosecutor said no, no, the law allowed the use of bots, we won't take any measure for this. He even made joke about our position from CGI and other people that are more liberal saying in the beginning you said that we should not control content. And now you complain that -- you are saying that we should act in a police, as in a more restrictive way. We learned a lot about this. I'm not so sure about the best way to deal with this situation that I only call as fake news. But we must understand that most of the people like junk news. Mainly when they refer to the opposite. When they bring bad things about the other candidate. And to finalize I say like our senior member of CGI says, that most of this junk news, they circulate inside a bubble because you have two different very, very polarized bubbles in which you have full of lies and very, very course speeches and sometimes it can call attention.

     But my point of view this global problem, I have listened during the whole day or in the event, in the morning I listened to the representative of Nigeria. She said we have in our country 200 different ethnic groups. And any of them will say that the other are -- the other are saying fake news or bringing fake news. I think that's a problem for democracy. I think the best way to combat fake news is bringing information and open the space with accountability for those who work in the wrong way. Thank you for your attention.

     >> MODERATOR: Thank you, Luis Fernando. Probably I like only to include other information. I don't know if you know in Brazil the Internet is not regulated by the country. It is a value service. No ministry or parliament have any control over the Internet. The steering committee is the entity. The stakeholder governance model. We don't have the power to put laws in place, but we send recommendations to the government. We send recommendations to the court, to the prosecutors. We have a very strong relationship with all stakeholders. But because of this very often CGI the steering committee is requested to express opinions to send some support and to give some input for other activities. This is probably a good sign that we have more flexibility. It is not a strong control coming from one side because all of society, all segments, all sectors of the society are part of the process. Flavia mentioned the bill of rights in Brazil was the result of a long debate after CGI put in place our principles, our ten principles that we use, guides for the best use of the Internet in the country. These principles in the end was the seat for our bill of rights and we are happy that we have this way to manage the Internet in Brazil. Some things is easier if you have strong laws. But in this kind we prefer the debate. We prefer the discussion. We prefer the decision sometimes is not win, win, win for everybody or 100% for everyone. Every part needs to give up and the win/win was 90% or 80% is the best result for the transfer and Democratic way that we work in Brazil. I will give some time for the audience. We don't like to have a political discussion. So please avoid local Brazilian local problem. Our problems. We need to solve this in our country, but we like to share with you. You listened to three speakers. If you have specific questions and we have an answer, we will try to answer it. If not, we will say not this time. Wait our next election. We have some minutes so if someone likes to have a question, I see -- please.

     >> AUDIENCE:  Hello, I'm from Brazil and an Isaac fellow. What I would like to ask. In the elections a lot of fake news were spread in WhatsApp and we have a problem. Although we defend net neutrality we accept zero practices. People can't do the fact Cheng. I like to ask you guys what do you think about this and what could be a possible solution?

     >> MODERATOR: Who will answer?

     >> FLAVIA: Thank you for your question. I want to first clarify a point. Despite the ISP's don't be regulated by the -- the regulator, telecommunication agency, we have in Brazil the consumer law that is a law that OBLIGE many charge to the platforms. We have a law that protect our personal datas and we have the federal constitution. Then in the competition law also. This platform are indeed great manipulate that act like this, not only in Brazil but in our planet now. And then they are -- they have to observe the law in Brazil. And the responsibility is not to break net neutrality obligations or other guarantees, but to -- don't put the Brazilian electors in vulnerable situation because they are taking our data, personal data to modulate our vote. And the result of the researcher made by universities, other institutes of research, show -- revealed that our base was used for manipulate voting. And in Brazil, the situation is worse because we have 120 million connections, and 109 are in data-limited place with zero rating. And then these people can't use Internet to check fake news, to check information, and they are limited to the news that they receive. Then is situations and in the lower classes, our research, the research of access of CGI revealed that in the lower classes, 80% access the Internet only for the mobile devices. And in the C class only 50% access by -- only access the Internet by mobile devices. Then this situation is grave and we in the CGI, we will investigate this and our superior court also. Thank you.

     >> MODERATOR: We will also include some comments from Fernando.

     >> ENRIQUE: I make a few comments different from Flavia's position. There is no local sense if the -- is a net neutrality break. Imagine even if 0 rating is breaking net neutrality, imagine if we have a total just inclusion in Brazil. If everyone can have access to the whole Internet, not just to Facebook or other things. The results would be different. I'm not sure. We should fight for inclusion, of course, but I don't believe it's totally defined in consensus that this was really an issue.

     >> MODERATOR: Luis, please.

     >> LUIS FERNANDO: Just to complete the comment of Manuel, the law -- the electoral law that authorized the use of Facebook and pushing of content, they were very focused on this kind of platform and they imagined that these platforms would have the name of the one who hired and who paid for the service, where it comes from, and mainly the content, making or bringing some accountability to the process. But what we observed in the process that most of the content and the propaganda was done through WhatsApp and I think that all of you are aware they explained that they have a technical restriction to -- because of cryptography and then they cannot control content. And more than this, it is supposed to be a peer-to-peer communication. That should not be subject to this kind of control. But when people realize that the massive shootings were occurring, we tried to propose to the court to make some kind of control to monitor, ask to be monitored these unusual behaviors. And the court said no. Since the law allowed bots, we will not do this. It is because of this that I say that we learned a lot in this election, okay? Thank you.

     >> MODERATOR: Thank you, in the front, the lady, please.

     >> AUDIENCE: My name is -- I'm from Columbia and work with a foundation. I have to say in Columbia that we have several similar problems in our election that was this year also. We share a lot of the problems with the Brazilian ones. So most of the time I was listing all the problems and say that's the same, that is exactly the same problem, but actually we were focused on another kind of problems that are related with elections and Internet in my country in this moment. The use of software for the election, Brazil has electronic vote and for me it's very concerned there is not one discussion about that in this panel, for example. I know that the problems with the fake news and disinformation is something American but there is not the only problem with the elections. I don't know if some group has studied the problem with software and the use of the vote and the problems with the transmission of the information or access to the software to analysis, for example. And if these kind of issues are something that is in the public knowledge and is part of the consideration of the Internet and election in Brazil. Thank you.

     >> MODERATOR: Thank you for the comment.

     >> LUIS FERNANDO: Thanks for your question. It is very hard to explain. I remember once -- I studied in France and had a Columbian friend. Once I made a joke in Congress. In my country we are very proud that in three hours' time after the closing of the election we know who won it. And he said no, in my country it's much better. We know it a month before. Okay? He was joking, of course. But you raised a very important question. That is the safety, transparency, accountability of the electoral system, the machine, the voting machine, okay? And that's quite a dogma to the people from the court. I'm from the order -- lawyers bar association in Brazil. Whenever someone raise any doubt or make any question, it seems that you are committing a crime. You are killing the President or killing the Pope because you -- it's better to bless -- marry the virgin than to bring any doubt against the system. We have just approved in the few last years a law that said that 20% of the voting machines should have a printer to make a double-check, okay? And many people -- many parties wanted this to create a physical system to check the voting process. And the Supreme Court declared this law unconstitutional, okay? That's a critical situation. I think that all transparent process can be checked. There is no problem. But I'm not -- I lost. I'm one of the losers in this point of view.

     >> MODERATOR: Please.

     >> AUDIENCE:  Good afternoon, I'm Jerome, independent consultant in Brazil and I would like to do one question to the panelists about anonymity. Actually, hidden identities were an important part of the fake news debate in Brazil. If we look at Facebook, for instance, they banned lots of profiles because of hidden identities or fake identities. But in WhatsApp there is no identity. People are just sending forwarding messages and the original message cannot be identified for who is the responsible for that. And it creates -- for me in my vision it's part of the problem in creating a polluted system, information system by the infusion of anonymous messages. And so I would ask you two questions. One, can WhatsApp be considered a peer-to-peer messenger in this context of massive groups and massive forwarding profiles? This is one question. And second, how do you analyze the problem of anonymity in fake news or is that a problem at all?

     >> MODERATOR: Flavia, you would like to answer?

     >> FLAVIA: With my difficulty with the language but I will try. Thank you, Jerome. Despite our Constitution -- federal Constitution in Brazil, maybe not forbidden, the anonymity, in our civil law we have protection of -- animals. That is a right important to -- that is important tool to protect freedom of expression and other -- in our democracy, I think. In case of the message sent by the social party, liberal social party, they use public groups in WhatsApp. We don't want including because -- (inaudible) forbidden that the platforms monitoring the message. This is not permitted in Brazil. But the groups opening groups of family, of friends, of -- (inaudible) football clubs and the university research and the institutes that make investigation with the system of boosting message have opened the content of the message. And then in this case, I think the superior court had the choose to be more inclusive in the control of the ethic, balance, and respect of the law in the electoral process.

     >> AUDIENCE:  Who could be deemed liable in the case the message is just going forward and forward and forward, you know what I mean?

     >> FLAVIA: Yes, but the flex, the flow of the sending message was not normal, was absolutely abnormal, this situation. We have one person be the add min -- the manager of 100, 200 groups, and sending message, by minutes, by seconds, and the use was abnormal. And that for us, for that, that is defend that the platform has also responsibility because in Brazil, the service have to be secure. Don't -- is not permitted put the consumers in a vulnerable and insecure situation and this is the case in Brazil, it showed that this obligation was not completed.

     >> MODERATOR: The time is running but okay, one, two and then we will finish.

     >> AUDIENCE:  Thank you. I want to respond to the issue raised by the lady from Brazil and the gentleman there to say I'm from South Africa. I'm assuming that in the law there should be a provision that deals with improper or illegal content where in, in South Africa we have a procedure. If you feel that this type of content or information is incorrect, or is illegal, what do you do is you can say this type of content is illegal but then there is a standard that determine -- there is a form that you complete and the first to take down that information and if he or she doesn't take that information, then you can take him to court. And the situation would just allow the information and then -- we work with the procedure. To take down that information but you need to prove and you need -- after the Internet service provider must take down the information from the web. Thank you.

     >> MODERATOR: Thank you. Comment?

     >> LUIS FERNANDO: As Flavia presented, we have a law called the Internet framework that doesn't allow anyone but the judge to stop a message or to put down a website. That means that no platform, no intermediary, can do it. In our case, any decision to stop circulation or to eliminate content must come from the judge. But we had several cases where the platforms just sent away or disconnected some accounts because of the misuse of the terms of use. The disrespect of the terms of use. And in a certain way it brings some doubt either if the platform is playing their natural right to mediate the conversation in terms of their terms of use or if they are more orientated for left or right or sympathizers of one or the other group.

     >> MODERATOR: I will give you a chance. The lady first and then you last.

     >> AUDIENCE: I'm Simone from the Czech Republic. I wanted to ask Mr. Fernando, you talked a lot about funding in the campaigns and also about these bot accounts coming from inside. I wanted to ask about the funding and the bot accounts. You talked a lot about the internal, the campaigns inside using the bot accounts. What do you think was the role of the outside influence, the bot accounts that originated from other countries? Did that have a large role do you think? Do you think it was a bigger role than the bot accounts that were from the internal sources?

     >> LUIS FERNANDO: Well, as we said, the use of foreign accounts is completely prohibited. If it is proved that someone used this kind of service, all the consequences may be applied. Even losing the right to be in power. But the proof of doing -- of what has been done is very difficult but we have some cases that people bring that shows that several numbers from which the message in WhatsApp came from were from abroad. And now this situation is under investigation and theoretically it might bring some legal consequences. But it is absolutely prohibited. Okay?

     >> MODERATOR: Please, your name.

     >> AUDIENCE: Diego from Brazil studying in the Netherlands. I'm looking at everything that has happened in the election because it was a concern to me. I do believe since we are discussing about the Internet role in this issue we should realize what's the role of its sector in addressing that. It might be an idea for a young scholar but I do believe there are a lot of studies that say the problem is not only about the fact checking. That this has been doing by Civil Society quite good way so far. But we also have the problem of source checking. And for source checking this means finding who was the source of the information, the regional information. You sometimes need the help of the platforms because they control the channel and they -- with some metadata they have and they can be held liable if they don't provide this kind of -- that's not related with the removal of the content itself but data that's important so you can track the source. This is very important for the end decision that will come by the court. Because the court is the one that will build this trust, like Mr. Fernando said. In Brazil we have the final decision for removing of the content has to come from the court and this is explained in many Democratic societies because the courts are the ones that have the trust of the public to decide if this content has some harmful content or not. And so what I mean, I do believe that maybe this corporation needs to -- we need to have rules that strengthen the liability of companies, not for removing content, but for helping in this source checking approach. Because even WhatsApp, for example, it is true that the communication system is encrypted there, but no message that was shared in WhatsApp is started there. It is always started from some blog, some newspaper, probably a fake one with fake content. But if there is a way to trace back where the source is, it might be a beginning of a solution. I can't say this right now and just like guessing based on some studies. I'm not so sure but that's one suggestion.

     >> MODERATOR: Any comment from the speakers here, the panel?

     >> FLAVIA: I want to say that the fake news properly it's only the tip of the iceberg. The problem is the use, not ethic of our personal data, the treatment, the collect, the use, and the manipulate and direction as happened with Cambridge Analytica and Facebook and as happened in Brexit. In here, one of the institute -- research institutes results showed what way they use it to identify the neutral elector, the negative elector, the positive elector, and to decide what message sent for each one. And then this is the problem. The problem is bigger, the problem is not the fake news because the fake news, the use of economic power -- old problems. The new problem is how we will have any degree of governance to the use of algorithms, of use of our datas, and I think the best discussion is fundamental to find the right way to resolve our problems.

     >> MODERATOR: The time is over, okay? Thank you very much, audience, for your patience and for your participation. I think the plenary always has the right to be present with questions and comments. Thank you, the speakers on the panel, and now we have our lunch time and then we have a nice afternoon with other meetings and discussions. Thank you very much. Bye-bye.